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11. Introduction
1.1 Introductory Words & Motivation for the Topic
Measuring development is an issue of particular importance for several reasons:  What is 
measured sheds light on how development is defined. For instance, if a given country is 
evaluated mainly according to GDP per Capita, development there will be seen as mainly 
economic and priority will be given to pursue progress in economic terms. 
What is measured will thus have a higher chance of getting done: If educational and health 
levels of a population are measured and countries compared accordingly, this will draw 
attention to these sectors. 
What is measured will usually be subject to a certain degree of simplification and 
arbitrariness: Lines need to be drawn as to which dimensions an index includes and what data
will and will not flow into these dimensions. This decision will influence the definition of a 
given country as developed or underdeveloped, it might impact aid flows and debt relief, 
investment ratings and special trade agreements (see sections 3.2. and 4.2.2 for further 
elaboration on these points). 
Development indices hence are not a neutral tool, rather they shape our notion of what needs 
to be done to ensure what kind of development to do as well as how and where to do it. They 
are flashlights highlighting certain sectors while leaving others in the dark.
The data and numbers arising from them suggest objectivity but this is not necessarily given 
because at the beginning of forming an index stands a selection process. The many different 
indices that exist as well as the process of continuously refining data for those indices can 
give different results for one and the same country in the same year. 
The name given to these indices –Development Indices – suggests that they are able to grasp 
the development of an entire region or nation in all its complexity. However, I argue that the 
notion of development is too large and complex to be forced into a simple tool. It has 
philosophical, economic, cultural, political, social, ecological and possibly many more 
dimensions. And it may differ from region to region, from theoretical context to theoretical 
context. 
Yet, an index inherently needs to be limited and remain relatively simple in order to be able to 
serve as a tool for decision makers. It needs to be something that serves current institutions 
2such as schools, households and formal economic units as easy and consistent measuring and 
assessment tool. The seemingly simple numbers and rankings a development index produces
suggest that development is something homogenous of similar simplicity to be handled in a 
technocratic way – more economic growth, more investment in education and health, 
increased income. 
On the other hand, indices help to shed light on areas of particular problems or particular 
improvement. They may aid in breaking down the overwhelming aim of development that is 
so difficult to be grasped into partial goals in the short and in the long run. This may be 
helpful to development research and development politics but only if treated with the 
necessary caution. This caution often appears to be lacking in development practice. 
Indices appear to be the backbone of development cooperation. They serve as benchmark, 
justification and standardization. How development is seen is reflected and enforced in and by 
them. I aim to analyse this backbone critically.
Focusing on the potential and limits of developing indices, on their validity and necessity in 
this paper, I aim to argue that development is something that needs to be defined differentially 
over time and within different regions of the world and that with each notion and index the 
theoretical and historical context within which it emerged needs to be considered. This is 
highlighted by evaluating indices in the light of one particular approach to development, 
namely Post Development Theory.
The scientific contribution of the study at hand lies in it being, to the best knowledge of the 
author, the first to not only evaluate indices according to the quality of their data or the 
indicators they include, but to analyse the idea of attempting to measure development from a 
particular theoretical standpoint. It is also the first research to evaluate development indices in 
the light of a specific development theory framework, namely Post Development Theory, and 
thus the first one to argue that the value and quality of an index does not only depend upon the 
quality of its data or dimensions included, but can also depend upon the theoretical viewpoint 
one takes. Furthermore, it is the first attempt to compare three development indices from 
different ‘development eras’ with one another according to their aims and the notion of 
3development they stand for1. Finally, it is the first serious attempt to look at the potential of 
the Happy Planet Index (hereafter HPI) in terms of its notion of development and what it can 
mean for the development debate.
Before beginning I would like to call the attention of the reader to the terms with which I 
write. I decided consciously to use the terms ‘developing world’, and some other generalising 
and stereotyping idioms. All of these concepts may well be regarded as an unjustified 
homogenization, even discrimination. I will use them none the less when criticizing 
instruments which enforce these very terms in order to highlight the strength of them and the 
dynamic quality of the development discourse, as Escobar puts it (Escobar, 1995, p. 42), from 
which it appears it is difficult to escape even when criticizing its ways and tools.
1.2 Research Question & Research Methodology 
1.2.1 Research Questions
The overall aim of this thesis is to look into and critically assess the necessity and validity of 
development indices, their potential and their limits. 
Research questions centre on this aim and are as follows: 
a) To what extent are development indices and indicators tools of power casting some 
countries into a state of backwardness and taking away their power of defining how 
they may wish to develop?
b) Under which conditions can a development index be regarded as being valid and 
necessary?
1.2.2 Research Hypothesis
Indices are not neutral or objective tools. They emerge from a particular ‘era’ of development 
thought. They hence have ideologies and political dimensions attached to them which are
visible if one looks at them through the lens of one specific theory. They may contribute to 
creating development and underdevelopment. They are thus valid and necessary only to a 
limited extent, depending on the theoretical context, its own claims as well as policy aims,
and only when treated with the necessary caution. Development in all its complexity and 
1 Marks et al and Canoy make comparisons between GDP per capita, HDI and HPI in NEF‘s Happy Planet 
Reports (see Marks et al 2006, p. 22f & 27 and Canoy, 2007, p. 8), however not in the light of a particular 
theoretical framework and not analysing each in depth according to strength and weaknesses both in data and
dimensions included as well as development idea.
4uniqueness cannot be grasped with a tool that inherently needs to be simple in order to be 
usable. 
1.2.3 Research Methodology
This thesis is theoretically embedded into the critical discussion of the definition and notion 
of development by the Post Development Theory, in particular by the theorists Arturo 
Escobar and Wolfgang Sachs. 
I chose Arturo Escobar and Wolfgang Sachs due to their critical attitude towards the use and 
general acceptance of the term development. 
Arturo Escobar was chosen since it might be insightful to rely on a theorist that is not from a 
Western background in order to critically asses ‘development’, a Western concept as I will 
argue.
Wolfgang Sachs on the other hand has a strong ecological background and analyses the 
concept of ‘development’ partially on the grounds of the ecological predicaments often 
coming along with it. This may prove to be useful as it sheds light on power relations 
incorporated in development and its tools – the question of using resources sustainably is 
directly linked to the question of who is using how much, with richer countries commonly 
overexploiting resources. An in this regard it may be interesting to note that the most 
commonly referred to development indices do not incorporate any environmental criteria. 
How their theories may aid in assessing development indices’ validity and necessity is 
described in this section, further below (see p. 6). 
As the tool of analysis, a case study design is chosen: While a non-exhaustive overview of 
existing development indices will be given, an in-depth description and analysis of three 
development indices that each has distinct profiles as to what they aim to measure is carried 
out.
The three indices analysed in depth are selected according to the difference of their profile in 
order to account for the diversity of development aims and definitions reflected in indices.  
Furthermore, the selection may partially reflect the ‘evolution of development’ since its 
introduction in 1949. They may also represent an evolution towards increased empowerment, 
as will be shown later.
5The three indices selected are as follows: Firstly the measure used when the term ‘developed’
and ‘underdeveloped’ was first introduced and which despite many criticisms continues to 
count considerably towards the development/progress status of a given country: The measure 
of GDP per Capita. 
The second index that is to be analysed in depth was one of the first serious attempts to go 
beyond the notion of income/GDP per Capita augmentation as progress, or even to replace it
and to include development dimensions that may lead to more empowerment if they are 
enhanced: The Human Development Index.
The third and final case is an index that differs considerably in several respects from the two 
above mentioned one: It does not include income as a factor; instead it includes ecology as 
well as personal life satisfaction, the latter being a concept which gained recognition only in 
recent years. It furthermore differs from other indices in that it was developed not by a 
multilateral development institution as is the case with the HDI and to some extend also the 
GDP per Capital via the System of National Accounts (SNA), but by a non-governmental 
‘think-and do’ tank (nef, 2011), the New Economics Foundation (nef) in London. It is the so-
called Happy Planet Index (HPI, not to be confounded with the Human Poverty Index which 
has the same abbreviation). 
In order to determine the question of validity of the chosen indices, it is vital to define what 
“valid” means in this context. Validity may be regarded as follows: 
“(…) die Gültigkeit eines wissenschaftlichen Versuchs oder eines Messverfahrens, z. B. eines 
(psychologischen) Tests. Die Validität gibt den Grad der Genauigkeit an, mit dem ein Verfahren 
das misst, was es zu messen vorgibt (…).” (Brockhaus Enzyklopädie, 2005).
[(…) the validity of a scientific attempt or a measurement method, for instance a (psychological) 
test. Validity gives the degree of accuracy with which a given method measures what it pretends to 
measure]2
Hence, the three cases are evaluated according to what they claim to measure and with which 
accuracy they do so. The indices are not only evaluated according to conceptual criticism 
(data validity, dimensions included, for instance health, education and income to measure 
‘human development’), to see if they ‘live up’ to their own claims here, but also and 
especially according to the theoretical viewpoints regarding development and development 
cooperation expressed in the second chapter by the two development theorists Arturo Escobar 
and Wolfgang Sachs. This second step aims to highlight that their validity, if at all, can 
probably only be given if they are evaluated within their own appropriate theoretical 
2 The translation has been done by the author.
6framework or conceptual understanding of development. For instance, GDP per capita may 
obtain validity if development is seen as economic progress. The HDI may have validity 
within the framework of ‘development as freedom’ as explained by A. Sen and especially as 
going beyond mere economic development. The HPI may have validity in the light of 
development incorporating broader, new dimensions (see also section 2.2.) and among those 
questioning ‘Western’ development due to its ecological problems. 
Their validity may be questioned however if a framework is applied that looks upon a 
generalising notion of development more critically, and aims more for diversity and/or 
participatory development forms. Furthermore, a theory which is as critical towards 
development as Post Development Theory may be particularly sensitive to all the possible 
shortcomings of such ‘tools’ of development, both in terms of their general conception as well 
as in terms of the dimensions (indicators) they incorporate. 
The indices’ necessity is assessed according to whether or to which degree they are necessary 
to attain development/progress and to define what development may mean, possibly 
highlighting that their ‘necessity’ depends upon whose/which interests they are necessary for
and what type of development a nation aims at. 
Giving an overview over how indices came into being, i.e. when, where and by whom they 
were developed and what their outcomes and their receptions were may help indicate what 
and for whom they are necessary.
Assessing them in the light of Post Development Theory may help to highlight that the 
necessity of these indices depends on who claims they are necessary for what. For instance, 
GDP per capita may be necessary to strengthen the notion of development as economic 
development to ensure hegemony of certain countries; indices may be necessary in terms of 
their ranking, possibly making them important tools to ensure a certain order of ‘social 
evolution’ in the world. 
This step may hence question the indices’ neutrality in terms of being numbers, free of any 
particular interest. 
Layout of Paper
The second chapter deals with the notion of development critically. It gives a brief overview 
of the state of ‘development’ in the world, the history of development thought and shows why 
it may be difficult to pin down a concrete definition, what dangers come along with speaking 
7in the name of development (and underdevelopment) and what reasons there might be for 
letting go of the concept altogether. It then introduces Post Development Theory and the 
theoretical approaches by Escobar and Sachs in particular.
The third chapter looks at the general requirements of an index, such as simplicity and 
understandability as well as policy implications a development index may have.
The fourth and main chapter analyses the mentioned three indices in depth according to data, 
dimensions and in the Light of Post Development Theory. 
The fifth chapter presents the conclusion and outlook of this dissertation.
2. Theoretical Framework: A Critical Analysis of the 
Concept ‘Development’ with particular Emphasis on 
Post Development Theory
Before taking a closer look at the measuring tools, this chapter takes a closer look at what is to 
be measured, namely at development.  
In the first step, the state of development is considered. An overview of the most common 
development dimensions like child mortality and life expectancy is provided, to give a non-
comprehensive overview of common components comprising the concept of development. 
The second step consists in a brief history of development thought giving an overview over 
the diverse definitions of and paths towards development. Overviewing over development 
thought aims at, on the one hand, showing the many-sidedness of development. On the other 
hand, it also provides an insight into the difficulty of finding an objective, universally 
accepted definition of the term ‘development’, since its notion, and the index used to measure 
it, depends upon the theoretical and historical context. 
2.1 The State of Development in the World in Numbers
By giving an overview over different dimensions commonly considered part of development 
in this section, I aim to show that the state of development in the world, for different regions 
and different aspects can be read and presented in different lights: The most positive, as well 
as the most negative tendencies can be chosen, particularly when talking about development 
in more generic terms, not specifying a particular country or time period. It is therefore 
important to handle numbers carefully, especially since they may often indicate objectivity. 
8According to Roth, 2010, the result of development cooperation is at best mixed so far. 
In terms of poverty, as of 2006, 85% in South East Asia and 75% in Sub-Saharan Africa are 
poor (have less than two dollars per day) (Nuscheler, 2006, p. 146). It is highly improbable, 
that Sub-Saharan Africa will reach the first Millennium Development Goal (hereafter MDG,
see p. 13 for more elaboration on the concept) of halving poverty by 2015 (Roth, 2010, p. 
161). 
On the other hand improvement in development can be seen in several regions in the world, 
especially in China and East Asia. Depending on the statistics which are applied, poverty has 
been reduced there considerably since 1990. The MDG which consists in halving extreme 
poverty by 2015 may thus still be reachable (Roth, 2010, p. 160). 
In terms of Food Security, as of 2006, over 800 million people are chronically malnourished, 
1 billion are nourished poorly. Every day, 24,000 people, three quarters of which are children, 
die due to the consequences of chronic malnourishment (Nuscheler, 2006, p. 152). Due to a 
considerable price increase in staple foods through 2008, the number of people suffering from
lack of food has increased by 75 million to a total number of 923 million in 2007 (Roth, 2010, 
p. 163).
Life expectancy at Birth remained static or has fallen in 32 countries, mostly in Africa and 
Eastern Europe. Collapse can be observed in countries like Zimbabwe, Lesotho and 
Swaziland mainly due to epidemics such as HIV/AIDS. Within a few years, life expectancy 
has fallen here by more than 10 years. In 9 countries (in Sub Sahara Africa and the former 
Soviet Union), as of 2010 life expectancy fell below the levels of 1970 due to HIV/AIDS and 
increased adult mortality (UNDP, 2010c, p.3). The distance between average life expectancy 
in low income and in OECD countries could therefore thus not be reduced between 1990 and 
2005. 
But also within nations and regions the state of health increasingly diverges (Heßelmann, 
2010, p. 224f). 
However, life expectancy has increased globally by 14 years on average, from 53 years in 
1960 to 67 years in 2006 (Heßelmann, 2010, p. 224) and UNDP points out that improvements 
9in both longevity and education have been considerable: The average HDI in 2010 has 
increased by 18% compared to the HDI 1990 (UNDP, 2010c, p.3). 
In terms of health, 80% of the world’s illnesses can be traced back to drinking dirty water and 
to a lack of hygiene. In 2003, over one billion people still had no access to clean drinking 
water, 2 billion lacked sanitary facilities.
The most common transmittable disease is Malaria. Every year, 300 million people get 
infected. In the countries that are most heavily affected, it dampens economic growth by up to 
1% (Nuscheler, 2006, p. 153f).
Every year, 1.8 million people die of indoor air pollution due to using biomasses as their main 
source of energy. 
Furthermore, every year, 3 million children die of illnesses like measles, pertussis, 
pneumonia, diarrhoea and dehydration (Nuscheler, 2006, p. 153f). 
Slightly more people died of tuberculosis in developing countries in 2006 (151 per 100000 
inhabitants) than in 2000 (150 per 100000 inhabitants). In Sub-Saharan Africa it has increased 
considerably (291 per 100000 in 2006 and 253 per 100000 in 2000). In many regions, 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia it may already be assumed that the 
health related MDGs will most likely not be reached (Heßelmann, 2010, p. 227), Southern 
Africa and some countries in the former Soviet Union have experienced the deteriorating 
health of their populations (UNDP, 2010c, p.1).
Yet, the number of deaths due to measles has been decreased. Also, since 1990, the number of 
people with access to clean drinking water has increased by 1,6 billion (Roth, 2010, p. 160). 
Overall, in terms of health and education, poor nations are coming closer to catching up with 
wealthier nations (UNDP, 2010c, p.3).
The trends in Maternal Death Rates are still critical: Every year, more than 500,000 mothers 
die of complications during birth in developing countries. While in developed nations, 9 
mothers in 100,000 live births die, in developing nations 450 in 100,000 and in Sub-Saharan
Africa 900 in 100,000 die (Roth, 2010, p. 161f). 
Child mortality in developing regions remains high with 80 deaths in 1000 births compared to 
6 deaths in 1000 births in developed regions. It is highest in Sub-Saharan Africa, with 157 
deaths in 1000 live births (Heßelmann, 2010, p. 226; Roth, 2010, p. 160f). 
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However, child mortality has been reduced by half since 1960 (Nuscheler, 2006, p. 155).
In terms of education, the absolute number of people who are illiterate has risen to 855 
million of which two thirds are women. Often, however, literacy only means ‘half’ literate. 
One third of children abort their education before intended completion due to child labour
(Nuscheler, 2006, p. 156f).
Still, on average, countries have reduced their illiteracy rate from 44% to 21% from 1956 to 
1998 (Nuscheler 2006: 156). Primary school enrolment has increased considerably (Roth, 
2010, p. 160): From 25% to 57% in Sub-Saharan Africa, from 45% to 80% in South Asia, 
from 55% to 96% in East Asia and from 60% to 91% in Latin America (Nuscheler, 2006, p. 
157).
There are mixed developments in terms of Rural- and Urban Development as well as 
Inequality. Since 2007, more people live in cities than in the country side. Two thirds of all 
mega cities are found in developing countries, most of them in East and South Asia. In the 
majority of cities in developing countries, more than 60% of the people live below the poverty 
line. More than 50% of the city buildings have come into existence informally (Frauke Kraas, 
2010, p. 181 & 184 & 193).
An urban - rural gradient can be identified: In rural areas, provision with educational and 
health goods is worse than in urban areas and there is a bias of development cooperation
being more abundant in cities. However, problems in cities prevail as well. In 1996 half of all 
city dwellers in developing countries lived in slums or spontaneous settlements (Nuscheler, 
2006, p. 157). Overall, inequality has widened over the last years both within as well as across 
nations (UNDP 2010c, p.6).
However, according to Kraas and Nitschke (2006, p. 22), an increase in dwelling in cities 
offers various benefits like a lower land consumption per capita, increased intercultural 
diversity, interaction and exchange, and a rising participation in political decision making 
processes. 
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2.2 Different Notions of Development: A Brief History of Thought
This section attempts to go deeper than merely presenting numbers, by putting ‘development’ 
and the different dimensions it encompassed over time in a brief historical context, giving an 
overview over the development of development theory.  This also serves to put the chosen 
theoretical approach for this thesis, Post Development Theory, into context and highlight what 
sets it apart from other development theories. While it is attempted to provide a linear 
historical overview, this is not always possible, since the history of development thought was 
not at all times linear, with different concepts and theories overlapping, as will be seen.
Development as a broader scheme applied to large regions in the world became important as 
an enterprise and academic discipline in the Post WW II period (Rapley, 2007, p. 1). Major 
development institutions came into being: What is known today as the World Bank was 
created as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to manage the process 
of rebuilding Europe after the War (Rapley, 2007, p. 1). Together with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), those organizations were known as the ‘Bretton Woods System’
(Leys, 1996, p. 6). Development consisted in industrialization and income gain, or, in short,
economic development, to elevate the poor form their misery: Such a notion was dominant
mainly due to (formerly) rich countries’ experience of development as industrialization
(Nederveen Pieterse, 2001; Rapley, 2007, p. 1).
Industrialization was furthermore deemed important by the former colonies that came to 
independence and often poverty. Many were looking for ways to catch up (Leys, 1996, p. 7), 
while many industrialized nations looked for ways to transform the new independent counties 
into becoming more productive and being open for potential investment. Furthermore, they 
needed to be developed in order to not fall prey to communism, being thus a part of the Cold 
War (Rapley, 2007, p. 2; Leys, 1996, p. 5). Academic ideas centred on the idea of raising 
incomes and modernizing society. 
In the 1950s, with the idea of development as economic progress, emerged the so-called 
Modernization theory and the Stages of Growth Theory by W.W. Rostow, where development 
culminated in the era of mass consumption (Nederveen, 2001, p. 6). His main work on this 
topic was sub-titled as ‘An Anti-Communist Manifesto’ (Leys, 1996, p. 6).
Development ideas came more from the left than from the right, but both sides focused on the 
state government as the main development agent, while being suspicious of pure market 
forces as privileging only a few elites. However, industrialization needed more resources than 
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foreseen and growth rates slowed down. The end of the post WWII boom in the 1970s hence 
revealed apparent inefficiencies in many third world states, which called for alternative 
developments (Rapley, 2007, p. 2f; Nederveen, 2001, p. 6).
This may have opened the door for views of poverty as the non-fulfilment of basic needs 
which resulted in the basic needs approach, introduced by the ILO in 1976. Basic needs were 
regarded as having sufficient food, clean water, clothing, shelter and other conditions 
important for a life in dignity which may be specific to different cultures. The approach was 
increasingly discredited in the 1980s, with rising neoclassicism and structural adjustment 
policies (Hoadley, 1981, p. 149 & 158). Its greatest sceptics came from the Third World itself. 
There was a concern that the engagement of the poor would distract from the development 
priorities like building infrastructure and industrialization. Besides, the claim for more 
participation questioned the position of power of their governments (Nuscheler, 2006, p. 233). 
Despite the apparent failure of the state-led development modes, in the 1960s, new left wing 
models appeared, claiming the market to be the major problem and calling for an even 
stronger role of the state. Their theories where commonly known as dependency theory, 
blaming the dependence of the Third World economies upon the First World and looking for a 
solution by capital accumulation through protecting their economies through state led 
measures (Nederveen, 2001, p. 6; Rapley p. 3). 
After the dependency approach had not brought the boom and solutions hoped for, mainly due 
to lack of social reforms within nations and failure to open markets gradually, state led 
development models increasingly lost credibility, while neoclassical economic models that 
called for more market and less state rose in the 1980s, questioning that developing nations 
were a special case and claiming their development model as a remedy for all (Nederveen, 
2001, p. 6; Rapley, 2007, p. 3). New development experts as well as donor agencies pressured 
Third World governments to push back the state and with it unions and other organizations 
hindering progress and adjusting their policies accordingly to achieve higher economic 
growth rates. This resulted in so called ‘structural adjustment’ which most Third World 
countries were pressured to take on despite their weak state due to their debt crisis in the 
1980s. In many countries this worsened the condition particularly of poor and vulnerable 
groups, weakening the credibility of these right wings theories (Rapley, 2007, p. 3). 
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This development may have influenced the emergence of a conception of development as 
social justice, a notion that the Nord-Süd-Bericht [North-South-Report] in 1980 highlighted: 
“[Entwicklung ist]  nicht nur die Idee des materiellen Wohlstandes, sondern auch die von mehr 
menschlicher Würde, der Sicherheit, Gerechtigkeit und Gleichheit.” (Brandt Commission, cited according 
to Andersen, n.d).
[[Development is] not only the idea of material wealth, but also the idea of more human dignity, security, 
justice and equality].3
Development is seen here as the augmentation and fairer allocation of the societal surplus, 
also due to political and economic reasons, for extreme differences in income lead to luxury 
consumption, non-productive accumulation of wealth and capital flight   Justice demands for 
changing structures in contrast to charitable emergency assistance in order to alleviate the 
consequences of unjust structures.  In order to achieve this, a profound change in ownership-
and power structures is of fundamental importance, since inequality where access to rights 
and resources is concerned is part of the root of poverty (Nuscheler, 2006, p. 238).. 
The removal of national and international barriers to capital movement weakened the role of 
the state as development agent in the long run (Leys, 1996, p. 7). A new academic debate 
catering more around leftist theories emerged in the 1990s, consequently no longer focusing 
on state led development, but on criticizing globalization and development itself (Nederveen, 
2001, p. 6f). This new approach was known as Post Development Theory (for further 
elaboration on this theoretical approach see chapter 3). From initial hostility, they gained 
increasing recognition and influence, also since some of its ideas such as more 
decentralization and participation fit in with other theoretical approaches (Rapley, 2007, p. 4). 
While the Asian boom led to a short renaissance of state-led development theories, it came to 
an end with the Asian financial crisis in 1997/1998, which gave the IMF the power to enforce 
further neoliberal measures upon these economies. Management of the Asian Financial crisis 
was, however increasingly criticized, even from within the field of economics, for instance by 
World Bank’s chief economist Josef Stiglitz, shaking the confidence of institutions that had 
formerly firmly believed in neoclassical development measures (Rapley, 2007, p. 5ff). 
The Asian case also revealed that there was not one single development model fitting all, and 
today theories are less concerned with more or less, but instead with ‘better’, with good 
governance and localized approaches. This was in line with Post Development Theory, calling 
3 The translation was done by the author of this paper.
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for people as the agents of development, while the theory’s rejection of development was less 
popular (Rapley, 2007, p. 5). 
Indices reflecting such calls for good governance emerged as well, such as the Corruption 
Perception Index, developed by Transparency International in 1995 (Transparency 
International, 2009, p. 1).
With the recognition of the failure of one-fits-all development models, radical development 
approaches, where peoples’ rights and freedom could at time be sacrificed for economic 
development came to an end (Rapley, 2007, p. 7). 
Individual well-being and capabilities became increasingly important on the development
agenda with Amartya Sen’s concept and book Development as Freedom, where people 
instead of economic development were to be the centre (UNDP, 2010c, p. 2): He saw 
development as enlarging freedoms according to individual preferences as well as 
participation in political and societal decisions. In short, he states “development can be seen 
[…] as a process of expanding real freedoms that people enjoy” (Sen, 2001, p. 3). He 
differentiates clearly between means and ends of development, stating that such a view 
“directs attention to the ends that make development important […]” (Sen, 2001, p. 3). For 
instance, he identifies growth in GNP as a possibly important means, but not an end in itself.
Sen identifies freedoms that are conducive to development like liberty and political 
participation and establishes them as being constituent to development and thus and end in 
themselves (Sen, 2001, p. 5). Taking these ideas into account, he developed the so called 
‘capability approach’ towards development (Sen, 1999). Such capabilities are linked to 
freedom, they are the “substantive freedoms he or she enjoys to lead the kind of life he or she 
has reason to value” (Sen, 2001, p. 87).  
Sen’s ideas influenced the UNDP in developing the so-called Human Development Index
(hereafter HDI), measuring education, life expectancy and income (Nederveen, 2001, p. 6).
Due to the many failed ideological approaches, Rapley states that development theory today is 
increasingly flexible and adaptive, using pragmatic approaches and tools (Rapley, 2007, p. 5). 
One such tool may be the so-called Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): The UN 
Millennium Declaration committed heads of states in 2000 to do to all they can to reach 18 
targets in 8 different dimensions of development:  “Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger” 
(reducing the number of people living of less than $1 Dollar a day, halving the number of 
those suffering from hunger), “Achieve universal primary education”, “promote gender 
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equality” (raise the female ratio of school enrolments at all levels and other gender gaps), 
“reduce child mortality” (5.5% of annual decline,  a two thirds decline overall), “improve 
maternal health” (reduce mortality by 75%), “combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases” 
(halt or reverse trends), “ensure environmental sustainability” (integrate sustainability 
principles into politics, ensure access to clean water for all, improve livelihoods of slum 
dwellers) and finally “develop a global partnership for everyone” (for instance address special 
needs of LDCs, raise ODA to 0.7% of GDP). Goals are to be reached by 2015, compared to 
1990 levels (UNDP, 2003b, p. 1ff).
Another consequence of this flexibility and adaptability may also be the attempt of 
development theory and cooperation to take up any new trend and/or newly discovered 
marginalized groups into its agenda. Thus, UNDO released not only general human 
development indices such as the HDI or the Human Poverty Index (focussing particularly on 
circumstance of the very poor, such as the probability of not surviving to age 40), but also 
specific ones, such as the Gender related Development Index, (GDI), which is similar to the 
HDI, but focuses specifically of women’s development (UNDP, 2008, p. 355). Furthermore, 
in its broader HDR’s, UNDP addresses issues such as inequality and good governance 
(UNDP, 2010c, p. 5f).
Today, power balance between both worlds increasingly shifts, particularly through the 
increasing economic importance of China and India, while the power of the World Bank and 
IMF diminishes, with China becoming increasingly active in the field of development 
cooperation. The Western model of development is progressively questioned with many of its 
development approaches to the Third World being regarded as failed (Rapley, 2007, p. 8f). 
Furthermore, environmental degradation emerged as a new challenge as well as consequence 
of economic development. This made environmental problems become central to the 
development debate (Rapley, 2007, p. 9). Ecological problems may also question traditional 
notions of modernity and economic development (Nederveen, 2001, p. 1).
An early pioneer of this tendency was the Club of Rome with its Report Limits to Growth,
issued for the first time in 1972. It showed how problematic it was to generalize the Western 
style of life.  This report called for a return to an ethics of sufficiency regarding development, 
for a ‘sufficiency revolution’. They insisted that quality of life is not a dependent variable of 
consumption. The report calls for the end of growth as the limits of it have been reached
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(Meadows & Club of Rome., 1972). The Club of Rome issued a 30 year update in 2005 in 
which they show that their pessimistic projections in terms of resource use have come true for 
the most part (Meadows, Randers, & Meadows, 2004, see for instance p. 105 & 135). 
New indices looking at environmental pollution and degradation caused by economic growth 
emerge, and the Happy Planet Index, combining ecological and well-being criteria, released in 
2006, may be regarded as an index of this time. Other indices dealing with development and 
the environment are for instance the Water Poverty Index (WPI) (Oxford Centre for Water 
Research, n.d.-b, p. p. 1) or the Climate Vulnerability Index (CVI) (Oxford Centre for Water 
Research, n.d.-a, p. 1).
The meaning and aims of development and development cooperation thus changed with 
changing historical circumstances, mirroring changing economic, social and environmental 
circumstances and often reinforcing them (Nederveen, 2001, p. 7).
On a final note for this chapter, it may be interesting to look at a philosophical definition of 
development: according to Brockhaus Enzyklopädie development in philosophy can be 
defined as
“Auswicklung, Entfaltung und Ausgestaltung des im Grunde einer Einheit Eingefalteten, z. B. als 
Entfaltung eines Gedankens, einer Vorstellung, einer Definition oder auch des Lebendigen, z. B. einer 
Pflanze aus dem Samen.” (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2010).
[Unwrapping, unfolding and embodiment of something wrapped within the bottom of a unit, for instance 
the unfolding of a thought, an association, a definition or life itself, for instance the unfolding of a plant 
from a seed]. 4
It is interesting to see how development in the philosophical sense is here defined as 
something already waiting inside the unit to be developed and not something to be brought 
upon from the outside, as may often be the case with development treated for instance in 
development cooperation (as mentioned for instance by Sachs, see section 2.3.4). 
The development indices mentioned within this overview provide an (non-comprehensive, for 
there are many more) insight into the large number and diversity of development indices. It 
4 The translation was done by the author of this paper. 
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appears as though every time another aspect is added to development (basic needs, human 
development instead of pure economic development, good governance), a new index follows. 
They are supposed to serve as a help for decision makers, providing seemingly clear, 
objective and simple numbers representing how development is progressing. 
The question put forth by Post Development Theory is whether it is really the wrong theory 
[or, possibly connected to that, an insufficient index] which is the problem, or whether it is 
instead development itself – and the attempt to quantify, simplify, standardize and measure it. 
The next chapter (sections 2.3, 2.3.3 and 2.3.4) delves deeper into this question.
2.3 Critical Voices of ‘Development’: Post Development Theory
The previous section gave a brief overview over the history of development thought and the 
different meanings the term had with the emergence of different theories. This chapter takes a 
closer look at one of them, namely Post Development Theory, which appeared in the 1990s as 
a response to failed ‘grand’ development strategies (see section 2.2).
This section thus looks at development more critically: When was it introduced with the 
meaning it has today, to ‘develop’ ‘developing’ nations? Does it have a historical dimension? 
What power relations go along with it and why? What problems arise with using this concept? 
Why is seemingly the entire world, a myriad of diverse nations, drawn in by this concept?
It is important to understand that this chapter is a summary of ideas. The author does not 
make her own statements or draw her own conclusions here, but merely presents thoughts 
from the main theoretical approach of this paper. For application of this theory regarding 
development indices, see chapter 4. 
2.3.1 An Introduction to ‘Development’ in Post-Development Theory
After having given more ‘general’ reasons for handling the term development critically with 
the help of Nuscheler, this and the following sections deal more specifically with the 
reasoning of Post Development Theory, which is later used to assess validity and necessity of 
development indices (see sections 4.1.3, 4.2.3 and 4.3.3)
As mentioned in section 2.2, Post Development Theory is highly critical of the term 
‘development’. It is not seen as neutral but as a particular ideology forming the Third World 
through the so called development discourse. This discourse is of Western origin and is a 
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powerful tool for creating spaces and knowledge of the Third World, of in fact creating the 
Third World and is continuously replicated. People, governments and countries are defined as 
underdeveloped and treated accordingly (Fischer, 2008, p. 265).
Post development theories question the very idea of development (Escobar, 2008, p. 170f).
Central to Post Development Theory is the understanding and analysis of development as a 
discourse shaped from the outside by experts and interests foreign to the Third World. The 
aim of the critical analysis of development discourse is to investigate the basic principles how
the Third World comes into being through representation and power. Economists, planers, 
demographers and many more shape the reality of the Third World and make it difficult for its
people to formulate their own interests in their own language. Origin of this development was 
the invention of the abnormal, like the poor, the illiterate, etc… which need to be normalized. 
Such an invention was necessary in order to make it possible to establish the necessity of
reforms and treatment (meaning development) of the Third World (Fischer, 2008, p. 268).
Through the development discourse, new symbols and vocabularies are formed, power 
relations replicated, practices of knowing and doing are changed and the plurality of 
discourses in different communities is suppressed (Escobar, 2008, p. 172f).
The approach of Post Development Theory differs fundamentally from all forms of alternative 
development theories as these usually deal with suggestions to improve development 
(planning and projects), but do not question the discourse, the idea of development itself. In 
contrast, Post Development Theory attempts to show how difficult this reality shaping, all-
encompassing discourse makes it to imagine something different, something new, beyond the 
idea of development. A central point of Post Development Theory is that development is 
currently, but should no longer be, the central organizing principle of social life in the world 
(Escobar, 2008, p. 172f). Thus, post development approaches to ‘development’ are not about 
looking for alternative development methods, but for alternatives to development. 
Representatives of this approach share a critical attitude towards established knowledge, an 
interest in local autonomy and culture and the advocacy of local grass root movements 
(Fischer, 2008, p. 170f).
In sum, Post Development Theory aims at a transformation of the political, economic and 
institutional regime of truth production which forms the development arena. Such a 
transformation calls for an institutional change, a change in societal relations and a movement 
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for new forms of participation, more autonomy for local communities of production of norms 
and discourse (Fischer, 2008, p. 173). 
Being perceived as radical when emerging, Post Development Theory is subject to a number 
of criticisms. Thus, it is accused of being destructive and offering no constructive solutions to 
the problems it highlights (Matthews, 2004, p. 373f). Storper states that Post Development 
theorists advocate interests of particular groups and vouch for decentralization without 
offering solutions as to how these groups can manage to live together. Futhermore, the 
increased autonomy and decentralization Post Development Theory calls for may serve as an 
excuse for a retreat of the state from necessary duties such as the provision of public goods 
(Storper, 2001, p. 36f). Critics also claim that the alternatives to development mentioned as 
vital by the theory are not clearly explained. Furthermore, stopping ‘development’ or 
development aid altogether would worsen the situation in most developing countries 
(Matthews, 2004, p. 373f). The theory is furthermore criticised for not acknowledging any 
possibly positive changes that development may have brought, such as improvements in 
literacy or mortality rates (Matthews, 2004, p. 378). 
Also, Western modernism/modernity may not be a singular historical experience in its 
tendency of colonization (Storper, 2001, p. 20). Storper claims that other civilizations before 
it, such as the Romans had similar tendencies of conquest and subordination: 
“Unfortunately, virtually every society, whatever its principles of social organization, has found a 
way to invent most of these horrors, and has usually used some form of instrumental rationality to 
carry them out.” (Storper, 2001, p. 21). 
There may be a difference in scale, however, with modernity today reaching most parts of the 
globe (Storper, 2001, p. 21).  
Another point of criticism regards that simply because the grand development strategies in the 
name of ideologies have failed, this must not necessarily mean that development in total has 
failed or should be abandoned and that improvements are possible (Simon, 2007, p. 207). 
Furthermore, there may be regions where people do demand ‘development’ in the standard 
sense, namely infrastructure, schools, dams etc. If development is rejected, their desires and 
demands might then be rejected as well (De Vries, 2007, p. 25). Also, criticism arose as to 
Post Development Theory arguing mainly on the macro level, and overlooking dynamics on 
the micro level such as individual action as well as complex interaction of macro- and micro 
level in a society (Storper, 2001, p. 38 & 42f).
20
While some of these points of criticism may be valid, Post Development Theory may still be 
regarded as important in its criticism of the universalism of Western development claims, its 
frequent failure to acknowledge a diversity of aspirations (Matthews, 2004, p. 379), its 
creation of new desires (De Vries, 2007, p. 25) and its tendency to subject parts of the world 
to a generalizing state of being ‘in development’ or even ‘underdeveloped’.
These points are dealt with in depth by the two theorists chosen for this paper. 
The theories by Arturo Escobar, a Colombian anthropologist and development theorist, deal 
distinctly with the colonial nature of development, the power asymmetries that go along with 
it, the reasons for its emergence and persistence as well as with the concepts and tools that are 
used in and for its name. His particular approach is explained more in depth in the following 
section 2.3.3.
Wolfgang Sachs, a German ecologist and development theorist, shares a similar attitude 
towards development with Arturo Escobar. However, he particularly brings in the ecological 
predicaments that come along with ‘development’. His theories deal with the ecological 
disaster which according to him was brought about by development (a notion first highlighted 
by the Club of Rome and increasingly recognised in development thought today, though 
possibly less so put in practice, see section 2.2) as well as its historical process. He also 
highlights the normalizing nature of development and the dangers which arise from such a 
homogenization to the world at large. Similar to Arturo Escobar, he aims at finding reasons 
for development’s allure. He discusses what strengthens and what might weaken 
‘development’ and why the latter might be important. His approach is explained more in 
depth in section 2.3.4.
2.3.2 Arturo Escobar’s Thoughts on ‘Development’
This section introduces and explains thought Arturo Escobar’s regarding development.
Arturo Escobar is an Anthropologist of Colombian origin. Escobar deals not so much with the 
material side of development as many theoreticians before him have done (for instance in 
dependency theory or modernist theory), but with the development discourse itself. He 
analyzes how the hegemony of development as a central tool of force directed towards the 
Third World came into being, using Michel Foucault’s theories of power. For him, the 
consequence of this analysis is his rejection of any form of ‘development’ (Fischer, 2008, p. 
163). Important parts of his analysis are the historicizing of development (highlighting the 
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historical circumstances that formed it – as opposed to seeing it as neutrally given), where he 
looks at development as part of the history of Western modernity, the power relations that
nourish ‘development’ and the colonial nature of the ‘development’ concept.
The History and Invention of Development
Escobar proposes to speak of development as a historically singular experience, a creation of 
a domain of thought and action, giving it a distinct historical perspective, which may be 
justified given the overview of development thought as bound to historical contexts shown in 
section 2.2. Development is thus not a neutral concept, but a historically produced discourse. 
In order to understand development as discourse, the question of how the process of ‘to 
develop’ became such a fundamental problem for many countries and how they strove to ‘un-
underdevelop’, subjecting themselves to systematic interventions, needs to be analyzed
(Escobar, 1995, p. 6; Fischer, 2008, p. 266).
According to Escobar, history about development is relatively young. Notions of 
underdevelopment and the Third World were discursive products of the post-World War II 
climate, they didn’t exist before 1945. ‘Development’ began in the early post World-War II 
period with the establishment of apparatuses of knowledge production and intervention (for 
instance the World Bank and United Nations). The concept is tied to Western Economy with 
its systems of production and power (Fischer, 2008, p. 264ff). Thus it was in the early post 
war era that mass poverty in Asia, Africa, and Latin America was ‘discovered’. The discourse 
of war was displaced onto the social domain as well as on a new geographical terrain: The 
Third World. The “War on Poverty” began to occupy a prominent place (Escobar, 1995, p. 
21). 
After 1945, a transformation in world affairs occurred: along with the end of the war, the 
colonial system of exploitation and control was over. A reorganization of world power was 
taking place with a consolidation of US hegemony. This went along with a need for the USA
to deepen the market for US products, to find new investment sites for US surplus capital and 
gain access to raw material (Escobar, 1995, p. 32).
One of the most important factors forming the discourse of development was the Cold War 
(Escobar, 1995, p. 33). Fear of communism was a main driver for this concept: If poor 
countries were not rescued from their misery, they would fall to communism. The US and the 
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West in general saw ‘Development’ as a strategy to advance the rivalry with the former USSR 
and to promote the designs of industrial civilization (Escobar, 1995, p. 34). 
Escobar uses Foucault’s ideas of power to state that the invention of ‘development’ was a new 
problematization, and with new problematizations new discourses and practices that shape the 
reality to which they refer emerge. The reality formed here was that the essential trait of the 
third world was its poverty; the solution was development through economic growth, all of 
which became self-evident, universal, necessary truths (Escobar, 1995, p. 25). 
Science, Technology and New “Objective” Knowledge about the Third World
Science and technology were regarded as markers of civilization since the 19th century by 
Western countries; this idea was rekindled with development age, but knowledge now centred 
on North American institutions and ideas. Once this system of knowledge, consisting of 
international institutions and universities was finished, it determined what was to be said, 
thought and imagined. It defined the space of development with its basic truth that any 
strategy of development has: Development is the path towards becoming like the rich 
societies: Industrialized, modern and urban (Fischer, 2008, p. 267). Development relied on the 
production of knowledge that could provide a scientific picture of a country’s social and 
economic problems and resources. Since empirical social science was thought to be objective 
and days of scientific prejudice and error were gone, problems were to be evaluated 
‘objectively’ by the new scientific means. Older ways of thinking would yield to this new 
spirit. These new ‘neutral’ approaches created new knowledge capabilities and further loss of 
autonomy. But most importantly, they contributed to blocking different modes of knowing
(Escobar, 1995, p. 37). 
Rich countries had the financial and technological capacity to secure their own progress. 
Looking into their own past seemed to confirm to them that their path was the only inevitable
one. Sooner or later the underdeveloped world would follow and become developed. The new 
type of economic knowledge and experience with design and management of social systems 
made this goal look even more plausible. It was only a matter of strategy to set in motion the 
right forces to ensure progress and world happiness. 
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But new forms of power and control, more subtle, were put into operation as well and poor 
people’s ability to define and take care of their own lives was eroded profoundly.(Escobar, 
1995, p. 40).
Development as the Colonization of Reality
According to Escobar, the organizing premise for the development discourse is the role of 
modernization as the only force able to destroy archaic superstitions and relations, whatever 
the social, cultural and political cost. Closely related to this organizing principle are 
industrialization and urbanization as necessary roads to modernization and thus material 
advancement as a means for social, cultural and political progress (Escobar, 1995, p. 39). 
The discourse of development is all encompassing and thus the examination of any given 
object within it should be done within the context of the discourse as a whole. In order to 
explain capital accumulation for instance, technology and new financial institutions as well as
systems of classification such as GNP/capita, decision making systems and international 
factors all need to be taken into consideration (Escobar, 1995, p. 39).
The development discourse was the result of an establishment of a set of relations. Thus, it
systematically formed the objects of which it spoke, grouped and arranged them in certain 
ways and gave them a unity of their own (Escobar, 1995, p. 40). It established relations 
between institutions, socioeconomic processes, forms of knowledge and technological factors 
which defined conditions under which objects, concepts, theories and strategies can be 
incorporated into the discourse. Such a system of relations establishes a discursive practice 
that sets the rules of the game: Who can speak, from what point of view, with what authority 
and according to what criteria of expertise. It sets the rules for the solutions of problems and 
the formation of a policy (Escobar, 1995, p. 43). Escobar refers to Foucault in order to show 
the dynamics of discourse and power: A certain order within a discourse produces permissible 
modes of thinking and being and disqualifies others. He calls this the colonization of reality: 
Certain representations become dominant and shape the ways in which reality is perceived
(Escobar, 1995, p. 5). The rise of development discourse and following production of the 
Third World and the previously explained colonization of reality is what Escobar calls 
coloniality. It incorporates colonialism and imperialism but goes beyond them. Coloniality 
didn’t end with colonialism but was rearticulated in terms of the post-World War II imaginary 
of three worlds and replaced previous articulations of Occidentalism and Orientalism
(Escobar, 2004, p. 219). 
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Due to the relations within the discourse it is determined what is legitimate as development 
practice. For instances what experts say and what international politics deem feasible may be 
legitimate practice, as relations allow for it to be so, but local knowledge and practice may be 
disregarded. Practices thus reproduce the same relations between elements as the ones making 
them possible. 
Development is omnipresent. It has the status of certainty. Governments, institutions and 
experts all study underdevelopment, create development plans and produce theories (Escobar, 
1995, p. 10). Development furthermore becomes naturalized through globalization because 
everyone desires the same things, namely commodities and markets (Escobar, 2008, p. 167). 
People themselves come to recognize themselves as developed or underdeveloped (Escobar, 
1995, p. 10). Thus, Non-European/Non-Western areas are systematically transformed 
according to European constructs. They are represented as part of the Third World and as 
underdeveloped. European/Western technocrats and development experts are detached and 
objective yet can immerse themselves in local life. They observe the world as object from an 
invisible position, being set apart themselves (Escobar, 1995, p. 7). The world is divided into 
copies and the original. A regime of order and truth is being set up, which is a quintessential 
aspect of modernity and deepened by economics and development. People of the Third World 
exist out there, to be known through theories and intervened upon from the outside. However, 
such an image makes sense only from the Western perspective. That it exists is more a sign of 
power over the Third World than truth about it and shows that the development discourse has 
created an efficient apparatus for producing knowledge about and exercising power over the 
Third World (Escobar, 1995, p. 9).
Change is not seen as a process rooted in the interpretation of each society’s history and 
cultural tradition. Instead, professionals attempt to devise mechanisms and procedures to 
make societies fit a pre-existing model that embodies the structures and functions of 
modernity (Escobar, 1995, p. 52). Development is related to the ideas and expectations of the 
West, to its judgement of a normal course of evolution and progress. Such a conceptualization 
led to development being a powerful instrument for normalizing the world (Escobar, 1995, p. 
26).
Development and Modernity
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Escobar sees modernity as an essentially European phenomenon. This means that modernity 
can be explained by reference to factors internal to Europe in terms of history, sociology, 
culture and philosophy. Modernity has its origins in 18th century Northern Europe around the 
processes of reformation, enlightenment, and the French Revolution (Fischer, 2008, p. 264). 
Man saw himself as the foundation of all knowledge and order of the world, he separated 
himself from the natural and the divine (Escobar, 2004, p. 211). All the world cultures and 
societies are reduced to being a manifestation of European history. Modernities are always a 
reflection of a Eurocentred social order, modernity is a ubiquitous, ineluctable social fact. 
Euro-modernity has produced global designs which allowed it to subordinate other local 
histories and their designs The modern practices of reason and rationality appear to be 
naturally given due to their universalization (Escobar, 2008, p. 167). Thus most people find it 
difficult to think about the Third World in other terms than those provided by development 
discourse, which are overpopulation, hunger, poverty and illiteracy. These terms are 
stereotyped and burdened signifiers, media images are an example of such signifiers. In order 
to move beyond them it is necessary to examine development in relation to the modern 
experiences of knowing, seeing, counting and economizing (Escobar, 1995, p. 12).
Modernity cannot be understood without reference to coloniality. It is coloniality that entails 
the marginalization of cultures and knowledge of subaltern groups. Within coloniality of 
power, local histories of European modernity have produced global designs within which 
subaltern groups have had to live (Escobar, 2008, p. 162). 
However, through the lens of anthropological criticism, it is possible to regard development 
and modernity as a specific collection of practices with a historical nature. This 
anthropologization is to form the basis for the critical analysis of development, in order to 
disclose the constructed, even exotic character of many of ‘our’ ‘reasonable’ practices
(Fischer, 2008, p. 264). 
Going beyond Development
In order to go beyond development, it is important to single it out its encompassing cultural 
space and to separate oneself from it by perceiving it in a new form (Escobar, 1995, p. 6). 
On the road to going beyond development, Escobar distinguished between alternative 
development, referring to “new” strategies like the basic needs approach or food security but 
which still are firmly rooted inside the development discourse; alternative modernities, 
referring to a higher participatory level and countertendencies by local cultures; and 
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alternatives to modernity, which refers to questioning the unanimous agreement on the 
universalization of modernity. Only the last option opens the possibility of going beyond the 
development discourse (Escobar, 2008, p. 162).
For alternatives to modernity and thus to development, Escobar points to a Latin American 
research group which moves inside the framework of modernity/coloniality/decoloniality.  
The theorists within this group refract modernity through the lens of coloniality. Their main 
aim is to re-read the ‘myth of modernity’ and to denunciate the assumption that Europe’s 
development must be followed unilaterally by every culture. The conceptual corpus of the 
research program among others refers to coloniality of power, seeing the global hegemonic 
model as articulating race, labour, space and peoples according to the needs of capital and the 
benefit of white people; to global difference and global coloniality, which means analyzing 
knowledge and cultural dimension of subalternisation processes effected by colonial power; to 
coloniality of being: to address critically the effectiveness of discourse with which others 
respond to suppression as a result of an encounter; and finally to Eurocentrism: The 
knowledge model of European historical experience, as having become globally hegemonic 
since the 17th century (Escobar, 2004, p. 217f; Escobar, 2008, p. 167f). 
There is a need to move beyond the paradigm of modernity in which the Third World has 
functioned. Modernity must no longer be treated as a great singularity. Instead, modernities 
and exteriorities (places and cultures outside of modernity) should be treated as true 
multiplicity where trajectories are multiple and can lead to multiple states. Furthermore, new 
classifications should be emerging which are not based on a division of the world into three
[or two, as is more the case nowadays].
Furthermore, Escobar mentions several measures that would make sense of how we think 
about the role of the state, national economic policy and development policy and that would 
help to counter act it. 
New coalitions that draw on cultural-ecological considerations, rather than traditional 
geopolitical concerns, should be formed. They would be new in that they complicate the 
nation state and regional economies. The former Third World might be better off without 
states, creating new forms of protection and negotiation. 
Secondly, Escobar mentions the necessity of selective delinking and re-engagement, and the 
down-stepping from too much market integration (Escobar, 2004, p. 226). 
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Finally, while social conditions could indicate thinking of the Third World as useful, new 
ways of thinking without using ‘pathologised idioms’ like ‘warlords’, or ‘the absolute poor’, 
need to be found. Peoples from the Third World are central to making the world a better place 
as they are the majority of the world. The logic coming out of these worlds needs to be 
understood in its own terms, not constructed by modernity (Escobar, 2004, p. 224ff). 
2.3.3 Wolfgang Sachs’ Thoughts on ‘Development’
“In the light of development all peoples on the globe appear to move along one single road. The lead-
runners show the way, they are at the forefront of social evolution, indicating a common destination even 
for countries with highly diverse trajectories in the past. Many different histories merge into one ‘master 
history’, many different time scales merge into one master time scale. The imagined time is linear, only 
allowing for progressing or regressing; and it is global, drawing all communities worldwide into its 
purview.” (Sachs, 2000, p. 4).
Wolfgang Sachs is a development theorist who, in distinction to Arturo Escobar, has an 
environmental background. His approach towards development critique is often via the 
ecological predicaments that go along with the Western model of ‘development’. This is 
precisely why his theories were chosen – to the author of this paper, the environmental 
predicament appears to be one of the strongest arguments against universalizing 
‘development’ in the Western and modern sense and thus against any tool fostering it.
The Age of Development
According to Sachs, the word ‘underdeveloped’ was first used 20th January 1949 in a speech 
by Harry S. Truman. In his speech, he identified more than half the world’s people as living in 
‘underdeveloped areas’ (Sachs, 2000, p. 4). ‘Underdevelopment’ served as one category for 
all non-industrialized countries (Sachs, 1993, p. 4). Similar to Escobar in this sense, Sachs 
calls this a new model of power which is anti-colonial imperialism (Sachs, 2000, p. 4).
The power vacuum opening up after colonial times were over and the Second World War had 
ended was filled by the US launching self-determination, free trade, democracy and 
international cooperation as core values of future order. The world was to be held together by 
economic dependence, not by political dominion; economic strength had taken the place of 
military power; the conquest of markets replaced the conquest of states. Economic 
development was thus the overarching goal, development was a conceptual vehicle for 
American dominance with a liberal face. It urged for national independence while expanding 
a new form of dominance. Development was proclaimed as the primary aspiration of 
countries after being free from colonial subordination. According to Sachs, even today, every 
effort and every sacrifice is worth it in order to reach this goal (Sachs, 2010d, p. xv). 
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The hegemonic needs of the North as well as the emancipatory needs of the South converged 
upon the prospect of development (Sachs, 2000, p. 8). However, the development 
conceptualization as growth remained blind to unequal power relations: Access to resources is 
determined by power and thus growth enabled the powerful at the cost of the powerless 
(Sachs, 2000, p. 14). 
Similar to Escobar’s notion of the development discourse consisting of a certain set of 
relations, according to Sachs it favors certain actors and certain actions, for instance 
technology transfer, while marginalizing others. It highlights certain solutions while others are 
forgotten (i.e. local knowledge). Development links knowledge to power. All of these factors 
have contributed to the development syndrome surviving until today (Sachs, 1993, p. 9).
According to Sachs (and to some extent Escobar as well), the idea of universal progress and a 
converging, universal history originated in the European enlightenment. Human dignity was 
universal. External or internal differences were irrelevant. As people moved along the path of 
progress getting rid of authority and superstition, opting for autonomy and reason, they strove 
for common progress. Men were disconnected from their past and bond of community. 
Neither social roots nor religious commitments mattered as history moved towards the 
universal rule of reason. Enlightenment envisioned savages as living outside civilization; they 
inhabited an infant stage of history being children and needing guidance by a father (Sachs, 
2010c, p. 112ff).
Development as Identity 
Similar to Escobar’s envisioning of development’s discursive power, Sachs sees development 
as a particular cast of mind, “a perception which models reality, […] comforts societies and 
[…] unleashes passions” (Sachs, 2010d, p. xvi). Different aid packages like ‘social 
development’, ‘rural development’, ‘basic needs approach’ were tied, different strategies 
used, but the overall validity of development remained, even in drastically changed historical 
situations. This is what Sachs calls “The tragic greatness of development [which] consists in 
its monumental emptiness.” (Sachs, 1993, p. 9). 
The development idea was legitimization, particularly for emerging states. The perspective of 
catching up restored the humiliated former colonies’ self-respect, it promised equal standing 
(Sachs, 2000, p. 8). Development has thus turned into a basis for identity. Political and 
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economic decolonization has occurred but not a decolonization of the mind. Instead, hopes for 
the future are fixed on the rich man’s pattern of production and consumption (Sachs, 2010d, 
p. viiif). However, along with development, often also social polarization prevails: The old 
ways have been smashed, the new ways are not viable, which leads to a loss of identity in the 
course of development (Sachs, 2010d, p. xvii). The right to cultural self-identity has been 
compromised by accepting the development world-view. Thus, through development, living 
spaces and cultural traditions of, for instance, indigenous people are put under pressure
(Sachs, 2010d, p. viiif). Development policy sought to replace traditional man by modern 
man. Since that has not happened, many people lived and continue to live in ‘no-man’s land’
(Sachs, 2000, p. 15).
Development as Homogenization and Loss of Creativity 
The development discourse is made up of a number of concepts which reinforce the 
occidental world-view (Sachs, 2010d, p. xix). Each development concept filters perception; it 
highlights certain aspects of reality while excluding others (Sachs, 2010d, p. xx). 
The view of history as the royal road to progress, a never ending process of improvement 
upon which all people converge is central to development as the homogenization of the world. 
Development constructed history as a process of maturation, like a flower with inner laws
leading to the final stage of blooming, a universal process; the peak was to be rationalization 
or liberation. Thus it is the task of planners and engineers of development to set out to 
remodel societies and accelerate maturation (Sachs, 2000, p. 5). World society has to be 
achieved by the improvement of the backward. As development spreads, indigenous people 
are to put aside their chronographies and join the perspective of progress (Sachs, 2000, p. 20). 
This one world thought calls for absorbing differences in the world into an ahistorical and 
delocalized universalism of European origin. Unity is thus realized through the 
Westernization of the world. Homogenization implies peace, diversity implies violence 
(Sachs, 2010c, p. 114). 
Development implies chronopolitics (all people move along the same road, following those at 
the forefront of social evolution) and geopolitics (a diversity of nations turns into a ranking 
order with the GDP-rich countries at the top) (Sachs, 2010d, p. xf). It furthermore implies 
predominance. Through development, the diversity of countries appears in a clear ranking; it 
shapes the orientation of the powerful and the less powerful. Underdeveloped countries can 
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only be recognized as such by displaying others as examples of maturity.  Assigning positions 
of leaders and followers is part of the developmentalists’ construction of history (Sachs, 2000, 
p. 6). 
Many cultures are linked to particular places with their own memories and cosmologies
(localism), while development calls for universalism. 
Places hence have special significances for peoples as they are imbued with experiences of 
the past and present, ancestors walked the earth and the web of social bonds is tied there. 
Language, habit and the particular style of being in the world are located there. Places are thus 
not just the intersection of a map but a concentration of meaningful human activity which 
gives it a distinct quality, a distinct aura. Such cultures are vulnerable to a concept which is 
not linked to any place, but rests instead on the concept of space (universalism). According to 
Escobar, Eurocentrism is ravaging place centred cultures and imposing on them space centred 
knowledge as it spreads science, state and market throughout the world (Sachs, 2010c, p. 
120f). After the Second World War, space trained eyes identified numerous cultures as 
backward and deficient. The globe was a homogenous space, waiting to be organized by 
universally applicable programmes and technologies. 
Science, state and market as based on a system of knowledge claimed validity everywhere and 
for everyone. It has no official origin and can thus penetrate everywhere. Since they are 
disembodied from any broader context of order and meaning, they are powerful in 
remodelling any social reality according to their specific logic.  They can thus unsettle all 
kinds of different cultures (Sachs, 2010c, p. 120).
Development in Times of Globalization
Globalization can be understood as development without nation-states, as the formation of a 
global middle class alongside the spread of a transnational economic complex. It no longer 
resides within nation states but produces a transnational class of winners, half of which 
resides in the North, half in the South (Sachs, 2010d, p. viiif). Social groups are no longer 
specific to one nation but begin resembling one another more and more in behaviour and 
lifestyle. 
Globalization tends to undercut social solidarity, nationally and internationally, since societies 
are less contained within nation states. Thus the reciprocal links between social classes which 
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constitute a policy becomes weaker (Sachs, 2000, p. 20). The elite’s sense of responsibility 
for the disadvantaged lessens as they themselves feel insecure with respect to their global 
reference group. Those who cannot compete (the social majority) are a liability. Globalization 
thus removes barriers between nations and at the same time erects barriers within nations. 
The transnational space more and more encompasses larger or smaller sections of a country 
instead of entire countries. Thus, the North-South division becomes to a certain degree 
obsolete. The dividing line runs between the global middle class and the excluded social 
majority, “the globalized rich and the localized poor” (Sachs, 2000, p. 21f); the North-South 
divide runs through each society (Sachs, 2000, p. 21f).
The Ecological Predicaments of Development
The reason that Europe was able to leap ahead of the rest of the world in the 19th century was 
its ability to overcome its limits by tapping into new resources. This model was available 
under exceptional conditions (resource availability) and thus can’t be generalized to the world 
at large. It requires social exclusion by its very structure (such amounts of resources are not 
available to everyone because they are limited) and the conditions are no longer available 
(Sachs, 2010d, p. xi).
Environment arrived on the international agenda with the UN Conference on the Human 
Environment in Stockholm in June 1972. It was proposed by Sweden due to worries about
pollution in the Baltic, for instance in the form of heavy metals in fish and birds, etc.  
This conference was the precursor to a series of large UN conferences in the 1970s which 
altered the post-war perception of an open global space where nations may individually strive 
for maximizing economic growth. The world view of an interrelated world system with a
number of common constraints, took hold (Sachs, 2010a, p. 26). 
In environmental negotiations, the claims to greater economic space were bargained against 
environmental demands (Sachs, 2000, p. 12). This process began in 1987 when the 
Brundtland Report announced the marriage between the craving for development and the 
concern for the environment. From this marriage of environment and development the 
‘ecocratic’ discourse emerged which aimed at new levels of intervention, administrative 
monitoring and control for the sake of the environment (Sachs, 2010a, p. 35). 
The ailing concept of development thus gained new life. What has happened before is 
repeated:
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“Every time in the last thirty years when the destructive effects of development were recognized, 
the concept [of development] was stretched in such a way as to include both injury and therapy.”
(Sachs, 2010a, p. 28). 
While development experts need to widen their attention, development remains what it always 
comes down to, even in the light of environment: Interventions for boosting the GNP/GDP
(Sachs, 2010a, p. 28). An alliance of development enthusiasts in the South and growth 
fatalists in the North formed, highlighting the importance of growth and at the same time the 
hegemony of the Northern development model; “for development without hegemony is like a 
race without a direction” (Sachs, 1993, p. 7). Such an adherence to development and thus to 
northern hegemony led to a position of structural weakness which made the absurd situation 
possible of the North being the cause as well as the provider of solutions for the global 
ecological crisis.
But according to Sachs, it is the Northern model of development with its over use of the 
world’s resources which has changed the face of the earth (Sachs, 2010d, p. xvii). We 
consume in one year what it took the earth a million years to store up, whereas this 
consumption mainly takes place in the West (Sachs, 2010d, p. xvi). Five of six planets would 
be needed if everyone consumed like this region (Sachs, 2010d, p. xvii). Humanity consumes
in one year what it took the earth a million years to store up, whereas this consumption mainly 
takes place in the West (Sachs, 2010d, p. xvi). Five or six planets would be needed if 
everyone consumed like the West (Sachs, 2010d, p. xvii). Hence, Sachs argues that Western 
countries can no longer be regarded as being on top of the social evolution scale, as this 
position is shattered by the ecological predicament. The entire direction the scale seems to be 
wrong (Sachs, 2010b, p. xii). 
Environmental degradation arises from two contradictory settings: One of success and 
domination and the other of marginality and powerlessness. In the second instance, after the 
global plunder, poor people degrade their habitats after having lost their traditional rights to 
secure sufficient sources of livelihood. According to Sachs, both of these processes, the
degradation by the affluent as well as the degradation by the poor can be considered the 
outcome of one and the same process of economic development (Sachs, 2000, p. 18). 
Sustainable Development
In 1970s with the oil crisis it appeared for the first time that growth also depended on the 
long-term availability of natural resources. Development planners became worried about the 
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conservation of inputs for future growth (Sachs, 2010a, p. 26). With incorporating 
environment into development, the Brundtland report gave birth to ‘sustainable development’ 
as the conceptual roof for both violating and healing the environment. Due to the ‘discovery’
of biophysical limits, development underwent another round of conceptual inflation. It had to 
be reworked to allow for both infinite growth and preservation of nature. The Brundtland-
Report defined sustainable development as follows: “Sustainable development is development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs.”5
The concept highlighted social justice in time but missed social justice in space (Sachs, 2000, 
p. 12): Whose needs and what needs are supposed to be met? The needs for survival (for 
instance water) or the needs for luxury (for instance air travel)? The concept of sustainable 
development shifted the locus of sustainability from nature to development. Sustainability
now referred to development instead of referring to renewable resources. It slid from 
conservation of nature to conservation of development. It asked the questions which services 
of nature are indispensable to development and which could be substituted. Nature became a 
variable (Sachs, 1993, p. 10).
Thus even those in favour of economic growth could argue in the name of sustainable 
development. The cure of environmental ills was to be found in an efficiency revolution: 
More should be achieved with less. Thus, sustainable development once more reaffirmed the 
Northern model of development in the first place (Sachs, 1993, p. 26).
Breaking the One-Way Development
According to Sachs, the development age is gone, but the core agenda as it should be is still 
unfinished: Justice as redistribution of opportunities and recognition of otherness has not 
made much progress. Development also faces new constraints with the arising of biophysical 
limits: justice can no longer be associated or achieved with growth. The question of justice 
needs to be decoupled from the pursuit of development (Sachs, 2000, p. 25). Ecology and 
poverty both call for limits of development. Peace with nature requires peace in economic 
warfare (Sachs, 1993, p. 7). 
5 (Brundtland, 1987. Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development. 
Chapter 2: Towards Sustainable Development).
34
According to Sachs, Western hegemony leaves its imprint not only on economy and ecology, 
but on minds as well. In order to decolonize minds, it is vital to break with ‘development’ as a 
habit of thought. The development discourse is an outcome of the post-war era, of a fossil-fuel 
based economy, colonial perceptions and the legacy of Western rationalism. These discourse 
elements are present in the development concepts as well: 
“[…]Poverty includes a materialistic prejudice, equality [includes] sameness, and standard of 
living reduces the diversity of happiness, needs [includes] dependency […]” (Sachs, 2010d, p. 
xiif)..
A reconceptualization is vital. Thus, for instance, it will not be possible to reconceptualize 
equity without recovering the diversity of prosperity. Equity needs to be delinked from 
economic growth and relinked to community- and culture-based notions of well-being. Also, 
a search for less material notions of prosperity that make room for dimensions of self-reliance, 
community, art and spirituality are needed (Sachs, 2010d, p. xiif).
Since Columbus, the consequences of exploitation have been borne by others. This is 
changing now as Northern countries have to face the consequences of worldwide 
colonization, for instance environmental destruction (Sachs, 1993, p. 20). Nowadays, a global
form of ecology can be understood in two ways: Either as a technocratic effort in favour of 
development, which results in the management of biophysical limits to growth or as a cultural 
effort to shake of the hegemony of Western values and retire from the development race. This 
implies designing cultural and political limits to development and finding indigenous models 
of prosperity (Sachs, 1993, p. 11f).
After having given an overview of Post Development Theory and its approach to 
‘development’ in this section, the following chapter returns to looking at development indices: 
It assesses general demands an index faces as well as challenges due to political significance 
and potential for arbitrariness. Chapter 4 will then combine the topic of development indices 
with Post Development Theory, assessing them in the light of this particular theoretical 
approach. 
3. Development Indicators – An Overview over 
Requirements and Challenges 
According to Stiglitz et al, statistics are an important part of information systems, a frame 
through which we perceive the world (Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2010, p. xxi). 
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Development, as shown in section 2.2, has numerous definitions and facets – and 
consequently, numerous development indices exist, using different indicators and falling back 
on different data. All of them face, however, similar requirements and challenges. 
This section aims at providing a non-exhaustive overview of the demands and challenges that 
are common to development indices in general, before critically analysing three development 
indices in depth in the next chapter. 
3.1 Requirements for a Development Indicator 
For the purpose of the paper, the author has chosen a number of criteria that an index or 
indicator must fulfil to qualify as a development indicator, since I have found it impossible to 
find a comprehensive definition of a development index in contemporary literature. I have 
developed the definition according to my observation and research about different 
development indices and indicators. I have come to the conclusion that the criteria mentioned 
below are the main characteristics that define development indices. 
In order to qualify as a development index, an index must at least include one factor focussing 
directly on the physical, mental, social or economic condition of humans (for example life 
expectancy). It must furthermore have been officially claimed as measuring development in 
countries by an international, bilateral or non-governmental organisation or foundation 
dealing explicitly with development and/or claiming for the index to measure development or 
to measure an important part of development.  
In order to be more than a development indicator, a development index must combine at least 
two different factors (often themselves indices or indicators) via a calculation and provide a 
ranking of outcomes in numerical order generating an ordinal scale.
Development indices, relying on statistics seem to have a difficult task – they need to measure 
something inherently complex but are themselves inherently simple and need to remain so. 
This difficulty is further explored in this chapter
According to Goossens et al (p. 7), there are three main ways of combining indicators/indices 
to form a global picture: using a single composite measure, consisting of various indicators;
using a framework accounting approach; or using an approach where many disaggregate 
indicators are taken into account.
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According to Klingebiel, indicators appeared and began to be used in the 1970s in the hope of 
providing a basis for planning and control by the state. The interest in development indicators 
has risen in the 1990s because the donor countries aimed at rationalizing development 
cooperation after the Cold War had ended and for this, transparent criteria were needed. 
Further reasons were the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) implemented by IMF and
World Bank: Tools were searched for to measure the social consequences of these 
programmes (Klingebiel, 1992, p. 4f).
Goossens et al state that the conditions an indicator needs to fulfil depend on the situation it is 
to be used for. They call this “fitness for purpose” (Goossens et al., 2007, p. 6)6. Stiglitz adds 
to this that in general the applicability of a metric may vary depending on different purposes 
(Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. xxiv). Thus, one index or indicator may not be able to grasp all 
necessary aspects of a matter.
According to Klingebiel who analysed the then recently developed Human Development 
Index in 1992, indicators in general are a methodological approach that attempt to assess the 
complexity of an object of investigation. 
An indicator (of which an index is usually made up) should fulfil the following tasks: 
 It should indicate something which otherwise is not observable and enable a 
quantification. 
 It should serve as an instrument to make an actual situation measurable 
(Klingebiel, 1992, p. 3). 
 It is not a replacement, but an instrument of research (McGranahan, Pizarro, & 
Richard, 1985, p. 220).
However, Klingebiel also points out that not everything is quantifiable. Many objects of 
investigation like political systems and human rights are highly complex. According to him, it 
is beyond dispute that an index cannot be sufficient for a detailed analysis as the complex 
development challenges can’t be grasped via a pre-determined grid (Klingebiel, 1992, p. 24).
However, this has been challenged by recent developments in measuring empowerment by 
combining qualitative and quantitative methods (Chambers, 2010, p. 9f).
6The study conducted by Goossens et al refers to sustainability indicators, not to development indicators. Yet, 
their insights as to the quality of indices and indicators may apply to development indices and indicators as well. 
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Stiglitz et al point out that there is no single indicator that can capture something as complex 
as our society. Using a set of numbers too small for that purpose might be misleading. 
However, through disaggregate indicators, certain factors might be highlighted (for instance 
inequality) which might or even must be forgotten in aggregate indices (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, 
p. xxv).
In development research and among decision makers, there appears to be a considerable need 
for orientation in the form of indicators. They are to serve as tools to measure the success of a 
development strategy, to compare different countries and to point out to deficits in certain 
areas (Klingebiel, 1992, p. 24). Thus, results of an indicator or index should be simple, 
sending out clear messages. They can be presented in the form of rankings, monetary units or 
a score (“good” or “bad”). However, an important pre-condition for indicators being usable is 
their comparability, internationally and regionally. As there is no international standard on 
data gathering methodology, this may pose a problem when data is gathered according to 
different models, data availability and when thresholds differ as well (Goossens, et al., 2007, 
p. 7).
Thus, for example the UNDP states in its Human Development Report in 2003: 
“The concepts and criteria used to define poverty lines also differ across countries, making 
national poverty lines problematic when the analytical purpose is to make international poverty 
comparisons” (UNDP, 2003a, p. 42). 
Marks et al add to this that any index can only be as good as the quality of its data. According 
to them, all indices and indicators, even those used by international institutions and decision 
makers have their shortcomings in this respect (Marks, et al., 2006, p. 3). 
An index which is made up of several indicators (a composite index) is usually more complex 
and has more claims imbedded in it. Its weaknesses tend to grow the more dimensions it tries 
to incorporate, therefore and in order to remain meaningful, an index should describe one 
clearly defined dimension of the development process. An increase in dimensions ( for 
instance a combination of political and cultural dimensions) may add to coming closer to the 
complex notion of development but may at the same time lead to a loss in contour and validity 
(Klingebiel, 1992, p. 25). Stiglitz et al add to this that composite indicators may be better 
regarded as invitations to take a closer look at its various components. They also emphasize 
that a general and important criticism regarding composite indices is their arbitrary character 
due to the different ways of weighting their various components. For an aggregation always 
means putting relative weights on its factors (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. 103f).
38
A fairly comprehensive list of requirements to a development indicator or index is given in 
the Caracas Report issued in 1989 (see Table 1 below), which also comments and provides an 
overview of a number of alternative development indicators that had already been issued back 
then (see for instance Henderson & Mailman, 1994, pp. 17-50 ). 
Some points in the below given table are difficult to combine or even implement, such as 
‘holistic’ (that would probably mean aggregation of many factors) and ‘simple’. Yet, it 
provides interesting insights into the many demands to a development index and the general 
dilemma between completeness and simplicity it faces. 
Requisites that an Ideal Index Must Satisfy
An Index must be:
Simple The index should be easy to interpret and its compilation and handling should not 
require a very sophisticated statistical base or methodology.
Dynamic The index should be flexible so it can reflect changing social realities and new 
statistical possibilities.
Sensitive The index must be capable of rapidly detecting social changes. Given the need to 
define priorities in the formulation of the Index, initially indicators that are sensitive 
enough to be able to evaluate changes in social conditions in the short and medium 
term should be selected.
Holistic The indicators chosen must be harmoniously interrelated to strengthen and 
complement one another. 
Reliable [also valid, addition 
by author]
The index must have a serious, adequate statistical base and count on autonomous 
professional handling and monitoring, free from any circumstantial distortion or 
manipulation.
Capable of combining 
globality with specificity
The set of general indicators selected must allow for the subsequent use of specific 
indicators adapted to specific situations such as differing geographical areas within a 
country. 
Participatory and promoter of 
self-reliance in the population
That is to say, it should enable the population to participate in its validation or 
modification and encourage the population’s capacity for self-reliance versus its 
dependence on external factors. 
The list mentions the criteria “simplicity” on top of the list which points to one of the main 
challenges a development index faces: How to measure something complicated and remain 
easily comprehensible and understandable. This often goes along with a simplification of 
complex matters, hiding local and regional trends and thus giving a distorted picture of reality 
(Goossens, et al., 2007, p. 7). 
Goossens et al highlight another point of importance for indicators and indices: The way they 
are being communicated and presented, using graphs, dashboards and world maps. An index’s 
influence depends on its quality as well as its understandability (Goossens, et al., 2007, p. 7).
Source: (Peréz, 1994, p. 92).
Table 1: Prerequisites an Index Must Satisfy
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To provide an example of ‘fitness of purpose’ mentioned by Goossens et al, Stammel assessed  
how the standard measurement GDP/capita was able to capture wealth in traditional 
communities in Western Samoa. His result was that this type of measurement was unfit to 
measure notions of prosperity in indigenous communities due to different notions of wealth 
and many activities being conducted outside the market (Stammel, 1996, p. 12) (for a more 
in-depth analysis of GDP per Capita as development indicator see section 4.1).
Already in 1992, Klingebiel pointed out that while indicators and indices gained 
increasing importance for development cooperation several dangers were associated 
with this kind of indicator fixation. Thus he mentioned the problem of strong faith in the 
objectivity of data and belief in statistics in general which would need to be considered 
carefully when handling and using indicators and indices in development cooperation
(Klingebiel, 1992, p. 32). While these points are further discussed in chapter 4, when 
assessing three indices in depth, the next section discusses the political dimension of 
development indices, which may also be increasingly important due to this mentioned 
faith in data objectivity. 
3.2 Development Indices’ Significance for Policy Making
As much as the concept of ‘development’ may influence policies by shaping the particular 
development discourse as seen in section 2.3, indicators may do something similar through 
enforcing, justifying or challenging a particular notion of development. 
Indicator outcomes, particularly for the HDI get considerable attention from media and 
governments, with governments watching out for their position (Mehrotra, 2010, p. 1), or 
receiving aid flows due to their ‘development status’ (Wolff, et al., 2011, p. 862). Outcomes 
may also serve as justification for governments’ achievements (or presented as such by the 
media), in both the case of the HDI (Wolff et al 2011, p. 843f) and the HPI (Seager, 2009; 
Winterman, 2006) (for a more in-depth analysis of the HDI and its impact see Chapter 4.2. 
For the HPI see Chapter 4.3). 
Three major ways for an indicator or an index to be used in political processes can be listed: 
“Backward looking”, which implies evaluating what does and does not work; “forward 
looking”, implying putting emphasis on new policy proposals as well as doing ex ante 
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assessments; and finally “practical politics”, providing a common language in debate, 
consistency in policy package and accountability (Canoy, 2007, p. 3).  Thus, it could be said 
that policies use indices for being accountable and less arbitrary. 
However, the construction of any index entails selecting certain indicators while leaving 
others out. Such a selection allows for manipulation or at least arbitrariness. Hence, according 
to Klingebiel, an indicator provides and shows more than mere facts. By choosing one over 
the other (and there are many to choose from as shown in section 2.2), a certain view of 
development is displayed. If GDP per Capita is chosen over the HDI in national or 
international statistics to present a country’s progress, the view of development is probably 
more economic than social (Klingebiel, 1992, p. 4):
“Ein Indikator steht explizit oder implizit in einem theoretischen Zusammenhang. Wird der 
Entwicklungsstand eines Landes beispielsweise ausschließlich mit dem Indikator 
Bruttosozialprodukt pro Kopf gemessen, so ist dieses Vorgehen wiederum ein Indiz dafür, dass der 
Entwicklungsbegriff vorrangig ökonomistisch definiert wird. Bei der Diskussion um geeignete 
Indikatoren handelt es sich deshalb nicht allein um Datenfragen und statistische Probleme. 
Vielmehr spiegeln sich in ihr oftmals die zentralen Themen der gesamten entwicklungspolitischen 
Debatte wider.” (Klingebiel, 1992, p. 4).
[An indicator has theoretical implications and connections. If the state of development of a country 
is measured only through GNP, this is evidence that the notion of development there is defined 
mainly in economic terms. Discussing appropriate indicators thus does not merely concern 
questions of data and statistical problems. Rather, central themes of the entire debate around 
development politics are mirrored in it.]7
Similarly, Klingebiel claims that the significance of indicator research has risen since for 
some donors they serve as orientation for decision making such as aid allocation. Indicators 
thus are not purely academic but have political relevance. Indeed, the notion of development 
they display as well as their results are often explosive and may lead to fierce discussion in 
UN panels (Klingebiel, 1992, p. 6). 
Klingebiel highlights this political sphere of a development index via the discussion around 
the then recently established HDI: Many countries from the Third World feared that the HDI 
would become a new criterion for allocation of development cooperation. This led to the
discussion around the HDI and HDR centring mainly on their political function and 
implication. Thus, particularly Latin American countries which tended to have higher 
positions within the ranking, worried to be of less priority for development aid (today 
development cooperation) (Klingebiel, 1992, p. 14). 
7 The translation was done by the author of this paper. 
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Today, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (hereafter PD), having come into effect in 
2005, may have contributed to the significance of indices measuring development to provide 
tangible ‘evidence’ for development success. The PD attempts to set international targets 
where the effectiveness and coordination of aid is concerned (Blunt, Turner, & Hertz, 2011, p. 
178) and envisions development primarily as economic development (Monye, Ansah, & 
Orakwue, 2010, p. 754). It was launched, among others, as a consequence of perceived past 
aid ineffectiveness (Hyden, 2008, p. 160). Furthermore, it may have been intended so the 
debate on aid effectiveness could be resolved (if it succeeded and made aid more effective). A 
further reason was its potential contribution to reaching the MDGs, combating perceived 
bottlenecks in aid management (Monye et al, 2010, p. 749f). 
The PD commits donors as well as partners to harmonisation (support is based on the partner 
countries’ development strategies, aid efforts are coordinated), alignment, increasing national 
ownership (partner countries take leadership where development strategies, funds and policies 
are concerned), increasing accountability and overall improved aid management (Blunt et al, 
2011, p. 179). 
However, the document also states that it is not to interfere with individual targets of 
countries and that each commitment needs to be seen in the light of the specific country’s
situation. Hence, while there is a call for more standardisation and harmonisation on the one 
hand, on the other hand, there is room for choice and individual interpretation according to 
different situations. The PD may consequently be considered to be internally inconsistent, 
asking for more stringent aid coordination, while being vague enough to allow for laissez-
faire and the most comfortable interpretation (Blunt et al, 2011, p. 179).
In Indonesia and Cambodia for instance, both those development organizations and donor 
countries that were in favour of using existing government structures and pooling aid as well 
as those favouring traditional bilateral agreements used the PD as justification for their 
approach. 
Donor countries wish to be seen as complying with the PD, while being able to pursue old 
ways of doing aid, insisting on their own targets and measuring ways. Such permissiveness is 
likely to maintain the status quo (Blunt et al, 2011, p. 180f).
Such permissiveness may be conducive to strengthening the common development discourse 
where 
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“[E]ven the catastrophic possibilities associated with climate change may not be enough to beach 
the defences of paradigms of conventional development discourse and entrenched economic and 
financial self-interest” (Blunt et al, 2011, p. 184).
There are however also voices claiming that the PD has a positive purpose in that it 
contributes to development progress and really makes aid more effective (Armon, 2007, 
p. 653).
In the light of an emerging importance and recognition of the PD (Hyden, 2008, 259; 
Armon, 2007, p. 653), the role of indices may become increasingly important: On the 
one hand, not adhering to the PD may be possible not only through its own 
inconsistencies, but also since indices may justify development efforts. On the other 
hand, donor countries and development agencies may be losing influence if adhering to 
the PD: Increasing ownership of national governments means increasing allocation of 
funds directly to them and thus decreasing control (Blunt et al, 2011, 173 & 180ff), and 
moving upwards in spheres of more policy and less direct project management.
Pressuring receiving governments is also more difficult due to new competitors such as 
China (which is particularly active in the African continent), often offering [officially] 
non-conditional development aid (Hyden, 2008, p. 260). This consequently means that a 
justification for aid distribution may be even more important. Such a justification may 
be possible through the use of development indices, as mentioned in the beginning of 
this section (see p. 37).
Furthermore, the PD requires better aid management, focussing on outcomes and set 
objectives as well as mutual accountability (Blunt et al, 2011, p. 179). Whether or not 
such objectives are met and accountability is given needs to be assessed. Some partner 
countries are required to establish assessment frameworks and donor countries are to 
rely mainly on such frameworks (Monye et al, 2010, p. 765), on indicators agreed to by 
all parties involved and on post-hoc evaluation applied by them (Armon, 2007, p. 653, 
Hyden, 2008, p. 268). Also, development indices may be necessary to establish whether 
or not to work with such a government in the first place and whether to continue to do 
so. Such a decision may depend on previous results and the focus on them may require 
“the setting up of independent monitoring groups with clear measurable performance 
indicators.” (Monye et al, 2010, p. 766). This is especially the case, as donor countries 
may be expected, under the PD, to make more long term commitments (Hyden, 2008, p. 
268). 
43
Consequently, good governance gains in importance (Armon, 2007, p. 653). This is 
particularly the case for institutions with a high disbursement volume such as the EU or 
the World Bank but also in general since there is an intention by the OECD to increase 
development aid (Hyden, 2008, p. 270). 
This may be one reason why the HDR 2010, for instance, is so careful to elaborate
extensively on the importance of good governance (UNDP, 2010c, p. 5f) (see section 
4.2.2 for further information on this issue). 
At the same time, the PD lacks concreteness in terms of precise methods and drivers 
(Armon, 2007, p. 264) and consequently may require ‘assistance’. Indices may possibly 
provide such assistance, indicating what does and does not work. As Klingebiel and
Wolff et al mentioned (see p. 37-38), indices may thus increasingly become a tool for 
aid allocation and gain more and more political relevance.
Of course, such relevance may still not ensure that development aid is specific to the 
local context (Monye et al, 2010, p. 769) or whether a country is truly progressing in the 
chosen indices’ dimensions. This is the case since first of all, common indices such as 
GDP per capita or the HDI are usually not sensitive enough to capture this; secondly 
indices may be used to measure progress that is ‘necessary’, for instance Tanzania is a 
grateful aid recipient due to its reputation of relative stability, despite only mediocre 
performance where poverty reduction or governance is concerned (Hyden, 2008, p. 
271). And finally because indices may have data shortcomings where progress reported 
by them may be due to data improvements/limitations instead of actual improvements 
(this issue is further elaborated chapter 4, in particular in 4.2. on the HDI). 
After having highlighted the political dimension of development indices, the following 
chapter focuses on three indices in particular. It highlights strengths and weakness of each one 
in general through a literature review of current criticisms which apply to them, as well as in 
the light of Post Development Theory in particular, assessing their validity and necessity for 
measuring development/progress. 
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4. Case Study Analysis: An In-Depth Evaluation of Three 
Development Indicators and Indices
4.1 Economic Growth and GDP per Capita as Development
Indicators
“In an increasingly performance-oriented society, metrics matter. What we measure affects what 
we do. If we have the wrong metrics, we will strive for the wrong things. In the quest to increase 
GDP we may end up with a society in which citizens are worse off” (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. xvii).
4.1.1 Description, Definition and History of GDP per Capita and 
Economic Growth
Composition and Importance Gross Domestic Product 
According to Stiglitz et al, Gross Domestic Product (hereafter GDP) is the most widely used 
measure of economic activity. It was intended as measure of market activity and production
(Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. 23). It is an indicator of economic situation and economic growth, 
albeit not designed as a general measure of welfare (Krämer, 2009, p. 1).
According to the United Nations System of National Accounts (hereafter SNA), “GDP is the 
total unduplicated output of economic goods and services produced within a country as 
measured in monetary terms.” (United Nations Statistical Division, 2010).
Goossens et al explain the three word ‘gross’, ‘domestic’, and ‘product’ in the following way: 
Gross refers to the fact that depreciation of the value of capital used in the production of 
goods and services is not deducted from the total value of GDP; domestic since the measure 
only relates to activities within a domestic economy regardless of ownership. If it refers to 
nation trade balances, the GDP becomes the Gross National Product (GNP); and finally 
product which refers to the goods and services, meaning the economy’s output being 
produced. GDP derives its value from the quantity and the quality (via prices) of products. If 
either increases, GDP will rise (Goossens, et al., 2007, p. 10).
The Gross Domestic Product is hence composed of all goods and services which are produced 
within a given country. It differs from a range of other measures to define a country’s 
economic progress: The real Domestic Product measures the changes in production results at 
constant prices, thus attempting to make a statement on how a society’s living standards are 
evolving in real terms via controlling for inflation. Nominal Domestic Product on the other 
hand measures them in prices of the given period (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. 23f). 
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In order to measure GDP, it has to be determined which types of goods and services do and 
which do not count towards it in order to avoid double counting: Final goods are 
distinguished from intermediate goods. As the latter are necessary for the production of final 
goods, they are not counted towards domestic product (Goossens, et al., 2007). In order to 
determine which products qualify as such, a production boundary has to be determined, which 
is not always without ambiguity. All products which are beyond this limit can then be counted 
as final products. GDP thus measures all final goods, whether consumed by households, firms 
or the government (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. 23).
Furthermore, productive activities are distinguished from non-productive ones: An exchange 
in goods and services, accompanied by capital flow is regarded as productive activity as they 
influence growth and stability of domestic product. Redistribution of already produced goods 
on the other hand is regarded as non-productive (Stammel, 1996, p. 29).
GDP may be calculated via three different methods: The effective demand side which looks at 
consumption and investment, the production side which measure the added value of each 
sector of the economy and the income side which looks at the capital, state and labour income 
(Goossens, et al., 2007, p. 11). 
The standard method of national accounts/GDP is calculated according to the SNA. The 
common currency is the US Dollar, other currencies are converted accordingly. National 
accounts were originally used for gathering information concerning problems of employment 
and economic policy (United Nations Statistical Division, 2011). For real purchasing power 
(hereafter PPP), the International Comparison Programme by the World Bank has to be 
consulted (The World Bank, 2011b).
Increase in GDP continues to be a primary aim of economic policy, since an elevation of 
living standard and well-being is assumed with its augmentation (Krämer, 2009, p. 1). GDP is 
at the heart of defining progress in the Western world and a key indicator for government 
decisions in many nations. The logic behind this is that if GDP per capita is rising, this 
implies that economic activity increases and thus that people are spending money, improving 
their quality of life (Marks, et al., 2006, p. 9).
History of GDP and Economic Growth
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According to Stammel, before 1879 economic growth was unimportant. Instead, the economy 
of a nation was dependent on the relation of humans to land (Stammel, 1996, p. 6). Finiteness 
of natural resources was not a question of concern. Alfred Marshall discovered in the 
beginning of the 20th century that valuation by individual consumers for the goods being 
produced needed to be taken into account in order to measure production (Goossens, et al., 
2007, p. 11).  
It was only after the WW II that economic development was associated with economic 
growth. First official estimates of GDP and GNI were made between the two world wars 
(Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. xxiv). GDP was intended to provide a measure of the level of market-
based economic activity, which by its very nature excluded home production. The work was 
pioneered by John Maynard Keynes, Simon Kuznets and Richard Stone, with Keynes theories 
of the government’s active role in the economy making national accounting tools necessary. It 
was his work which, due to its emphasis on consumption, shaped the notion of citizens not as 
farmers or workers but as consumers. Simon Kuznets and Richard Stone received the Nobel 
Prize also for contributing to creating such instruments: The system of national income 
accounts (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. xxiv & 23). Western industrial nations agreed about the later 
called System of National Accounts becoming the standard in the light of a lack of 
alternatives (Stammel, 1996, p. 19). Economists, being rarely even quoted before the Second 
World War, rose to become one of the most important political authorities. 
Today, although being a mere measure of market activity, GDP per capita is regarded as a 
measure of societal progress and well-being (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. xxv).
In order to enhance comparability between nations, the National Comparison Project (ICP), 
today administered by the World Bank came into being, using purchasing power parities. The 
ICP method made use of an internationally compatible basket of commodities; GDP was now 
called ICP-GDP (today also GDP PPP) (Stammel, 1996, p. 25; The World Bank, 2011b). The 
difference between nominal GDP per capita and real purchasing power is much larger the 
poorer a given country is, thus applying PPP means that the income gap between rich and 
poor nations usually becomes smaller (Goossens, et al., 2007, p. 14). The gap between rich 
and poor nations was thus not as big anymore. However, conceptual problems concerning the 
calculation of GDP remain: Thus for instance it is difficult to compare countries with 
fundamentally different consumption behaviour: baskets of commodities vary across the 
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world as for instance poor people may spend more on food and rich on entertainment, making 
comparisons again difficult (Stammel, 1996, p. 26; Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. 48). For a ranking 
of top and bottom five nations comparing GDP and GDP PPP, see Table 2 and 3 below. There 
are differences among the rankings, but some similarities remain: There is an overlap of 2 
countries among the top 5 and an overlap of 3 among the bottom 5 countries. 
4.1.2 Evaluating GDP per Capita and Economic Growth as Development 
Indicator
With GDP per Capita, the distinction between validity and necessity of data, indicators and 
the index in total is not as easy, as this is in fact more an indicator than an index. Also, the 
data feeds directly into the criticism of the indicator in total. Thus, this section is organized 
according to different types of criticism (for instance, reasons for and against using it as a 
development indicator) instead of according to data and indicators. 
Evaluating GDP per Capita according to Data
Shortcomings
GDP per capita has a number of conceptual difficulties, one being the production limit: 
Services provided by the government for instance are usually not included in GDP, but 
account for about 30% of all services in France and Sweden but only 20% in the US (which 
may imply that simply by this measure, the US inherently has a higher GDP) (Stiglitz, et al., 
2010, p. 27). Thus, economic activity of governments is not properly accounted for (Krämer, 
Top & Bottom 5 countries 
according to GDP/Capita in $US 
PPP
GDP/Capita 
in $US PPP
Luxemburg 83,978
United Arab Emirates 57,821
Norway 55,672
Singapore 50,701
Brunei Darussalam 48,995
… …
Niger 676
Eritrea 624
Liberia 396
Burundi 393
Democratic Republic of Congo 320
Top & Bottom 5 countries 
according to GDP/Capita in $US
GDP/ Capita 
in $US
Monaco 186,175
Liechtenstein 134,392
Luxembourg 108,706
Bermuda 101,346
Norway 78,674
… …
Malawi 278
Somalia 220
Liberia 216
Democratic Republic of the Congo 170
Burundi 151
Table 2: GDP per Capita in $US, 2009. Source: 
(United Nations Statistics Division, 2011).
Table 3: GDP per Capita in $US according to Purchasing 
Power Parities, 2009. Source: (The World Bank, 2010).
Table 2 & 3: GDP per Capita (nom.) & GDP per capita (PPP)
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2009, p. 2). Furthermore, the potentially different interpretation of where the production 
boundary is to be drawn makes international comparison difficult (Stammel, 1996, p. f). The 
production boundary additionally causes the exclusion of certain types of goods and services: 
Thus GDP per Capita as it is calculated currently rewards exchange values compared to utility 
value. Luxury goods enhance GDP while needs for the masses tend to do so less and 
consequently are more likely to be ignored. Nuscheler gives the example of luxury clinics in 
developing nations when basic health centres would be needed on a large scale (Nuscheler, 
2006, p. 188f).
Another important issue with GDP is the systematic non-observance of subsistence, informal, 
voluntary and home based activity, in sum, every activity that does not occur via the formal 
market (Krämer, 2009, p. 2; Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. xxv). Wherever a high share of self-
supporters (that is, people who live in a subsistence economy) exists, GDP per Capita can at 
best be a rough estimation. The same is true for economies where the informal sector plays an 
important role. This is problematic since according to Nuscheler, the informal sector ensures 
survival of more people than the formal sector(Nuscheler, 2006, p. 187).
In Western Samoa, for instance, an appraisal via capital flow is generally problematic as not
the entire production reaches an external market. Many parts do not reach an exporter as they 
are sold in small weekly markets. 
Particularly where subsistence economy and luxury goods are concerned, such issues with 
GDP are, according to Stammel, greater in developing than in industrial nations (Stammel, 
1996, p. 39).  
In conclusion, all goods and services that have no monetary price attached to them, as well as 
all informal activity are not captured by GDP and may be undervalued by a society using it as 
a measure of well-being (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. 24). This is also problematic the other way 
around: Service people used to receive from family are now purchased on the market, adding 
to GDP, when living-standard has not necessarily been improved (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. 49). 
Stammel illustrates some of these problems by means of formal and informal gift exchange in 
Western Samoa: Gift exchange is not accounted for in GDP but is an integral part of the 
indigenous status system in Samoa. The exchange of gifts is a vital investment in kinsman 
relationships and prestige (Stammel, 1996, p. 73). Stammel makes a similar case for transfer 
payments paid by migrant workers to their family and friends. According to him, these are 
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advance payments and investments for an unknown future: The presentee is in one’s debt 
(Stammel, 1996, p. 73). 
Next to certain goods and services being excluded from GDP, another difficulty is the correct 
assessment of products’ quality. Some products are difficult to assess in monetary terms as 
their quality level is too complex, like education or health products and services. Measuring 
quality is thus a great challenge, but important for well-being. According to Stiglitz et al, 
underestimating quality is like overestimating inflation. Hence, Measuring GDP per Capita 
may take away attention from other, possibly more crucial aspects of development (Stiglitz, et 
al., 2010, p. 24f)8. 
Merits
According to Stiglitz, monetary valuation of goods and services makes it easy to add up 
quantities of different natures. This is one reason for GDP per capita having gained such 
importance (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. 23). Stammel adds to this that economic wealth is that 
part of wealth which remains measurable, with money being the measuring unit (Stammel, 
1996, p. 19f). The reason for the dominance of GDP per Capita is thus according to Stammel 
that it is the measure with the lesser evil: Monetary values are measurable and generally 
accepted (Stammel, 1996, p. 37). Furthermore, according to economic theory, prices are 
always to be seen in relation to other prices – and are thus an expression of the valuation of a 
given good or service. GDP is thus an attempt of a way to measure appreciation. However, a 
lack in transparency and comparability, added to a high complexity of many products (for 
instance in the finance sector) make such a reflection difficult (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. 23 & 
25).
Klingebiel too gives the conviction of the lack of a real alternative to GDP per Capita as 
reason that it is still in use. He lists two major rationales for not replacing it: Indicator 
research does not aim at replacing it but instead looks for methods and concepts to measure 
further concrete circumstances like health, nutrition and education. However, the lack of data 
is often problematic. The second reason is the deficits where a theoretical and methodical 
consensus in other potential areas of indicator research are concerned, for instance indicators 
concerning the environment, subjective wellbeing, culture, and aggregated indices that 
attempt to measure complicated circumstances or development as a whole. Here, often neither 
8 Stiglitz et al state that in the 1990s an underestimation of quality had led to an overestimation of inflation by 
0.6% in the US, leading to several changes to the U.S. consumer price index (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. 24f). 
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a clear conceptual dimension nor the necessary quality and availability of data is given 
(Klingebiel, 1992, p. 6ff).
According to Stammel, alternatives cannot compete with the systematic, exchangeable and 
inwardly consistent characteristics of the national accounts calculation. It also alleviates the 
study of single factors and sectors and their influence upon the entire economy (Stammel, 
1996, p. 19ff). 
According to Stiglitz et al the success of GDP lies in its attraction as a single headline figure 
allowing comparisons of socioeconomic performance over time and between countries 
(Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. 102). Therefore, in the economy, GDP per Capita still serves as an 
important benchmark. The same is true for the political sphere, the main reason being that 
circumstances which are not precisely measurable do not hold the promise of clear successes. 
They cannot be used to show progress (Stammel, 1996, p. 29). Hence, political leaders 
continue to be often graded according to economic success (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. xx). 
Evaluating GDP per Capita according to Content
GDP per capita excludes ‘external costs’: A price someone pays for a given good may 
exclude costs to society and environment at large. Hence all costs not reflected in market 
terms are disregarded by GDP per capita (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. 24). An increase in crime for 
instance may entail an increase in GDP, for example via increased costs of police and other 
security measures – however, social costs have risen at the same time (Stammel, 1996, p. 28).
The same may be true for the effects of natural disasters like hurricanes (Marks, et al., 2006, 
p. 9).
Negative aspects of economic growth like environmental degradation (or environmental 
costs) are not accounted for: With rising production, environmental degradation is rising as 
well; however, it is not deducted from production, instead consumption of resources is added 
to the GDP (Nuscheler, 2006, p. 146). Thus for instance driving by car will add more to the 
GDP than driving by bike. Environmental protection measures on the other hand may 
decrease GDP: Money used for investment in such measures is not available for other outputs 
any longer and thus GDP is lowered (Stammel, 1996, p. 28).
Thus GDP per capita suggests there is a trade-off between economic growth and the 
environment. However, Stiglitz et al wonder whether with a comprehensive measure of well-
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being this would be seen as a false choice as an improvement in environment may increase 
well-being even though GDP per capita goes down (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. xx). 
However, the UN Committee of Experts on Environmental-Economic Accounting is 
attempting to mainstream System of Environmental Economic Accounting (SEEA) and to 
elevate it to an international statistical standard by 2010 and to advance its implementation in 
countries (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. 106). So far however, ecological and social consequences of 
economic activity are not properly accounted for in GDP (Krämer, 2009, p. 2). 
GDP hides income inequalities: It measures average income but gives no indication of the 
distribution of available resources for instance between urban and rural areas, between sexes 
and between social stratums (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. 44). This is particularly relevant for 
developing nations: Nuscheler claims that in most developing nations, two thirds of people 
have less than the official GDP per Capita (Nuscheler, 2006, p. 146). There may be an 
increasing inequality in most countries in the world, a trend which is not captured by GDP 
(Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. xxi). 
Nuscheler claims that measuring monetary income and consumption ability disregards the 
circumstances of the poor, as poverty has much to do with legal discrimination and a lack in 
political participation.
Also, using GDP per Capita as a development measure constricts the perception of 
development, as societal and cultural diversity are not accounted for. Furthermore, an increase 
in quality of life and self-determination may not necessarily be correlated with an increase in 
GDP per Capita (Krämer, 2009, p. 1). Using GDP per Capita as a welfare measure may lead 
to confusing means with ends: The end is to increase wellbeing, not to enhance economic 
growth. As Stiglitz et al (2010, p. xxii) put it, “Our economy is supposed to increase well-
being. It [too] is not an end in itself.” While a relationship does exist, it ceases to do so at a 
surprisingly low level of average income (Abdallah et al 2006: 9) (for further elaboration 
regarding this point see section 4.3.2).
Comparison of GDP per Capita produces a ranking of nations and highlights gaps between 
them. It encourages an economic catch-up race and thus consolidates the definition of 
development as economic development. Economic development appears to be so all-
encompassing that even non-economic factors seem to be affected by it (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, 
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p. xxiv). Development may have different meanings in different countries, yet industrial 
nations are taken as the model. But it may be that their archetype is not as desirable and a 
repetition of their path impossible. The aim of development should be according to national 
preferences, not according to GDP per capita and thus according to a measure which is 
imposed from outside as the case may be (Stammel, 1996, p. 39). 
Criticism concerning GDP per Capita increases from many parts, especially civil society. 
Questions are raised whether the assumptions made in the past are still appropriate in the 
present. The threat of global warming in particular contributed to this criticism (Stiglitz, et al., 
2010, p. xxiii). Already in 1954, a UN expert group recommended the use of other indicators 
from the areas health, education, employment and living. Almost all institutions recognized 
the major points of criticism regarding GDP which are given above (Nuscheler, 2006, p. 146). 
However, according to Stammel, international competition as well as belief in economic 
growth as being most effective in combating poverty appears to leave no alternative than to 
pursue this path of ‘development’. Therefore, problems with data and measuring may be
answerable, while the problems which refer to the content of GDP per Capita go much deeper 
and are harder to resolve (Stammel, 1996, p. 29).
Revisions of GDP per Capita
There have been a number of attempts to revise GDP per capita. Those can be distinguished 
according to complement/adjustments of GDP or finding alternatives (Goossens, et al., 2007, 
p. 21 & 31; Marks, et al., 2006, p. 10). The revisions presented here are not exhaustive but 
highlight some of the mentioned main issues and attempts of dealing with them. They focus 
on complementing and adjusting instead of replacing GDP, as the next two cases will deal 
with alternatives/possible replacements of GDP. 
Median income would be a conceptually simple way of capturing distribution aspects. The 
difference between average income and median income9 widens with rising inequality. Thus, 
if the top 10% receive all income gain, median income remains unchanged while average 
income rises (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. 44).
A further important revision might be the invariance principle. This means that the value of 
what is measured should not be dependent upon institutional arrangements as is currently the 
9 Median income is the central income data point such that half of the population are above and half below it 
(Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. 44).
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case. A health service which is provided privately currently adds more to GDP than if it were 
provided by the government. However, the latter might serve larger shares of the population 
(Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. 27). 
The Index of Sustainable Measure of Economic Welfare (SMEW) by Tobin and Nordhaus is 
an attempt to deduct so called “Regrettable Necessities”, meaning social costs from GDP, 
subtracting components that don’t contribute positively to welfare and adding monetary 
estimates of activities that do (Nordhaus & Tobin, 1972). Total public and private wealth are 
estimated, including educational and health capital. In Western Samoa for instance, costs for 
driving to work, for police as well as negative environmental impacts do not apply while 
values for spare time and own production are higher (Stammel, 1996, p. 78).10 However, 
problematic about the SMEW is its lack of unanimity as to which products qualify as 
defensive expenditure and what do not. Furthermore, estimates for environmental damage or 
natural resource depletion are not included (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. 37 & 104).
Green GDP refers to an adjusted Net Domestic Product, taking into account consumption of 
natural capital which comprises resource depletion and environmental degradation (Stiglitz, et 
al., 2010, p. 30f). 
Refinements of SMEW are the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) and the
Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) which deduct evaluations of the costs of water, air and 
noise pollution and try to account for the loss of wetlands, farmland and primary forests, CO2 
damage and ozone depletion (Daly, 1996, p. 5ff). ISEW was developed by Herman Daly and 
John Cobb and belonged to a group of approaches from the 1980s and 1990s which attempted 
to highlight the forms of economic growth which are detrimental to human well-being
(Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. 104).
According to Stiglitz et al, values for ISEW and GPI start diverging from GDP at some point 
in time leading to the so-called threshold hypothesis according to which from the point of 
diversion with GDP growth no longer improves well-being (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. 104).
The World Resources Institute created the so called Natural Resource Account in 1989 and 
recalculated Indonesia’s average GDP from 1971 to 1986. The result was that Indonesia’s 
10 It should be considered that these data are from 1996. However, they may still point out to general difficulties 
of GDP per capita to measure welfare in societies that may have non-economic or non-market priorities. 
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GDP would decrease considerably from roughly 7% to 4% if the depletion of its natural 
resource was taken into account (Klingebiel, 1992, p. 29).
Stiglitz et al point out to the difficulty of defining and characterizing sustainability. Charging 
GDP for the depletion of natural resources may not be sufficient to really measure 
sustainability. They continue to stress that we need measures of overconsumption or 
underinvestment (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. 107f). These issues are according to them reflected 
in the measure of for instance the Ecological Footprints, the latter of which will be explained 
in the next case study (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. 108ff).
While environmental depletion may be given a monetary value, hurdles to attempts to 
measure and thus appreciate the quality of the natural environment (and consequently reasons 
why they are not being applied much more) are the lack of reliable measurement and 
monetary valuation of changes in environmental quality (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. 29). 
According to Stiglitz et al (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. xxvi), the aim must be to construct a simple 
index (unlike, for instance, the mentioned index by Prescott-Allen) including metrics that 
capture what is of most concern. GDP per capita may remain as a measure, but it should be 
more clearly identified as a measure of market activity, not of well-being. 
Stiglitz et al however also draw the attention to the explicit political dimension of GDP and 
the resulting difficulty to revise it. Thus, Stiglitz claims that while attempts for supplementing 
or even replacing GDP are generally met favourably nowadays, his attempt while being Chief 
Economist at the World Bank and government adviser to improve the GDP’s calculation, a 
reform which he claims was not very ambitious was met with great political resistance. For, 
he states “there were those who were afraid of the light that better information systems might 
shed.” (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. xxii). 
In summary GDP may not be a sufficient criterion for assessing a country’s development. 
Stiglitz et al in 2010 state that in theory, advances in research would enable societies to 
develop broader, more all-encompassing measures of well-being (Klingebiel, 1992, p. 32; 
Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. xxiii). Krämer agrees when stating that dynamic development in 
modern economic happiness research in the last years is due to the existence of methods with 
which it is possible to measure human wellbeing (Krämer, 2009, p. 2). 
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It should be noted that the list of revisions to GDP is non-exhaustive. There are many attempts 
to replace or at least complement it. However, the examples above show that GDP is in fact 
viewed as flawed by many institutions, alternatives are searched for and are available.
Revising and/or replacing GDP may today be more a question of political coordination and 
political will especially, or, to use Sachs’ and Escobar’s terms, of breaking the power of the 
discourse of economic development. This notion is explored further in the next section. 
4.1.3 Evaluating GDP per Capita in the light of Post-Development Theory
GDP per Capita as a development indicator depicts an economic definition of development 
narrowing a complex and diverse concept to one of its possible dimensions. The previous 
section has attempted to summarize reasons why making use of such a notion of development 
may be critical: GDP per capita/economic development is not able to grasp alternative 
definitions of wealth and or quality of life. It does not incorporate goods and services which 
are not traded via a (monetary) market (for instance in economies relying on subsistence). 
Furthermore, it hides social and environmental costs and may add them positively to the GDP 
of a given country thus painting a biased image of progress.
This constriction of development as expressed in GDP per Capita and the fact that despite 
many critical voices it continues to be widely applied in order to evaluate whether a country 
classifies as developed or underdeveloped highlights one potential, and at the same time 
limitation, of an index: It not only reflects but reinforces a previously existing definition of 
development. It may be regarded as one of the concepts Sachs (2010d, p. xix) mentions, that 
make up the development discourse and reinforce the occidental world-view, filtering 
perception, highlighting certain aspects of reality while excluding others (Sachs, 2010d, p. 
xx). Any index or indicator claiming to measure development represents a given development 
concept, filters perception and consolidates its definition of development. Stiglitz gives the 
example of perceiving the world through a lens as a metaphor for indices. 
Applying GDP per Capita as development index highlights the importance of economic 
development in order to “un-underdevelop”. The perception of development is filtered as to 
the importance of economic growth rates and the apparent ways towards it: capital 
accumulation, savings rates, and international trade. All other aspects of development and in 
particular all alternatives to development or modernity are excluded (Escobar, 2008, p. 162). 
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The continuing importance of GDP may show that the degree of civilization in a country can 
still be measured by its economic performance level. Statistical toolkits and GDP per capita 
are ready made indicators for assessing a country’s position on the road of development 
(Sachs, 2000, p. 5f). Poor countries and their peoples are lacking what the rich have; they 
were defined according to standards of wealth by the more economically advantaged nations 
and thus also by an economic conception of poverty. The yardstick that was applied was the 
annual per capita income (Escobar, 1995, p. 23). Thus, according to Sachs (1999, p. 8), the 
perception of poverty “was nothing more than the result of a comparative statistical operation
[…]”.
When Sachs (Sachs, 1993, p. 17) points out that it is the development creed introduced in 
1948 by the World Bank and in 1940 by President Harry S. Truman which impedes serious 
debates about economic growth, it might be said that this causality also works the other way 
around: It is the idea of economic growth which defines who is poor and who is rich, who is 
to become like whom, and thus enforces the development creed, hindering any serous debates 
about this concept. Thus development, functioning as a discourse, means that it creates a 
space in which only certain things can be said and even imagined, a space for systematic 
creation of concepts, theories and practices (Escobar, 1995, p. 39).
Sachs points out that such a constriction of imagination did not only happen in the First, but in 
particular in the Third World when stating that the development idea was legitimization; it 
was raison d’être for emerging states. The perspective of catching up restored the humiliated 
former colonies’ self-respect, it promised equal standing (Sachs, 2000, p. 8).  Hopes for the 
future are fixed on the rich man’s pattern of production and consumption and thus 
development and the hope for catching up are linked to an increase in GDP per Capita (Sachs, 
2010d, p. viiif). Being a developed society, meaning an urban-based civilization characterized 
by growth, political stability and increasing standards of living, became important in the Third 
World itself (Escobar, 2010, p. 149f). Sachs emphasises this by analyzing the struggle to 
reconcile ecology with economy. Thus, he claims, in environmental negotiations, the claims 
to greater economic space are often bargained against environmental demands (Sachs, 2000, 
p. 12). At the UNCED in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, for instance, environmental concessions 
were used as diplomatic weapons to more development. There, a continuing commitment by 
Southern countries to run the development race could be observed. For the South, the 
Northern model was considered Utopia. The blessings of development justified the rushing 
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ahead on the economic race track, but development is like a race without a finish line: 
Societies which settle at the accomplished stage of technical capacity are unthinkable. 
Already at the Stockholm Conference, all no-growth positions were rejected by the Third 
World countries. An alliance of development enthusiasts in the South and growth fatalists in 
the North was formed (Sachs, 1993, p. 7). The compulsion to drive up GNP had turned them 
into enemies of nature (Sachs, 2010b, p. 26).
The North sees an infinite economic future, while the South cannot free itself of this mimicry. 
Other, for instance indigenous models, seem impossible, as they would be at the expense of 
the wealthy (Sachs, 1993, p. 17). According to Sachs, different cultures had over time 
developed complex and ingenious systems of institutions and rules regulating use of resources 
in a way so that equilibrium between resource extraction and resource preservation remained. 
But through global consumer class, their livelihoods have been undermined (Sachs, 2000, p. 
26). 
Instead of highlighting the progressiveness of Western nations, it could also be highlighted 
how they tap into nature and draw on the environment far beyond their national boundaries. 
As of 2000, the wealthy 25% of humanity occupy an Ecological footprint as large as the entire 
biologically productive surface area on earth (for an explanation of the Ecological Footprint 
see section 4.3.1). 20% of the world’s population consume 80% of the world’s resources. 
They eat 45% of all meat and fish, consume 68% of electricity, 84% of all paper and drive 
87% of all cars. In short, they are cornering environmental resources to their benefit at the 
cost of other groups and should thus not be regarded to be on top of the social evolution scale 
(Sachs, 2000, p. 18). 
While Sachs’ analysis may highlight the destructive potential of GDP per capita and 
economic growth, it also points to another aspect: Equality. Resource consumption is highly 
unequal in the world with most of it being consumed by the West11. This is hidden by a 
development measure like GDP per capita. Given, however, that it is a discursive product of 
the Post World War II era, constructed and applied by the West, this may not be surprising. 
Furthermore, as Sachs (2010d, p. xiv) points out, economic growth, while completely 
disregarding relations of power or income distribution, held within itself the promise of no 
sacrifices for anyone: The rich needed not give up anything, for as long as growth would be 
11 While a global consumer class is also rising in many parts of the Third World, aspiring to the development 
model of the First World. 
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sustained, the situation would eventually get better for the poor as well. GDP thus worked as a 
tool for streamlining the world to follow the West and thus putting it in a position of structural 
power while at the same not asking for any sacrifices from the Western side. 
Thus, not to lose grounds in economic markets has become an obsession by governments. 
There no longer appeared to be space for a policy of self-determination or to organize 
societies creatively and differently, hence controlling their own destiny became difficult for 
countries. Streamlining for competition is everything, diversity regarded as an obstacle 
(Sachs, 2010a, p. 116). Economic growth according to Sachs fed and feeds on nature and 
communities and unpaid costs are shifted back to them like, for instance, displacement, 
dispossession and social polarization, which have been on the rise along with growth rates 
(Sachs, 2010d, p. ixf). A subordination of social life under the rule economy follows. 
According to Sachs, these factors undermine a society’s capacity for well-being and limit 
their space for manoeuvre. The best examples are the Northern countries that seem incapable 
of doing anything but running the economic race (Sachs, 1993, p. 5).
The historization which Escobar and Sachs carry out highlights that GDP per capita is not 
neutral and no natural truth. It has been produced under certain historic circumstances and is 
connected to the interests, claims and ideologies of its time. This displays its arbitrary parts 
and the power aspirations as well as asymmetries linked to and caused by it. GDP co-invented 
poverty and characterized the Third World as problem-laden and may have contributed to 
economic progress and development becoming natural, universal truths and paths that must be 
followed. From a market activity measuring tool to a tool measuring welfare. GDP has 
become a benchmark according to which it is determined who is at the forefront and who at 
the backend of social evolution. 
Escobar links the rise of development to the rise of US hegemony: When the US arose as the
new hegemonic power after the World War II this rise to hegemony implied a need for the US 
to deepen the market for US products and to find new investment sites for US surplus capital 
(Escobar, 1995, p. 32). Furthermore, access to cheap raw material to support the growing US 
industry was required. Contrary to the Marshall Plan for Europe, the so called Four Point 
Programme was intended for the Third World. It was similar to the Marshall Plan but much 
smaller, since the Third World was supposed to look for private capital. In order to be able to 
do this, the Third World had to create “the right climate”, including a commitment to capital 
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development, curbing of nationalism and the control of the left, the working class and the 
peasantry (Escobar, 1995, p. 33f).
Consequently, in order for the US to expand its hegemony other nations needed to follow its 
path and notion of development. Colonial times had ended and could not be restored due to 
the threat of communism. Tools were needed to make the rest of the world follow without 
military submission. GDP per capita, a benchmark against which nations were evaluated and 
later came to appraise themselves as Sachs (2000, p. 8) points out, could be regarded as a tool 
towards the US development model, a tool to submit to economic development concepts 
mentioned above by Escobar: The search for private capital to help US investments, the 
opening of markets to enhance trade and the general commitment to capital development. 
In the light of economic development being linked so strongly to interests of a certain
country, the ideological nature of its core indicator GDP per capita is further highlighted. It 
might no longer seem astonishing that a tool is used for measuring welfare that only measures 
‘official’ exchanges of goods and services, but not social aspects or well-being.
GDP per Capita hence appears to have been the first development indicator since the concept 
of development and underdevelopment was introduced. It may be regarded as one of the first 
development tools to reinforce with seemingly objective data the idea of the developed and 
the underdeveloped. It appears to be a good example of the power knowledge and statistics 
have for shaping and creating our reality: In the beginning it meant to measure the level of the 
market-based economy in a given country. Thus it was clear that many important parts of 
development of a given nation would be excluded. Over time however, it became a more 
general benchmark: Through monetary means and statistics, people where defined as being 
poor or rich, countries were seen as being developed or underdeveloped. GDP per Capita was 
to help find the solution. It helped in creating a reality where three worlds existed. Stiglitz et 
al highlight this by mentioning that the GDP measure needs to be supplemented by other 
measures of well-being and environmental sustainability (Stiglitz, et al., 2010, p. xxvi): GDP 
needs to be supplemented, not replaced. It needs to remain, it has become a part too important 
for our reality to let go. Furthermore, even where mere supplementation of GDP is concerned 
it might be interesting to note that, while indicators and indices have been developed which 
either adjust GDP for environmental damage (ISEW and GPI), or “simply” attempt to 
measure environmental sustainability (for instance the Ecological Footprint described in one 
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of the following case studies), they do not appear to be widely applied either by political 
decision makers, media or international organisations to measure progress of countries.
GDP per capita continues to be at the heart of national and international decisions despite the 
fact that it was not designed for measuring society’s ends. 
The fact book published by the OECD as well as the many indicators displayed in the Human 
Development Report and further indicators of progress and development published by other 
institutions (see section 3.3.) equally demonstrate that there are many attempts to supplement, 
correct or even replace GDP. Consequently, not only what we measure appears to matter, as 
Stiglitz claims. Possibly, the attention an index or indicator of development receives and 
whether or not it is applied on a large scale does not only depend on the way it is 
communicated as Goossens et al mention (see section 3.3) or on the availability, precision and 
quality of data as Stiglitz et al state (see section 4.1.2.3). Rather, it might be important who is 
communicating where and with what interests at heart. The selection of which indices and 
thus which benchmarks are being heard and applied might be reflected in Escobar’s analysis 
of a set of relations that systematically produce interrelated objects, concepts, theories and 
strategies making up the development discourse: Due to these relations it is determined what 
is legitimate as development practice. Certain actors and power relations decide what is to be 
problematized, which problems are considered (and thus which come into existence) and 
which are not. Such a tendency may also be mirrored in Stiglitz’ back then unsuccessful 
attempts to criticize and warn the World Bank where handling of the Asian crisis and 
structural adjustment measures were concerned (see also section 2.2).
It should be mentioned that the broad application of GDP per capita as a development 
measure had not only an implicit, but an explicit political dimension: Applying GDP had 
direct political consequences especially for developing nations, as Stiglitz et al (2010, p. xxix)
points out: Capital investment and privatization of natural resource extraction all added to 
GDP and hence were to be fostered by governments and all development institutions. Yet, due 
to social, health related and environmental costs, they might in fact be worse off than before. 
GDP per capita as a measure of progress may be regarded as a tool of imperial globality, as 
described by Escobar: A form of global coloniality which includes a heightened 
marginalization and suppression of the knowledge and culture of subaltern groups (Escobar, 
2004, p. 207). According to Escobar, imperial globality spreads a Eurocentric way of life that 
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has historically privileged white/Western people at the expense of non-Westerns world-wide.  
Included in this concept is a type of social and political fascism which marginalizes large 
parts of people in the world and helps maintaining a pattern of capital accumulation that 
benefits a minority of the world population (Escobar, 2004, p. 217). GDP per Capita may thus 
help to impose norms like free-markets and cultural notions of consumption.
Coloniality of power can be seen as operating via the imposition of a normative economic 
system and the aim of economic growth. The more the knowledge of the workings of such an 
economic system spread, the more the hope of bringing material prosperity to the rest of the 
world was strengthened. Economic growth was regarded as the continuum between rich and 
poor countries and would allow the latter to replicate conditions in mature capitalist 
economies like industrialization, high levels of literacy, etc. Development was seen as the 
process of transition from one situation to the other, a view that culminated in the stages of 
growth theories by Rostow in the 1960s (Escobar, 1995, p. 38).
The aim of a developed society was to be reached with the assistance of ambitious plans, 
executed by development experts (Escobar, 2010, p. 149f). Planning relied upon practices 
regarded as rational and objective. However, Escobar emphasizes, determining local realities 
by non-local institutional practices is already highly ideological and political. Project planning 
and implementation gives the impression that policy is the result of discrete, rational acts. 
Instead, it is a process of coming to terms with conflicting interests where choices are made, 
exclusions effected and world-views imposed. Identifying people as a problem for instance, 
seems neutral, when in fact this identification has been an act of choice already. Furthermore, 
these problems are presented in such a way that some kind of development programme has to 
be accepted as a legitimate solution (Escobar, 2010, p. 154f). 
While planning may not be put on a level with development indices and indicators in general, 
a development index and possibly GDP per Capita in particular is a tool to foster the planning 
process, to lead the direction it takes. It is at the root of making a choice: Results of an index 
may serve as justification for commencing the planning in the first place and it may justify it 
by showing its ‘success’. Furthermore, by deciding which index to apply, a decision is made 
what is to be planned and who is going to be problematized. Thus if GDP per capita has risen 
in a given region by a given percentage, this may be taken as proof of success of a given 
project. If GDP per capita is particularly low in particular regions in the world, this may serve 
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as the justification for intervention via project planning or similar types of aid (see also 
section 3.2). It serves as the justification for planning in the first place. And, like planning, it 
fragments the world in which people live. Not the overall enhancement of quality of life, but 
economic progress is being planned and measured. If planning is a choice to identify 
something as a problem and in need of change, a development index enhances this choice by 
lining it with numbers of progress, regress, development or underdevelopment. And such an 
index represents a choice in itself – a choice as to which indicators are used, which data is 
incorporated and which left out. In the case of GDP per capita, the economic dimension is 
being measured, while all other dimensions and, more importantly all other views of quality 
of life are left out. 
Escobar sees development and in particular economic development as the anthropology of 
modernity, as a non-neutral, but instead culturally and historically specific, phenomenon. 
Thus, the West can and should be anthropologized, which means rendering its cultural 
products (and thus also development), its constitution of reality exotic (Escobar, 1995, p. 11). 
Modern practices of reason and rationality may appear to be naturally given due to their 
universalization. However, through the lens of anthropological criticism they can be regarded 
as a specific collection of practices with a historical nature (Fischer, 2008, p. 264). Such an 
anthropologization appears reasonable given that a tool which originally was not designed for 
measuring welfare but mere market activity was and is applied as one of the major 
benchmarks of modernity to measure progress, despite its very serious shortcomings where 
data as well as concepts of progress are concerned. That it fosters the notion of progress even, 
or rather particularly when environmental degradation (a fundamental part of human life) and 
social cost are rising. 
Seeing development not as a natural coercion but anthropologizing it as a cultural product, 
takes away the apparent neutrality of data produced by GDP per Capita and of GDP per capita 
in total. Instead, it renders it exotic. And as an exotic tool, GDP per capita may well be 
arbitrary, include cultural markers and disregard characteristics of other cultures when 
assessing their “progress”. It may be one-dimensional in its measurement, since it is designed 
to fit a particular culture and a particular time. GDP per capita may consequently be seen as a 
tool fostering the process of replication of the poor nations to become like to rich nations. 
Progress in that way could be measured by it. 
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The next sections summarizes findings for GDP per capita and economic growth as 
development indicators and addresses the original research question posed at the beginning of 
this paper – the question of the validity and necessity of this development index. 
4.1.4 Validity and Necessity of GDP per Capita  
Development was invented after the Second World War with the rise of US hegemony. This 
ascent was connected to the search for new markets and new forms of domination especially 
in the light of fighting communism. Development received an economic impregnation still 
visible today – and GDP per Capita as the benchmark against which countries were assessed 
was a tool to drive this type of development. It thus may be regarded as neither neutral nor 
naturally given just as the development discourse itself. Instead, it may be seen as a tool of 
domination, of standardization and homogenization: A tool which produces a ranking with the 
countries on top being ahead of the others and needing to be followed in an evolutionary, 
coercive way which fosters environmental and social destruction along with economic 
development. This destructive power in itself speaks against the indicator’s neutrality. 
Besides, just as with planning, a choice is being made whether or not this particular indicator 
is used for evaluating progress. Furthermore, the indicator itself displays signs of arbitrariness 
at least as a welfare measure: It does not include non-Western forms of exchange and 
production, for instance subsistence driven economies.  It enhances the development 
discourse and was at the forefront of creating the Third World – as a monetary indicator, 
defining poverty and states of development of non-monetary based societies by monetary 
means and an arbitrary, monetary poverty line. It appears to be of vital importance to 
anthropologize it – to refrain from seeing it as neutral data objectively assessing the world’s 
progress, but as a historically produced tool of a particular (Western) culture.
As said in section 2.3.3.4, Escobar distinguished between alternative development, alternative 
modernities and alternatives to modernity. Only the last option opens the possibility of going 
beyond the development discourse (Escobar, 2008, p. 162). 
Here, the question is to be raised whether the indicator or index which is evaluated fits into 
any of these categories. The author argues that GDP per capita does not. It certainly does not 
open the way to alternatives to modernity. But even alternative development is a notion which 
does not seem to be reflected in this indicator. Its dimension is purely economic, while 
alternative development refers to going precisely beyond such a one dimensional notion of 
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development. Thus, GDP per capita not only remains part of the development discourse but 
can be regarded as a founder and pillar of it. 
The question remains whether this indicator may be regarded as valid and whether it is 
necessary. In accordance with the definition of validity and necessity in the beginning 
(see section 1.2.3), the answer as to whether GDP per Capita is a valid development 
indicator depends on whether it meets general indicator demands (see section 3.1), what 
it aims to measure, which particular theoretical context it is evaluated in (see section 
2.2), what political process it is involved in (see section 3.2) and whether it is necessary 
as a measuring tool for assessing development/progress.
If the political aim is to measure average augmentation of monetary income or mere 
market activity (which is what it was intended for in the first place) the answer might be 
a yes, particularly if looked at from the angle of the era of economic growth and 
industrialization, since GDP per capita is a self-contained, coherent indicator which is 
all-encompassing in measuring currents of (market) exchanged goods and services. 
If the claim of GDP per capita is to measure long term monetary income gains 
(disregarding its distribution) the answer must be no: Environmental costs (degradation) 
are added to GDP per capita and these may transform into tremendous monetary losses 
in the middle and long run. Adding to this is the lifestyle which appears to overburden 
the earth’s resources as it is, being even more problematic as it represents itself as being 
the peak of quality of life for other nations and cultures. This may incur heightened 
environmental and later monetary costs as well. 
If the aim is to measure what every person in a given country gains, the answer must be 
no as income distribution is completely disregarded (according to Nuscheler, two thirds 
of people in Third World countries have less than the average GDP per capita).  
If the aim is to measure economic progress, the answer cannot be yes, although care 
needs to be taken with answering with a clear no. A rise in GDP per capita might 
indicate a higher rate of industrialization in a given country. Just as well however, it 
might indicate higher prices of raw material (for instance oil) in a given country which 
are unstable and short term, having nothing to do with a stable economy (Stiglitz, et al., 
2010).  
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If the aim is to measure a societies progress overall, the answer must clearly be no. 
Reasons are manifold and have mostly been given above: Monetary income is not equal 
with quality of life. Social indicators are disregarded, environmental destruction 
influences GDP per capita positively, progress needs to be defined from the inside and 
not imposed from the outside. GDP per capita as a benchmark may serve as a tool of 
power to foster a style of development and life imposed on from the outside. It is not a 
valid indicator for measuring societal progress for it does not contain the right data to do 
so, and, at least as important, it produces a ranking which makes it seem that there is 
only one road to progress: Enhanced monetary income, not matter who has it, who 
wishes for it and who does not and what else is enhanced or hindered with or by it. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to regard the index as sufficiently simple, understandable or 
well communicated, given common misunderstandings and misapplications, thus not 
meeting general indicator claims (see section 3.1).
The question of necessity is a bit more difficult to answer. For it cannot be answered 
before asking: Necessary for what and for whom? GDP per Capita is necessary to 
measure market activity and monetary gains in income and to some extent to measure 
economic progress. Is it also necessary to objectively evaluate development? Looking at 
the development discourse as Escobar presents it, it appears to be a highly necessary 
tool for imposing upon the world a Western notion of development. It coincided with 
the invention of development and underdevelopment. It served as proof for the World 
Bank’s discovery of poverty and Truman’s invention of underdevelopment. It may be 
necessary for standardizing and homogenizing what development means anywhere. It 
may be necessary as a tool of dominion without military conquest. It may be necessary 
as a pillar for the development discourse, for dividing the world into developed and 
underdeveloped. That power and profit is attached to it might be reflected by the fact 
that it seems surprisingly hard for decision makers in any sphere (political and 
economic) to let go of it as a tool to assess the world, despite manifold alternatives and 
great improvements in data availability and statistical measuring. Its historic dimension 
and the notion of development it depicts which appears to be clearly correlated to 
interests of power disqualify it as a tool neutrally assessing development or progress. 
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GDP per capita may not be necessary for objectively assessing progress if the aim is to 
go beyond a standardized notion of development, to find, as Escobar puts it alternatives 
to modernity. It may not be necessary to foster a type of development which may be less 
standardized and more defined individually. In fact, it may not only not be necessary, 
but hindering this process. This is true even for finding alternative developments, for in 
order to reach such an aim, different indices focussing more on social progress would be 
necessary. 
A clear answer as to validity and necessity of GDP per capita as a development 
indicator thus cannot be given, for it depends on the aim and notion of progress and of 
the institutions, countries, persons and intentions behind it when this indicator is 
applied. However, in the author’s opinion, it is not necessary, but harmful for assessing 
progress towards sustainable, diverse forms of development. 
The next section looks at an index which aims to go beyond economic development, to 
even possibly replace it by addressing its particular shortcomings and possibly 
remedying them.
4.2 Development - More than Augmentation of Income: The Human 
Development Index
“Human Development is a process of enlarging people’s choices. The most critical of these wide-
ranging choices are to live a long and healthy life, to be educated and to have access to resources 
needed for a decent standard of living.” (UNDP, 1990, p. 1).
4.2.1 Description, Definition and History of the HDI
The Human Development Index was the first attempt to merge economic with social data and 
measure progress beyond economic means (Stammel, 1996, p. 15). The Human Development 
Report was developed and issued for the first time in 1990 by the UNDP. The background to 
its development may have been, as Klingebiel (1992, p. 4f) points out, an enlarged interest in 
development indicators in order to rationalize the development debate and measure progress 
after the Cold War was over. 
A further reason for its development was, according to statements in the first Human 
Development Report in 1990, to provide an indicator that goes beyond a purely monetary 
definition of development:
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“This Report is about people - and about how development enlarges their choices. It is about more than
GNP growth, more than income and wealth and more than producing commodities and accumulating 
capital. A person's access to income may be one of the choices, but it is not the sum total of human 
endeavour.” (UNDP, 1990, p. 1).
The first report in 1990 features a ranking for 130 nations with data from 1987 (Hess, 2010, p. 
544). The HDI has since been published every year as part of the Human Development Report 
by the UNDP (Wolff et al, 2011, 846). It was an attempt to put humans and the human 
dimension of development in the centre and was seen as a complement to other development 
reports which highlighted mainly economic aspects of development (Anand & Sen, 1993, p. 
1f). The crucial elements of life were to be measured (Nuscheler, 2006, p. 149). The HDR 
described itself as a “forceful case for a new approach to thinking about development” 
(UNDP, 2010c, p. 1).
Not the level of income of a country but the way this income is used was decisive: It is 
possible for a country to display a high GDP per Capita and a low level of development and 
vice versa. A high GDP per Capita is not automatically comparable with human progress as it 
does not reflect many human problems and does not display investments that only pay off in 
the long run, for instance in education (Stammel 1996, p. 14f). As shown in the first quotation 
above, Human Development in the HDR is defined as enlarging people’s choices. The 
indicators used within the index are seen as a means towards this end (UNDP, 1990, p. 1). 
In this notion of development Amartya Sen’s ideas are reflected who shaped the idea of 
development as freedom and as enlarging choices (see also section 2.2.1) (Anand & Sen, 
1993, p. 1f; Fischer, 2008, p. 280). It was developed by Mahbub ul Haq, a Pakistani 
economist together with Sen and other scholars to express their dissatisfaction with GDP per 
Capita as measure of progress (Klugman, Rodriguez, & Choi, 2011, p. 249). Ul Haq 
commented on the GDP per Capita as a measure of progress with “[a]ny measure that values a 
gun several hundred times more than a bottle of milk is bound to raise serious questions about
its relevance for human progress.” (Haq, 1995, p. 46).
According to Klingebiel, HDR experts were of the opinion that ideally a large number of 
indicators should be used in order to make Human Development measurable. However, they 
also recognized the lack of relevant data as well as the increasing complexity of indices when
too many indicators are used. Therefore, three indicators that they identified as most critical to 
enlarging people’s capabilities (as cited in the first quotation above) were chosen: Average 
Life Expectancy at Birth, a literacy indicator (from 1991 onwards a combination of 
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alphabetisation of adults and average school enrolment years with a weighting of 2:1) and the 
availability of sufficient resources for a decent standard of living: The GDP per Capita in real 
purchasing power, chosen, according to Klingebiel, due to a lack of alternatives (Klingebiel 
1992, p. 10f). Originally, these three areas were given the same weight (Mehrotra, 2010, p. 1). 
The results were originally divided into three sections: Countries with a high level of human 
development with a score of > 0,800; countries with a medium level of human development 
with a score of 0,500-0,799; and finally countries with a low level of human development 
with a score below 0,500 (Morse, 2003a, p. 283; Nuscheler, 2006, p. 149). Minimum and 
maximum values were defined which took as orientation the worst (42 years, 12% of 
alphabetisation and $220 as yearly real purchasing power income) and best results of 130 
nations covered in the report. In 1996, the goal where income was concerned was defined as 
the average official poverty line of the nine industrial nations. In 1991, the method to 
calculate literacy was reformed: Next to the adult literacy rate, the average length of school 
enrolment was added. The level of income to be attained was changed as well (Stammel, 
1996, p. 15). When the HDI and the HDR were first issued, UNDP intended to create further 
indices measuring political freedom, personal security, international relations, physical 
environment, and equality and gender aspects. As they could not be included into the HDI due 
to methodological and conceptual problems but should not be left out of analysis, additional
indices were created and include into the HDI as of 1991: A gender sensitive HDI, the Gender 
Related Index (See section 3.3.5.) was added as well as a distribution-adjusted HDI and a 
Human Freedom Index (Klingebiel, 1992, p. 11).
The next section assesses the HDI as development index through a literature review, giving an 
overview of current criticisms regarding data as well as dimensions included in the index
4.2.2 Evaluating the HDI as Development Index 
Evaluating Data
The UNDP calculates values for the HDI for a given country against a maximum and 
minimum value and assigned a value between 0 and 1. Calculation for each individual 
dimension (Life Expectancy, Education and Income) is as follows (Morse, 2003a, p. 283): 
(1) HDI = (Real value for country - minimum value) / (Range (maximum - minimum))
From 1994 till 2009, the three indicators were added up and divided by three, making them 
substitutable amongst each other. Several authors criticized this approach since in this way it 
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would be possible to offset a decline in one dimension with a rise in another (Sagar & Najam, 
1998, p. 263). 
In 2010, UNDP addressed this criticism: The formula was revised from arithmetic to 
geometric form (Klugman, et al., 2011, p. 253): 
(2) HDI = ³v (Life Expectancy x Education x Income)
This formula leads to lower values particularly for countries whose development across the 
three dimensions is uneven (Lazar & Lazar, 2011, p. 146f). When recalculating previous 
values for Romania with this new method, including new thresholds and data revisions (see 
paragraphs below), Lazar et all find considerable difference in HDI values for the past 20 
years. This might be the case for a number of other countries, particularly those of low and 
medium development (Lazar & Lazar, 2011, p. 148f).
Wolff et al come to the conclusion that due to the mentioned statistical changes such as 
revision of formula but also changing of thresholds for assigning the status of most to least 
developed to a country, 34% of nations in the HDI of 2010/2011 may be wrongly classified 
(Wolff et al, 2011, p. 845). 
Evidence for this may be that developing nations’ classifications have varied considerably 
over the years around the thresholds (see Figure 1 below).
Figure 1 shows that the distribution used to be relatively uniformly distributed in the 1990s, 
but looking rather “twin peaked” in recent years and spiking around the values that serve as 
Source: Wolff et al, 2011, p. 844.
Figure 1: HDI Differences in countries’ classification from 1990 to 2006
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cut off from a particular category (Wolff, et al., 2011, p. 844).
Wolff et al find that HDI statistics contain “substantial amount of noise on the order of 0.01–
0.11 standard deviations” (Wolff, et al., 2011, p. 867). While formula revision may be 
partially responsible, data precision and availability tends to be another problem, since UNDP 
draws its data in part from domestic sources. Data precision tends to be lower among 
countries with low development status due to less inclusive data and worse data availability 
(Grimm, Harttgen, Klasen, & Misselhorn, 2008, p. 2533 & 2538). Furthermore, data gaps are 
filled by data from other organizations, such that data from different sources, relying on 
different surveys but for the same purpose are mixed. Such shortcomings make continuous 
data revision necessary.
Wolff et al illustrate the problem of data revision by comparing Venezuela and Portugal for 
their 1975 HDI value, calculated in retrospect by the UNDP. In 1999, Portugal’s HDI for 
1975 was below Venezuela’s, but with the yearly data revisions, in 2006, Portugal’s HDI for 
1975 climbed significantly above that of Venezuela (see Figure 2 below) (Wolff et al, 2011, 
p. 849f).
The weaker data for developing countries leads to a higher probability of them being 
misclassified and assigned the wrong cut off value. This is particularly the case if many are 
close to those cut off values, as has been the case for the last HDR’s and rankings: Up to 45% 
of so called developing countries could be affected (Wolff et al, 2011, p. 858 & 867).  
Source: Wolff et al, 2011, p. 849.
Figure 2: HDI from 1975 for Portugal and Venezuela, with data revisions from 1999 till 2006
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There has been relatively little change for the so-called developed countries on the other hand, 
with the top places being occupied by similar nations throughout the years (for instance 
Netherlands, Canada, Japan, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, France and the United 
States) as well as for the countries on the very bottom (Niger, Congo, Somalia, Sierra Leone, 
Mali) (Lazar & Lazar, 2011, p. 149f; UNDP, 2010b, p. 143ff).
The changes among many developing countries are particularly problematic, since many 
NGO’s and international organizations use the HDI and in particular its cut off values to 
determine how much development aid countries in a particular category (i.e. ‘low 
development’ when under the threshold of 0.49 compared to 0.51 in 2006) are entitled to 
(Wolff et al, 2011, p. 862f). The high data variance especially around those threshold values 
may give rise to strategic behaviour in order to be able to receive more development aid 
(Neumayer, 2003, p. 113f) or pay less for instance where environmental negotiations are 
concerned (nef, 2011). Changes by the UNDP where such thresholds are concerned may add 
to the problem.
Table 4 below summarizes all threshold revision from 1990 to 2010:
Statements such as a certain number of countries having moved up or down the HDI may be 
misleading since data revision makes comparison over time so difficult (Habermeier, 2007, p. 
60; Morse, 2003a, p. 292ff). Thus, movement of a particular country by a few steps up or 
down may be attributable to mere data updates (see for instance Cuba which fell by 30 places 
from 1990 to 1991 due to data revision). This is especially true among poorer countries where 
there might be ample room for manipulation due to such drastic changes (Klingebiel, 1992, p. 
16f).
A country may also move up or down because new countries with a higher or lower ranking 
have been added to the table (Morse 2003a, p. 291). 
While setting maxima and minima  as indicated by formula (1) above avoids a country doing 
badly solely on the basis of other countries’ performance and makes temporal comparison 
Source: Lazar & Lazar, 2011, p. 146.
Table 4: HDI Threshold Revisions 1990-2010
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easier (Morse, 2003a, p. 268), these values were changed several times, especially during the 
1990s, for all three indicators, leading to changes in the resulting ranking (Wolff, et al., 2011, 
p. 853). 
All the mentioned points are considered below in more detail for all three dimensions of the 
HDI.
Income
Despite having looked at GDP per capital already in chapter 4.1 above, one point of data 
criticism specific to the way GDP per capita is used in the HDI is concerning the many 
changes of those maximum and minimum values due to methodological discussions. In the 
1990s, UNDP changed values from $47,860 as maximum to $40,000 and from $200 to $100 
as minimum (Klugman, et al., 2011, p. 252). In the late 1990s, UNDP attempted to lessen the 
impact of income on rankings due to diminishing returns of high income upon development 
by using a new formula (the Atkins Formula). However, since this new method severely 
penalized high and middle income countries, this method was let go again (Sagar & Najam, 
1998, p. 253). In 2010, UNDP took up GNP (Gross National Income) per Capita instead of 
GDP per capita, since the former measures output by enterprises of a given country’s citizens 
regardless of where those enterprises are located, taking into consideration increasing 
globalisation of money and trade flows. This changed minimum and maximum values again 
to $163 (min. for Zimbabwe) and $108211 (max. for United Arab Emirates) (Lazar & Lazar, 
2011, p. 143f).
Income has thus undergone a number of changes where data is concerned, making it 
necessary to handle the respective outcomes with car.
Education
Education is possibly the dimension that has undergone most data changes: The first HDI in 
1990 measured Education solely by looking at the adult literacy rate. 1991 to 1995 looked at 
mean years of school enrolment (1/3) as well as adult literacy rate (2/3) (Narayana, 2009). 
Later editions all measure Education by taking the percentages of the relevant age groups of 
the population for primary, secondary and tertiary education (1/3) as well as the adult literacy 
rate (2/3) into consideration (Lind, 2010, p. 304ff). In 2010, this changed again: Next to adult 
literacy rate, mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling were taken into 
consideration (Lazar & Lazar, 2011, p. 143f). Furthermore, the calculation method changed 
from weighted, arithmetic means to geometric means (see Figure 3 below): 
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0 represents the minimum value for years of schooling and literacy rate respectively while 
0.951 represents the best combined value, found in New Zealand (Lazar & Lazar, 2011, p. 
146). 
Changing the formula for education can change countries’ ranking position considerably. 
Samoa for instance suddenly became a country of medium development when it had been 
classified as highly developed in the first HDI with education now including average school 
enrolment. As school enrolment in Samoa tended to last no as long as in many Western 
nations, it fell several places despite the conditions in the country remaining the same, and 
results for life expectancy continuing to be 66 years, while alphabetisation remained at 98%
(Stammel, 1996, p. 76).
As mentioned with the other two dimensions, these changes may mean that the HDI is not 
comparable over time (Klingebiel, 1992, p. 23). Narayana shows this by comparing Education 
outcomes over time in India: India’s HDI fell from 0.439 in 1990 to 0.308 in 1991 due to the 
mentioned methodological changes where measuring Education is concerned. 
Apart from this, similar to many other poorer nations, India also struggles with data 
availability, making its outcomes from the HDI possibly less precise (Narayana, 2009, p. 
284). 
Yet, overall authors are in favour of measuring education since it is recognized as a driver of 
economic progress and investment climate (Habermeier, 2007, p. 65f; Narayana, 2009, p. 
279f).
Life Expectancy
For Life Expectancy at Birth, UNDP changed maximum and minimum values between 1990 
and 1994, and again from 1995 to 2009 (25 and 85 years taken as ‘reasonable values’ and 
Source: Lazar & Lazar, 2011, p.146.
Figure 3: HDI New Revised Formula for Education, 2010 
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saturation points) (Klugman et al, 2011, p. 252f). In 2010, after 30 years of observations 
values of 20 and 83.2 years were chosen (Lazar & Lazar 2011, p. 144). Again, this may make 
inter-temporal comparison, at least for those years, difficult (Morse, 2003a, p. 281 & 291). 
Contrary to the other two components, the formula for Life Expectancy at Birth is the only 
one that has not changed throughout the years (Lazar & Lazar, 2011, p. 143).
Table 4 below summarizes for all three indicators, for which years data revision took place:
Evaluating the Indicators
A common criticism was that life expectancy and literacy were “cheap” indicators: The poor 
as well may live longer and enjoy schooling, but that may not necessarily enhance their 
quality of life (Nuscheler, 2006, p. 149). Furthermore, income, albeit now measured in terms 
of purchasing power, was still a part of the HDI meaning that for instance activities fostering 
environmental degradation were incorporated as well (Klingebiel, 1992, p. 21). Below, Life 
Expectancy and Birth and Education will be evaluated in detail. For a detailed evaluation of 
GDP per Capita (income) see chapter 4.1 above. 
Life Expectancy at Birth
Life Expectancy at birth looks at the average years a person born in a given country can be 
expected to live. Data relies on mortality rates at different ages. Life expectancy is regarded as 
a good measure of progress since it depends on a number of conditions which are expected to 
influence quality of life, for instance infant mortality which relates back to access to 
healthcare and sanitation (Marks, et al., 2006, p. 11). 
However, there are a number of important points of criticism to take into account: Life 
Expectancy measures merely length, but not necessarily all aspects of quality of life. It is only 
an “indirect measure of healthy years lived” (Engineer, Roy, & Fink, 2010, p. 61). While it 
takes into account life shortening diseases (in many poor countries) such as tuberculosis, 
Source: Lazar & Lazar, 2011, p. 143.
Table 5: HDI Data Revisions from 1990 to 2010
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cholera, etc., it does not take into account the new form of illnesses often found in wealthier 
society, such as increasing mental illness (for instance depression or eating disorders), which 
do affect quality of life (Schimmel, 2009, p. 101). Engineer et al attempt to remedy this in part 
by including ‘‘expected lost healthy years’’ into the HDI (Engineer, et al., 2010, p. 61). 
Veenhoven on the other hand suggests combining Life Expectancy with Happiness and thus 
measuring how long and happy people live (‘Happy Life Years’), a concept taken up by the 
Happy Planet Index (see section chapter 4.3 below). In his study, economically affluent 
nations with high degrees of freedom and justice are found on top with such variables 
explaining 66% of the variance, while social security and income equality seem to have little 
influence. However, the author also emphasizes that living long and living happy are separate 
and mentions countries such as Bangladesh, where happiness levels are relatively high 
compared to Life Expectancy, while the opposite is true for many former Soviet Union 
member countries such as Azerbaijan (Veenhoven, 2005, p. 61 & 79).
A further point of concern may be that it is questionable to measure Life Expectancy in terms 
of units, where each unit counts the same: An decrease in Life Expectancy from 40 to 39 
possibly should not count the same as from 60 to 59 (de la Escosura, 2010, p. 845). An 
increase from 45 to 50 years seems more important than one from 80 to 85 years (Dasgupta & 
Weale, 1992, p. 125). 
Additionally, average Life Expectancy at Birth may hide considerable differences of Life 
Expectancy within a country. This is the case for instance in many Arab countries where 
health access differs considerably between rural and urban areas (Boutayeb & Serghini, 2006, 
p. 12). A particularly interesting and concerning example may be countries that are at the top 
of the HDI and enjoy high degrees of Life Expectancy, but who have minority indigenous 
populations whose Life Expectancy is significantly worse than the average. Examples are 
Australia, the USA, Canada and New Zealand. Indigenous populations in those countries 
enjoy only a medium level of development, compared to the high overall level. Cooke et al 
create an HDI for indigenous people to show (lack of) progress where human development for 
this particular group is concerned (Cooke, Mitrou, Lawrence, Guimond, & Beavon, 2007, p. 
1). Grimm et al on the other hand attempt to remedy such inequalities by measuring Life 
Expectancy for income quintiles (Grimm, et al., 2008).
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Overall however, most authors agree on the importance of Life Expectancy for measuring 
human development while recognizing its shortcomings (see for instance Boutayeb & 
Serghini, 2006, p. 1). 
Education
Education has received considerable attention within the HDR’s, with many of them 
focussing on some other educational aspect apart of what is included in the HDI, such as 
education expenditure of governments (Mehrotra 2010, p. 1). 
Considering the HDI only, measuring education in terms of school enrolment and 
alphabetisation rate may say little about the quality of that education, which varies 
considerably across nations (Hicks, 1997, p. 1289). This may be particularly true in cases 
where the literacy- and school enrolment rate is close to 100% and differences across those 
countries would be measured primarily in terms of quality (de la Escosura, 2010, p. 843). 
However, including mean years of schooling partially addresses this problem (Engineer, et al., 
2010, p. 62).  
Measuring education by giving weight to school enrolment and the literacy rate may be 
narrowing the concept of education too much: alphabetisation is not necessarily the same as 
actual education. Both concepts disregard knowledge passed on orally for instance, which 
may, however, form an important part of education in the relevant country/community
(Schimmel, 2009, p. 96; Stammel 1996, p. 76).
Furthermore, when looking at education as enhancement of well-being, it contributes only 
significantly to it once a basic need is met. Higher levels may even cause unhappiness since it 
increases one’s aspirations and thus the potential for not reaching them and being unhappy
(Schimmel, 2009, p. 102). While Schimmel considers including education into the 
measurement of human development, he calls for inclusion of well-being studies into the HDI 
to complement it (Schimmel, 2009, p. 109f).
Similar to Life Expectancy in this sense, average literacy rate and school enrolment may hide 
inequalities in terms of educational access within a country. Grimm et al attempt to calculate 
Education by income quintiles (Grimm et al, 2008, p. 2531).
However, several authors recognize the importance of the components the HDI uses, 
particularly Education (formation of human capital, higher quality of life) and Life 
Expectancy to measure human development (Hess, 2010, p. 542; Lind, 2010, p. 301; Muller 
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& Trannoy, 2011, p. 1; Narayana, 2009, p. 279). In particular, education is seen as a driver to
economic development (if this is a valid point of achievement) in countries with an HDI of 
under 0.7 (Habermeier 2007, p. 65).
Evaluating the Index in Total
At its initial release, a strong point of criticism from developing countries as well as some 
development experts concerned the omission of problems which were specific to 
industrialized countries (Klingebiel, 1992, p. 16f). Further criticism referred to dimensions
like the distribution of income, regional and gender differences, cultural factors and political 
freedom not being considered. However, when including all these factors, comprehensive data 
collection as well as transparency for decision makers and the general public would be 
difficult to ensure (Stammel, 1996, p. 16f). 
Furthermore, decision makers from the realm of development politics, government 
representatives and the media discussed the political function and implications of the HDR 
and HDI: Did the UN have the mandate to do indicator research and would this influence the 
allocation processes of UNDP resources and other multi- and bilateral donors? May the UN 
give out grades for development politics and political freedom? (Klingebiel, 1992, p. 14). 
Developing nations insisted that they had a right to an independent allocation of resources, 
reasoning that the UNDP, as a special organ of the UN had to remain a universal and neutral 
institution. Since they helped with financing the UNDP and thus understood it as also their 
programme. They felt that the HDI were contrary to this self-conception and feared that the 
emphasis on human development of the HDR would entail a promotion of a discussion 
around a “grand strategy” of the UNDP which might lead to a sectoral and regional 
concentration of financial means. While the majority of development experts embraced the 
stronger emphasis of the human dimension in the HDI, the majority of developing countries 
were thus against the inclusion of the HDI in the criteria check list for allocation of UNDP 
means regarding the development programmes.
Western industrialized nations on the other hand saw the HDR as basically a right step for the 
UNDP to choose focal points. They were in favour of the UNDP having a regional (poorest 
nations) as well as a sectorial concentration.  While some points of criticism of the HDI were 
shared with the developing nations, they held on to furthering the development of the HDI. 
Some donor states were even in favour of the HDI being used as criteria for the allocation of 
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development aid. Thus, a low ranking position within the HDI was to indicate a high need for 
means of development aid (Klingebiel, 1992, p. 18f).  Considering that this is the case today 
(Wolff, et al., 2011),  it appears that the apprehensions of developing nations were at least 
partially justified. 
Industrialized nations were overall much less critical of the HDI, although the reasons for 
supporting it differed. Some, like the Scandinavian nations wished to replace the GDP per 
Capita indicator with social indicators. The USA, while supporting the HDI, primarily wished 
to measure “political and economic openness“, and to generally take into account political 
freedom by way of the HDI (Klingebiel, 1992, p. 18f). 
Development experts focussed more on the methodological criticism and asked whether the 
construction of an aggregate index was reasonable or whether disaggregated indices were not 
better in reflecting a nation’s reality. They feared that the attempt to find a globally valid 
measure for assessing living conditions had failed already in the 1970s due to methodological 
constraints in social indicator research. A replacement of GP per capital with such a global 
measure could hence present the same weaknesses as the GDP per Capita itself (Klingebiel, 
1992, p. 19ff).
Such attempts highlight the political importance development indices may have.
Current points of criticism relate to the HDI being overall arbitrary in its choice of indicators, 
its weighting of those indicators as well as being too complex (see for instance Lind, 2010, p.
301f ; Sagar & Najam, 1998, p. 251f). Further points regard the omission of environmental 
and further social criteria, similar to the initial criticism mentioned above (Hess, 2010, p. 
544). 
Some consider the HDI’s disregard of equality dimensions a particularly serious omission 
(Hicks, 1997, p. 1283; Grimm et al, 2008, p. 1257): The HDI hides inequalities between 
countries, particularly where income variation is concerned (Morse, 2003a). Grimm et al find 
that, if inequality were included, the lowest quintile of industrialized countries would be 
below middle income countries (Grimm et al, 2010, p. 2534ff). 
However, it should be noted that the Human Development Report 2010 addressed this issue 
and does calculate loss of human development (HDI) due to inequality in general as well as 
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gender equality in particular. Furthermore, users can build their own Development Index 
choosing among nine dimensions on the website of the HDR 2010. Thus, while the HDI’s 
components remain unchanged, the HDR addressed some of the points of criticisms by 
enlarging its concept of human development by other dimensions (UNDP, 2010c, p. 3ff). 
Environmental sustainability, despite gaining increasing importance remains underrepresented 
(Morse, 2003b, p. 183). However, Jha et al find a significant negative relationship between 
the rate of deforestation and the HDI rank, with low rates of deforestation when the HDI rank 
was high despite possibly high levels of population growth (Jha & Bawa, 2006, p. 906). It 
might hence be said that HDI partially addresses one sustainability concern indirectly. 
Overall, its willingness to change and respond to criticism (even if slowly) may be regarding 
as a point of merit. 
While problems of data, formula and threshold revisions make over time comparison difficult, 
the HDR 2010 includes a hybrid HDI, which shows progress for many countries over the last 
20 years, highlighting that there may be methods in place to make inter temporal comparison 
possible (Lazar & Lazar, 2011, p. 147).
The most important point of merit for the HDI is possibly that it remains the first serious 
attempt to include social next to economic criteria to measure human progress (Anand & Sen, 
1993, p. 1f). Furthermore, it has gained considerable attention and weight in doing so in 
politics, academia and even the business world for purposes of international pricing, for 
instance where medication is concerned (countries classified as ‘poor’ may receive up to 90% 
discounts), up to today (Wolff et al, 2011, p. 843). It has gained attention in the media with 
counties watching for their position, media commenting on it and governments justifying their 
efforts through it (Mehrotra, 2010, p. 1). 
It is a considerable achievement to gain such wide recognition over time. In terms of 
environmental obligations, for instance under the Kyoto protocol, there have been proposals 
to link costs of abatement to status in the HDI (Hu, 2009). Such recognition may be owed in 
part to the HDI’s relative simplicity as well as to its transparency (every HDR contains 
calculation methods and explanation of steps taken) and open availability (Klugman, et al, 
2011, p. 251). 
Furthermore, the HDR frequently looks at the different dimensions that the HDI composes 
and is able to highlight that, for instance, convergence in longevity and education (in its 
narrow definition here) is happening, while no convergence can be observed where income is 
concerned. UNDP furthermore highlights in its report the lack of a significant correlation 
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between economic growth and educational as well as health attainment. UNDP also states that 
development in other important dimensions such as democracy may be possible without 
having a high rank in the HDI and that is possible to have a high HDI rank and fail in other 
dimensions such as ecological sustainability (UNDP, 2010c, p. 6). It might be said, then, that 
the HDR makes an effort to handle the HDI with care and consider all its dimensions, or, that 
it attempts to go with current trends and include new dimensions development though has 
discovered (see section 2.2.).
There are a number of attempts to ‘rectify’ or complement the HDI calculations in order to 
meet such broader concepts as well as criteria of policy use and equality. Many of these also 
produce an alternative ranking (de la Escosura, 2010, p. 841ff; Lind, 2010, p. 301ff; Wolff, et 
al, 2011, p. 843ff). See (D'Acci, 2011, p. 47) and (Schimmel, 2009, p. 93) for substitutes and 
complements in terms of well-being and happiness. 
Wolff et al (2011, p. 864) are especially interesting since they attempt to address the three 
classes of error formula-, data- and cut off value revision and show that with recalculating the 
HDI 2006, taking the current data knowledge, formula and cut-off values into account, the 
world map would look differently (see Figure 4 below). 
Source: (Wolff, Chong, & Auffhammer, 2011, p. 864).
Figure 4: Revised HDI according to Data-, Formula- and Cut-Off Value Revision
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Apart from its data quality and indicator omission there are also critical voices where the 
HDI’s overall approach is concerned: Thus Schimmel criticizes the HDI’s approach as 
arbitrary and its definition of poverty as a lack of ‘having’ contrary to wealth and ‘having’ 
found in Western nations. Thus, progress would be defined as finding a path towards such 
material abundance instead of recognizing broader aspects of well-being and progress. He 
compares the HDI to happiness studies and recommends complementing findings from the 
HDI with outcomes of such studies to include individual people’s perspectives on their lives
(Schimmel, 2009, 95ff). 
Stammel claims that prosperity cannot be reduced to single aspects of life, which according to 
him is the main limitation of the HDI (compared to the Human Development Report which 
incorporates a much more extensive development analysis of the world) (Stammel, 1996, p. 
77). 
Klingebiel criticizes that the HDI, being an aggregate index, incorporates the corresponding 
structural weaknesses (selection of indicators allows for manipulation, as does the weighting 
of the different parts). In order to be able to remain valid nevertheless, the HDI should 
continue to measure merely one, namely the social dimension (Klingebiel, 1992, p. 32f).
Another point of criticism is the HDI’s impersonality: It works with averages, does not 
consider individual needs or causes of injustices and poverty (Schimmel, 2009, p. 105f). Yet, 
this is probably inherent to any index since its task is to work with averages and to quantify in 
order to point out trends on a larger scale. It is thus not a problem specific to or caused by the 
HDI. An index needs to retain a certain level of simplicity to remain understandable and 
usable for the public and decision makers and to be able to highlight what it focuses on. 
Therefore, it may be difficult for the HDI to incorporate for instance indices of sustainability 
of equality. Different indices may need to be consulted to obtain relevant information here. 
Overall, while HDI is an important complement and in some cases almost supplement of GDP 
per Capita as a measure of progress, comparability over time and among countries need to be 
handled with care due to data limitations (Morse 2003a, p. 281ff). Broader issues such as the 
notion of Quality of Life, how Education and Life Expectancy are viewed and presented and 
the role income plays and should play for development also need to be kept in mind when 
using the HDI to assess a given country’s status of development. 
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The following section combines the particular theoretical approach chosen for this paper with 
the HDI and assesses this index in the light of this development critical theory. 
4.2.3 Evaluating the HDI in the Light of Post-Development Theory
The Human Development Report was the first serious and partially successful attempt to 
replace GDP per capita as a development indicator. One of its attempts was to measure 
important parameters for enlarging people’s choices. It attempts to include the social 
dimension by claiming to measure education and life expectancy alongside income and to 
measure income not in nominal GDP per capita but in GDP per capita – PPP terms. It may be 
regarded as an important step to taking away the notion of measuring welfare and 
development from GDP, also by showing the differences in ranking when those two metrics 
are applied: There is only one overlap when comparing the top 5 and bottom 5 countries 
according to both rankings, and that is Norway (No. 5 according to nominal GDP and No. 1 
according to the HDI 2010) (see Table 5 & 6 below). 
Top & Bottom 5 countries 
according to GDP/Capita 2009 
GDP/ Capita 
in $US
Monaco 186,175
Liechtenstein 134,392
Luxembourg 108,706
Bermuda 101,346
Norway 78,674
… …
Malawi 278
Somalia 220
Liberia 216
Democratic Republic of the Congo 170
Burundi 151
Yet, income remains as part of human development within the index. As the shortcomings of 
income as an indicator have already been discussed in the previous case study, criticism won’t 
be taken up again as regards income. However, it is noteworthy, that even this index which 
claims to measure human development, going beyond GDP, deems it necessary to include 
income as one of its parameters. 
Similar to GDP per capita, the Human Development Index may be regarded as a development 
index of its time: It too has a historical dimension, as Sachs points out and as section 2.2 
highlighted. Thus Sachs claims that in the 1970s, when the failure of growth to benefit the 
majority of people was exposed, development was redefined as transcending growth. It was 
Top & Bottom 5 countries 
according to HDI 2009 Rank #
Norway 1
Australia 2
Iceland 3
Canada 4
Ireland 5
…
Mali 178
Central African Republic 179
Sierra Leone 180
Afghanistan 181
Niger 182
Source: UN Statistical Division, 2011. Source: UNDP, 2009.
Table 6 & 7: Comparing nominal GDP per Capita and HDI
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economic growth plus redistribution, plus participation, plus human development in the 
1990s. Areas like employment, equality, poverty eradication, basic needs, the informal sector 
and women were established as development fields, each brought new tools and new tribes of 
experts. This led to a conceptual inflation setting in, which was, however, not detrimental to 
development’s political importance: All camps could now claim to promote development; the 
struggle over meaning reflected the struggle over policy (Sachs, 2000, p. 9). This is consistent 
with the notion described in section 2.2, that development thought has become flexible and 
adaptive, incorporating new trends, groups and areas into itself whenever they appear.
Sachs continues to explicitly refer to the Human Development Index. According to him, 
growth sceptics have redefined development as enlarging people’s choices; the formula 
developed by them provided the basis for the Human Development Concept with its emphasis 
on literacy, health and participation. Development with them should be at the service of 
people’s well-being rather than people at the service of development. But, according to Sachs, 
this view can’t escape the development creed either: 
“[T]he Human Development Index is, much like the GNIP, a deficit index: It ranks countries 
hierarchically, assuming that there is only one best way of social evolution.” (Sachs, 2000, p. 11).
Sachs’ argument is thus that this index is deficient not so much where its indicators or the data 
it relies on are concerned, but that it is yet another index which, just as the GDP per capita, 
produces a ranking with some countries on the top and others on the bottom which are 
supposed at the forefront of social evolution. Just like the GDP per Capita, the HDI may thus 
be regarded as a tool within the development creed, not one to go beyond it. A tool which 
fosters the homogenization of the world, defining what education (or what education is 
composed of: School enrolment and literacy) and what health is and what prosperity means. 
And having those nations and cultures which do not fulfil this definition claim to be 
underdeveloped and follow those that do. 
Sachs criticises the development creed and all parts of it on the grounds of its homogenizing 
nature. He compares the collapse of ecosystems through environmental degradation with the 
breakdown of cultures through development imposed on them through supposedly universal 
norms. The image he uses is the extinction of languages: Each tongue has its own way of 
perceiving the world and find meaning. When species disappear, ecosystems break down. 
When languages die, cultures do the same thing. The dying of the languages indicates that a 
homogenization of the world is going on (Sachs, 2010a, p. 112). Consequently, for Sachs 
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development is to be compared to a global monoculture: No matter what ideals and goals 
societies had, for the sake of development they are all crammed into a single category: The 
underdeveloped. They were defined according to what they lack and are expected to become, 
not according to what they are and want to be (Sachs, 2000, p. 6). Escobar adds to this that 
societies were perceived not in racial terms anymore (as they were during colonial times), but 
as diseased, underfed, uneducated and physiologically weak masses, calling for 
unprecedented social action (Escobar, 1995, p. 30). As development spreads, indigenous 
people are to put aside their chronographies and pulled into the perspective of progress
(Sachs, 2000, p. 5). 
The question arises whether the HDI, as described above does not as well function as an 
instrument of homogenization. This has been discussed above in the light of the ranking 
produced by the HDI. However, given that both Sachs and Escobar emphasize the different 
world views, languages and characteristics lost in the development creed, it might be 
interesting to take a look at the indicators the HDI is made of. Thus, literacy, being measured 
by the HDI in the beginning as the percentage of adult literacy and later by weighting adult 
literacy and average time of school enrolment, might not be equal to education. Maybe an 
important part of education would be to learn about one’s own view of perceiving the world 
and to learn to treasure them in one’s own language. By predefining what education, what 
knowledge means and by designating that a long life enhances human development, a choice 
is made to define all those which do not adhere to this definition but maybe have their own 
view and system of education or quality of life/health as deficient. 
Thus, according to Sachs, there is a –previously explained- fundamental difference between 
universalism and localism, seen in the dichotomy of space (Universalism) and place 
(Localism). Cultures linked to a particular place with their own memories and cosmologies 
are vulnerable to a concept which claims universality, but rests instead on the concept of 
space (Sachs, 2010c, p. 122). Space concepts as might be incorporated in the HDI may thus 
be dangerous to place-linked cultures. 
Escobar gives an example for a project which attempted to avoid such an imposition and 
instead attempted to achieve a strengthening of this ‘place linkage’ while enhancing literacy 
and education: The “Gente Entintada y Parlante”12 from 1985 (see Box below).
12 Translated into English this would roughly mean „The Inky and Talking People“.
85
Gente Entintada y Parlante (GEP). A Project Representing “Alternative Modernities”
According to Escobar, the Colombian Pacific coast is rich in oral traditions and literature, springing from 
colonial times, adapted by local and the African Heritage. The oral traditions are permeated by modern 
forms from state, economy, education, migrants and urbanization such that oral literature is subject to 
change and innovation. Adding to this is modern media which brings new challenges and possibilities. 
According to Escobar, development and modernity involve literacy and in the 1980s when a continental 
literacy program was planned for this region, the fear was that such a program would uproot people form 
their cultures for the sake of modernity. The project was embedded into the time of the post-Freire-, 
popular education- and popular education movement. This led to the formulation of an approach to a 
literacy project based on appropriation of communication media by local groups. Thus technologies were 
to be adapted to local cultures and the general aim was to strengthen local of communities. The result of 
this attempt was a powerful communications movement whose effect according to Escobar can still be 
felt today.
The starting point of “Gente Entintada y Parlante” was the belief that “marginal and incipiently lettered 
cultures” (Escobar, 2008, p. 181) are capable of assuming control with the appropriate support. The 
approach was to be incorporated into daily life in order to overcome the traditional subject-object relation 
of conventional literacy projects in development. The support entailed the following: Ready made supply 
of communications material like paper and ink and a basic information technology infrastructure for 
planning and self-management of circulation of recorded and printed material. The idea behind the 
project was that the availability of materials would challenge local artists and activists to assume 
responsibility for their literacy and to produce and spread their own communications material. Results at 
first were poor but became increasingly strong and vibrant: Numerous groups appeared in many parts of 
the South Pacific, producing all kinds of material. Artists of all kinds established relations with local 
farmers and other workers, depicting their lives and day-to-day realities. The movement widened, it 
began to include radio and later video and an international festival. Placing the project in the middle of 
communities enabled the construction of a literary culture specific to the Pacific. GEP’s products often 
dealt with valorisation and a more realistic representation of blackness and an important part of the 
project was that locals for the first time produced their own representation of themselves. Thus the 
project became a space for the construction of their proper identity and of promoting a more endogenous 
self image. GEP at the same time enabled development via the spreading of literacy and the 
communications that questioned it through cultural appropriation for the project by cultural activists and 
locals. The movement pressured institutions to communicate differently with their target population. GEP 
enabled expression of cultural autonomy and alternative vision of development. It is an example of what 
Escobar calls “alternative modernities” (see chapter 4.1.4). Such projects need not be linked to a political 
project in order to have a political character (Escobar, 2008, p. 180ff).
The success of this project would possibly only be grasped by the HDI partially, if the index 
was used to assess progress of this particular region: Literacy has risen through it, but school 
enrolment may not have done so. Yet, the project has contributed to education in a broader 
sense, empowering the people to represent themselves.
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While a broad view of what education would probably hardly be measurable anymore (and 
the same goes for a broader view of health), it also has to be emphasized that such a notion of 
education to which, even at the beginning when the HDI was first issued, only Western 
nations adhered on a large scale may be regarded as being not a neutral tool. Next to 
measuring it, the HDI defines who is developed and who is not. It should be noted that the 
HDI divides the world into four parts, as previously mentioned: Countries with a very high 
level of human development with a score of > 0.787; countries with a high level of human 
development with a score of > 0.669, countries of medium level of human development with 
a score of > 0.487; and finally countries with a low level of human development with a score 
< 0.487 (UNDP, 2010c, p. 143ff).
While the shortcoming of the measure of income have been discussed in the previous case 
study (namely that it completely disregards other forms and views of prosperity and, as we 
will see in the case study which follows, that life satisfaction is only correlated with income to 
a limited degree), it is interesting that this index which proposes to go beyond income seems 
to be unable to free itself from this. If we suppose that the benchmark of income was at the 
root of defining underdevelopment, poverty and backwardness, by this way discriminating 
against two thirds of the people worldwide, HDI must be confronted with a similar criticism. 
It still continues to bear this mark of ideology and discrimination that income is a way to 
evaluate progress and to define who is ‘free’ and who is not if the intention of the HDI is 
really to enlarge people’s freedom. While it may be true that in an increasingly monetarized 
world (where globalization adds to its spreading), an adequate income does enlarge individual 
freedom, it may also be true that an index which professes this, measures it and claims that by 
way of this indicator some are freer, better off, more developed than others, may enhance this 
process. This process of self-reinforcement serves as a quality example of the strength of the 
development discourse and the difficulty of going beyond it. 
As Escobar puts it, the development discourse is a perceptual field structured by grids of 
observation, modes of inquiry, registration of problems and forms of intervention. It is 
defined by a set of relations and discursive practice that systematically produced interrelated 
objects, concepts, theories and strategies. New objects and modes of operations have been 
included, but the same set of relations continues. This set of relations ensures that even 
seemingly opposed options can coexist, such as, in case of the HDI, claiming to go beyond 
GDP per capita as a measure of progress and yet including income as one of its dimensions.
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According to Escobar, this systematization of relations gives the development discourse and 
thus development a great dynamic quality: It is able to adapt to changes and thus survived up 
to today (Escobar, 1995, p. 42). 
Furthermore, Sachs’ statement about science and data as seemingly neutral appears to be 
interesting for evaluating the HDI: Data has, according to him the aura of neutrality and can 
penetrate everywhere. But is does not display actors, victims or causes. This description 
appears to fit well to the HDI. Its data appears to be neutrally describing societies’ progress, 
not displaying its people, actors behind this progress, causes or effects of it. Drawbacks may 
be highlighted, but the question remains as to who is to be blamed for them. However, an 
index cannot necessarily be blamed for not showing such causalities, since it is a simplifying 
tool, almost ‘by nature’.
By explaining the dynamic quality of the development discourse and the power relations 
which it incorporates, Escobar explains how even opposed positions might survive within and 
strengthen the development discourse. More importantly however is his point that choices are 
being made. The development discourse is made up of a set of power relations which allow 
for certain people, institutions and possibly countries to be heard and for others to be 
excluded. Such an analysis might explain why, in the case of the HDI, the indicators which 
define it are incorporated while others are left out. Such a choice is necessary for any index. 
However, in the light of Escobar’s theories, it appears vital to highlight that such choice is 
even happening. In case of the HDI the question needs to be raised why these particular 
indicators are included. Even if one were to accept that broader notions of development or 
health or even wealth cannot be included into this or any other index due to their complexity 
and subsequent immeasurability, the question still remains why other indicators are not
included into the HDI. Why are only indicators that highlight the seeming high status of 
development in Western countries included while others are excluded that might at least shed 
light on challenges in the Western world? Examples would be almost any indicator from the 
ecological field. As Sachs has pointed out (see previous case study), it was and continues to 
be the Western part of the World and its style of consumption which brings the world on the 
border of ecological collapse – where climate change, loss of biodiversity or overfishing are 
concerned. Ecology being at the basis of human life might justify including it as an indicator 
in an index which attempts to measure human development. Further examples of indicators 
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which might not necessarily reflect well on developed nations are notions of feeling healthy, 
mental illnesses or stress related diseases, sense of belonging and community coherence and 
treatment of the elderly. However, it is important to bear in mind that, if sound data were 
given, including these dimensions might not only reflect poorly on developed nations, but also 
on developing nations, since one reason why developing nations do not flag up as much may 
be lack of good data there where mental health is concerned. 
Overall, this is not to say that in any of these cases any country of the Western world or any 
particular underdeveloped country may not perform well or poorly. But it is to highlight that a 
choice made in case of the HDI, meaning on the one hand which index to apply and on the 
other which indicators to incorporate into a composite index, may not be a coincidence or 
come naturally.
Sachs and Escobar stress that the Western model must not be followed universally. In the 
light of ecology as well as equity Sachs emphasizes that it is about changing the wealthy 
much more than changing the poor, in other words to alleviate wealth at least as much as to 
alleviate poverty (Sachs, 2000). All of these issues point in the direction of finding ways to 
criticize the West as well as the rest. This sheds light on the problem of development 
indicators moving inside the space of development and reinforcing a view of one part of the 
world being on top of the ladder and the other being defined only according to that. On the 
other hand it also calls for refraining from defining this other part of the world continuously 
from the outside and in the light of a benchmark invented by those who fulfil it. 
The HDI does not include power relations or (global) equality. It defines the Third World as 
problematic and the First World as model. One might say that it adds to ecological destruction 
instead of shedding light upon or alleviating it. If alleviating wealth is more important than 
alleviating poverty as Sachs says, its ranking might point in the wrong direction. 
The next sections summarizes findings for the HDI and addresses the original research 
question posed at the beginning of this paper – the question of the validity and necessity of 
this development index. 
4.2.4 Validity and Necessity of the Human Development Index
The Human Development Index was developed and issued in 1990 by the UNDP with the 
intention to create an index that went beyond GDP and that would be at the service of 
people’s well-being rather than placing people at the service of development. It furthermore 
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professed to measure the enlargement of people’s choices being to a limited extent a 
reflection of Amartya Sen’s notion of development as freedom. It incorporates the indicators 
income (GDP per Capita purchasing power adjusted), education (by now a weighted average 
of adult literacy and years of school enrolment) and life expectancy at birth. 
By way of the post-development discourse theories by Escobar and Sachs a comprehensive 
analysis as to the index’s neutrality, validity and necessity has been attempted. 
An important issue is the choice of its indicators: As said before, any index which aims at 
remaining one needs to make a choice as to its indicators. An index is a lens through which 
the world is perceived. It would cease to be an index if it tried to incorporate every aspect in 
the world, in the case of development, every aspect regarded as crucial for development, from 
human rights to child mortality to income. Thus, the HDI cannot be criticised for omitting 
aspects. Still, the selection it makes is interesting and may reflect Escobar’s theories on the 
dynamic quality of the development discourse and particularly the power relations which 
define it. For the question arises why these particularly indicators have been depicted as 
reflecting to be at the service of people’s wellbeing. The fact that no indicator is included 
which reflect poorly on developed nations (and there do exist many, particularly where 
ecology is concerned) and three where they indeed do appear to be on top of the resulting 
ranking may highlight Escobar’s theories of power asymmetries, of a colonization of reality 
and a set of relations shaping the development course and Sachs’ ideas of development being 
a global monoculture. 
A further critical issue regarding the HDI arises when asking what prosperity, education and 
health actually are and whether or not income, literacy and school enrolment as well as life 
expectancy are adequate reflections on three inherently complex concepts. While this 
complexity may prove difficult to measure, it reflects that also here, a choice is made: One of 
many definitions of wealth is used, one of many of education and one of many of health. It 
might just as well have been others. This choice may highlight the importance and 
consequences of having the power of definition, in this case of these concepts: For those that 
do shape the perception of the world we live in. Furthermore, simply because something is 
easy to measure doesn’t mean that it is worthwhile to do so; for knowledge is often connected 
to power and measuring (or rather results of measuring) may reinforce previously existing 
power relations. 
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Data and weighting are other issues with the HDI: Depending on the way the three indicators 
(or indicators for those three indicators as in the case of education) are weighted against each 
other, outcomes for several countries may vary widely. This is reflected by the examples of 
Tanzania and Cuba who switched up to 30 places in the HDI ranking when weighting was 
changed. The importance of weighting and data quality for the results of an index thus 
highlights its arbitrary parts as well as the potential for manipulation. The HDI is political, 
even possibly ideological in several ways: Where the choice of its indicators, the weighting of 
these indicators and the produced ranking are concerned. 
It remains to be summarized whether the HDI is valid and necessary in the light of these 
criticisms. As for validity, like with GDP per Capita, the answer depends on whether it meets 
general claims to a development indicator,  what the policy aim is, what the HDI claims to 
measure and from which theoretical angle it is assessed (see also sections 2.2, 3.1 and 3.2). 
The HDI’s relative simplicity and understandability may make it valid in terms of general 
indicator claims. The other questions may be answered differently depending on whether we 
look at the single indicators or at the claims of the index in total: If the aim of GDP per Capita 
adjusted to purchasing power is to measure monetary income, the answer as to its validity 
would be that it is valid. Adult literacy and average school enrolment may be adequate to 
measure literacy overall, although the validity of its inherent assumption that those schools 
are teaching literacy successfully by x years may be questioned. Whether a population on 
average may enjoy a long of short life may be adequately measured with life expectancy at 
birth. However, an index is more than the compilation of disaggregated indicators. It 
aggregates them for a reason. In the case of the HDI it claims to measure human development 
by aggregating three indicators. Where this claim is concerned the answer as to the HDI’s 
validity can hardly be yes. The reasons have mainly been given above: Who defines what 
human development is, can and should it be defined from outside? And even if so, the index is 
much too simple and not many-dimensional enough in order to measure human development. 
It might need to be considered at this point that for an index to gain attention, it may need to 
be communicated well as Goossens 2007 points out; and one important step for doing that is 
the index’ name – in the case of the Human Development Index, the name may have been 
well chosen at the time because it indicated that it went beyond mere economic development. 
Yet, the claim associated with this name may need to be reconsidered today.
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As it is an index it is maybe not desirable for it to become more complicated but in the light of 
this should reduce its claim. Furthermore, if the separate indicators claim to measure wealth, 
education and health it might be difficult as well to answer the question of their validity with 
yes, as these concepts are too broad to be covered by income, literacy and life expectancy. 
However, it is important to point out that the Human development report in 2010 stated that 
“human development is an evolving idea” (UNDP 2010c, p.2), and that it is important to 
adjust development concepts according to the local context thus not claiming ideas to be 
fixed, but flexible and adaptive, as indeed, the whole idea of development seems to have 
become (see section 2.2).
The answer as to the necessity of the HDI again depends upon further questions: Necessary 
for whom and for what? In order to reinforce a world view, or in Escobar’s words, a 
development discourse, where the West appears on top of the social evolution and the rest is 
to follow and where large parts of the world appear as backwards, deficient and 
underdeveloped, the HDI is certainly necessary. It highlights even more dimensions of 
backwardness than GDP per capita. Of course, it also highlights parts of non-monetary 
progress which might contribute to a “de-monetarization” in the world. In this respect, it can 
also be regarded as necessary especially when taking into consideration the attention it has 
received where differences in ranking between mere GDP per capita and the HDI are 
concerned. The HDI might thus contribute to alternative development. 
Care should possibly be taken when it comes to the HDI’s necessity for enlarging people’s 
choices and development being at the service of people rather than the other way round. The 
index might not be necessary for this. For with the power relations visible also in this index 
and the narrowing of several concepts as well as with the ranking it produces it may just as 
well be the other way round and people still be at the service of one particular type of 
development. However, this may also depend on the way the HDI is used and interpreted: 
Whether its outcomes are taken as measuring development in total and all that do not adhere 
to the definitions and concepts presented in are seen as underdeveloped and hence are 
pressured to do so or whether it is seen as one possible way among many. 
The following section looks at the third, most recently released index of this case study. The 
Happy Planet Index (HPI) will be assessed according to current criticisms regarding data and 
dimensions found through a literature review before assessing it in the light of Post 
Development Theory. 
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4.3 Happiness, Ecology, Efficiency: The Happy Planet Index as a 
new Index for Measuring Development?
4.3.1 Description, Definition and History of the Happy Planet Index
The Happy Planet Index was developed by the New Economics Foundation (NEF) in London. 
The first report and consequently the first ranking were issued in 2006 with a second report 
and an updated ranking being released in 2009 (Abdallah, et al., 2009, p. 1).
The NEF did not newly collect the data for the first report, nor did they develop new 
indicators to compose this index. Instead, the thought behind this index was to create an 
instrument that would measure ends and not means (Marks, et al., 2006, p. 2). Contrary to 
many media reactions to the release of the HPI (see for instance BBC News, 2006), it does not 
rank countries according to where people are happiest. Instead, as the name indicates, it 
attempts to measure the ‘happiness of the planet’ overall: How can people live well without 
over using the planet’s resources (Ng, 2008, p. 425)?
The HPI is composed of three indicators: Life Expectancy at Birth, individual Life Satisfaction
and the Ecological Footprint. The formula which leads to the final outcome, a number, is as 
follows: 
(1) Life Expectancy at Birth X Life Satisfaction
Ecological Footprint
Or
(2) Happy Life Years (HLY)
Ecological Footprint
(Marks et al, 2006, p. 8ff). It attempts to measure what output countries are able to produce 
with how much input: The length and quality of life a country is able to provide its citizens 
with and the amount of natural resources it uses to do that. In other words, it tries to measure 
if a country is able to provide its citizens with a decent standard of living while not stepping 
over the carrying capacity of the planet (Ng, 2008, p. 426). 
The HPI might thus be called a measure of efficiency (Marks, et al, 2006, p. 7). This is 
depicted by Figure 5 below, where Happy Life Years (HLY) are plotted against the 
Ecological Footprint for the 143 countries included in the 2009 ranking.
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Of the three indices evaluated in this paper, the HPI is the only one including a direct 
environmental criterion and, especially, the only one attempting to combine both 
environmental and social criteria, while leaving out the economic component (income). 
Table 7 below shows the outcome of the top five and bottom five countries for the HPI 2006
and 2009. Variations are possible due to data changes and are explained below.
Figure 5: HLY & EF for 143 countries, HPI 2009
Source: Abdallah et al., 2009, p.26.
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Table 8 and 9 show the top and bottom 5 nations, for the rankings of 2006 and 2009.
While the indicator Life Expectancy at Birth has already been explained above in the section 
about the HDI, Life Satisfaction and particularly the Ecological Footprint may be less evident 
and will be briefly described there. An evaluation as to their validity and necessity will follow 
in the sections below. 
The indicator of Life Satisfaction attempts to measure how satisfied an individual person is 
with his or her life. Its outcomes are mainly based on large surveys for different countries, in 
which the participant is asked to answer a question similar to the following one (this one is 
mainly used as a basis for the HPI): “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your 
life these days?” by ranking their happiness from 0 to 10. Data is taken from World Values 
Survey (WVS) from the openly accessible World Database of Happiness, comprised by Ruut 
Veenhoven, University of Rotterdam (Marks, et al., 2006; Veenhoven, 2011, p. 48).
Answers are collected for one city/region/country and an average is taken. In general, so 
called developed countries (according to income as well as the HDI) perform well, scoring 
around 7 on the scale, while countries with poor social performance such as some countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa score lowest with 3 or 4 on the scale.  There are, however, also countries 
which do not fall into this pattern, particularly in Central America (Marks, et al., 2006, p. 32). 
For a complete ranking of the 2006 and 2009 outcomes, see Appendix B.
Top & Bottom 
5 countries 
HPI 2006
Life S. Life E. EF Outcome
Vanuatu 7.4 68,6 1.1 68.2
Colombia 7.2 72.4 1.3 67.2
Costa Rica 7.5 78.2 2.1 66.0
Dominica 7.3 75.6 1.8 64.5
Panama 7.2 74.8 1.8 63.5
…
Ukraine 3.6 66.1 3.3 22.2
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo
3.3 43.1 0.7 20.7
Burundi 3.0 43.6 0.7 19.0
Swaziland 4.2 32.5 1.1 18.4
Zimbabwe 3.3 36.9 1.0 16.6
Top & Bottom 
5 countries 
HPI 2009
Life S. Life E. EF Outcome
Costa Rica 8.5 78.5 2.3 76.1
Dominican 
Republic 7.6 71.5 1.5 71.8
Jamaica 6.7 72.2 1.1 70.1
Guatemala 7.4 69.7 1.5 68.4
Vietnam 6.5 73.7 1.3 66.5
…
Burundi 2.9 48.5 0.8 22.2
Namibia 4.5 51.6 3.7 20.7
Botswana 4.7 48.1 3.6 19.0
Tanzania 2.4 51.0 1.1 18.4
Zimbabwe 2.8 40.9 1.1 16.6
Source: (Marks et al, 2006, P. 56).
Table 8 & 9: Top & Bottom 5 countries according to HPI 2006 & 2009
Source: (Abdallah et al, 2009, p. 61.)
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As mentioned before, problems and merits as to data as well as to the idea of measuring 
happiness will follow below. 
The Ecological Footprint is an attempt to measure (un-)sustainable consumption patterns in 
the world. It compares demand for natural capitals with the earth’s ability to (re-) generate 
natural resources (Ewing, Reed, Galli, Kitzes, & Wackernagel, 2010, p. 1f). Matthis 
Wackernagel developed it as part of his PhD at the University of British Columbia, Canada in 
the early 1990s (M. Wackernagel, 1994, p. 1ff). The earliest academic publication appeared in 
1992, by William Rees, Wackernagel’s supervisor (Rees, 1992, p. 121ff). 
The Ecological Footprint measures biological productive land and sea area and the use of the 
resulting resources by humans, while considering the relevant area’s ability to regenerate the 
used up resources. For a given country, resources produced for export to another country (i.e. 
bananas) are not added to the producing, but the consuming, or importing nation, since this 
indicator attempts to measure end-consumption (Monfreda, Wackernagel, & Deumling, 2004, 
p. 232).
If all productive land and sea areas in the world were taken together, as well as their 
regenerative capacity and divided by the number of humans, not considering space for non-
human life such as mammals, every human being would be allocated 1.8 hectares of fertile 
land/sea area. As of 2010, the average space needed by humans exceeds this number already 
with an average person needing 2.7 hectares, or 1.51 planets (Ewing, et al, 2010, p. 1). This 
average is not taking into consideration the unequal distribution among regions: As of 2009, 
the average US American requires 9.4 hectares or ca. 5.2 planets, while the average Austrian 
requires 5 hectares or ca. 2.8 planets and the average Jamaican requires 1.1 hectares or ca. 0.6 
planets (Abdallah et al, 2009, p. 61). Humanity first started overusing earth’s biocapacity in 
the 1970s (Ewing, et al, 2010, p. 12).
An evaluation as to problems and merits where data and the idea of measuring environmental 
performance this way is concerned follows in the sections below.
4.3.2 Evaluating the HPI as a Development Index 
Evaluating Data
Since Life Expectancy at Birth has already been evaluated above, when analysing the HDI, I 
will only look at Life Satisfaction and the Ecological Footprint here. 
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Life Satisfaction 
While in this paper happiness, life satisfaction and well-being are to some degree used 
synonymously, in current literature the first two concepts are often distinguished, although 
there is a certain correlation between the two (R. Di Tella, MacCulloch, & Oswald, 2003, p. 
5). Happiness is seen an affective state, where the positive affect outweighs the negative 
affect. Life Satisfaction is a cognitive state, thus considering live overall. It is the latter 
concept which if at all, should be used for indices and policy making (Samman, 2007, p. 15f). 
This concept is evaluated here and used in the HPI. 
The Life Satisfaction data relies on large representative surveys of > 1000 participants. A 
survey for a given region typically asks the above mentioned question, aiming to obtain a 
representative sample of the population in question (Marks, et al, 2006, p. 48; Veenhoven, 
2011).
The HPI takes the outcome of such surveys and converts it into numbers from 0-1. 
In order to assess how good the data for measuring life satisfaction is, it is important to look at 
the criteria reliability (or stability: Do outcomes stay the same if the individual is asked the 
same question later), validity (“Does the measure reflect the concept intended?”), consistency 
(“Do outcomes correspond to other observed criteria related to the subject?”) and 
comparability across nations (Frey & Stutzer, 2002, p. 31). These criteria are assessed below
both for measuring happiness in general as well as for the data used by the HPI in 2006 and 
2009. 
Reliability
Happiness surveys, much like other surveys, generally rely on the judgement of those 
involved. When inquiring about life satisfaction, the answers given by participants usually are 
not random and spontaneous, but result from a conscious cognitive process, assessing one’s 
past and comparing one’s situation to others (Frey & Stutzer, 2002, p. 4; Schimmel, 2009, p. 
98).
Still, particularly economists are sceptical on relying purely on what people say (also called 
‘cheap talk’), instead only believing a person’s preference if they are willing to pay 
accordingly for it (Ng, 2008, p. 428).
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However, physiological approaches such as brain imaging, as well as health measures such as 
heart rate and rates for depression and third party reports correspond to the subjective 
happiness outcomes (Ng, 2008, p. 429; Samman, 2007, p. 17). Such correlations appear to be 
consistent across countries (Frey & Stutzer, 2002, p. 32).
There are a number of biases to consider such as distorted appraisal, where people are 
influenced by available information (i.e. they perceive the interviewer to be obviously worse 
off than themselves) or distorted response, where the wording or sequence of questions may 
influence results (Frey & Stutzer, 2002, p. 32). 
Validity
While careful survey design may ensure that people answer reflecting their true feelings, there 
are some biases to consider, mainly due to distorted reporting: Due to ego-defence 
mechanisms or due to social desirability people may tend to over- or understate their actual 
level of life satisfaction (Frey & Stutzer, 2002, p. 32).
Consistency
Life satisfaction is consistent with a number of more objective measures such as, for instance, 
levels of democracy and decentralization, (loss of) employment or income, serious illness or 
marital status. People that state they are satisfied with their lives furthermore are also 
perceived to be happy by those close to them, are smiling more, are more socially outgoing, 
more helpful to others, less often involved in conflicts, less often absent from work, 
optimistic, energetic and more creative, tend to remember more positive than negative life 
events, have a higher level of tolerance for frustration, are less likely to commit suicide, more 
healthy (since have a more effective immune system) and need less psychological counselling 
(Frey & Stutzer, 2002, p. 32). 
Comparability across nations & Intertemporal Comparability
Cultural biases may make comparability difficult: The average US American may tend to 
report higher levels of happiness, since optimism is highly valued, while the average Japanese 
may report lower levels, since modesty is highly valued.
While according to Frey et al, cross cultural differences are not that strong that they make 
cross country comparison meaningless, survey outcomes may need to be validated by 
alternative measures of wellbeing (Frey & Stutzer, 2002, p. 33f).
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There are a number of further biases to consider when looking at survey outcomes: People 
tend to not be able to recall past suffering correctly. When recalling past pain, people are 
often wrong about the length of time they suffered, but right about the maximum pain they 
endured (Frey & Stutzer, 2002, p. 33f). Also, people misjudge the speed with which they 
adjust to new circumstances, one reason why the income effect goes away so soon (P. R. G. 
Layard, 2003, p. 7). This adaptation effect may also make intertemporal comparability 
difficult: It is not clear whether having a higher standard of living, more social protection, 
rights, freedom, democracy and health than 100 years ago makes people report themselves 
significantly happier than back then (Ng, 2008, p. 430).
Another problem may be that happiness is not measurable across the full cardinal scale: A 
very unhappy person may respond may rating their life with a 3, but a 0 might be rare. This is 
also, since people may consider 5 as neutral or 50% as a bare passing grade (taking this from 
grading at school for instance), and hence take 5 or 4 instead of zero when they attempt to rate 
themselves as very unhappy (Ng, 2008, p. 430). While there are thus some problems to be 
taken into consideration when measuring happiness, it is important to remember, that other, 
more common measurements of wellbeing have problems possibly of larger proportions, such 
as the GDP per capita (see above) (Ng, 2008, p. 429)..
Below, the specific data for the HPI 2006 and 2009 is assessed, taking into consideration the 
above mentioned criteria.
HPI 2006
For the HPI in 2006, the majority of data comes from the World database of Happiness 
(Veenhoven, 2011). The HPI requires data for as many countries as possible, ideally for all. 
However, in the case of the first report and ranking released in 2006, the relevant survey had 
not been conducted for all countries. Thus, the authors of the HPI 2006 used other surveys 
also related to inquiring about happiness, but asking slightly different questions such as “How 
often have you felt that you were unable to control the important things in your life?” from 
the World health organization Survey, or “In general would you say that you are satisfied 
with your life? Would you say that you are 1. Very satisfied, 2. Fairly satisfied, 3. Not very 
satisfied, 4. Not satisfied at all?” from the Latino Barometer (Marks, et al, 2006, p. 48f). 
Asking a question, even with the intended same meaning in a different way or with different 
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wording and different answer possibilities (a score of 0 to 10 versus a score of 1 to 4)can, 
however, bias outcomes due to the above mentioned distorted response bias (Frey & Stutzer, 
2002, p. 32). 
Furthermore, for 62 countries, no data was available at all, and instead proxies such as life 
expectancy were used, running regressions with those (Marks, et al, 2006, p. 49f). While 
estimates were statistically validated, and authors used all available data on life satisfaction, 
NEF states themselves in their 2006 report the “need for more and better data” (Marks, et al., 
2006, p. 45).
Thus, the HPI’s reliability may be at stake due to different wording in the surveys and the use
of proxies. 
HPI 2009
Life Satisfaction data for the HPI released in 2009 is considerably better: Authors used the 
same question (All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life these days?) for 112 
countries. This was possible due to Gallup having included this question in their surveys over 
the last two years. 
84 countries were surveyed by the World Values Survey (WVS) as in 2006, using the exact 
same question. While there was an overlap among both surveys for 68 countries, 16 additional 
countries could be taken from the WVS. Since outcomes where, however, not exactly the 
same (due to differences in samples reached and a different order of questions, since Gallup 
asks respondents a series of questions), NEF ran a linear regression with the WVS and 4 
further variables as the independent variable, predicting 91% of Gallup’s life satisfaction. 
Thus, the relationship between the two was approximated which made the outcomes for the 
16 countries from the WVS and the 112 countries from Gallup comparable (Abdallah, et al, 
2009, p. 52). 
A different question was used for 14 further countries, taken also from Gallup: 
“Please imagine a ladder with steps numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top. Suppose 
we say that the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the 
ladder represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder would you say 
you personally feel you stand at this time, assuming that the higher the step the better you feel 
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about your life, and the lower the step the worse you feel about it? Which step comes closest 
to the way you feel?” (Abdallah, et al., 2009, p. 53).
While this question correlates highly with the standard one above with r = 0.83, the authors 
also here ran a stepwise regression using additional variables and being able to predict 90% of 
the variance (Abdallah, et al, 2009, p. 53). 
A ranking for 143 countries with better, but not perfect data, since distorted response bias may 
still be given to some extent, is thus available in the Happy Planet Report 2009.
While in the HPI 2009 consistency, validity and reliability are thus to some extend given (but 
important limitations remain due to approximation via post-hoc regression), issues with the 
comparability across nations may need to be considered. Since the HPI relies on a raking, 
biases here might distort it, and alternative measures of wellbeing may need to be applied to 
validate HPI outcomes. 
The Ecological Footprint
In order to measure the Ecological Footprint (EF) of a country, the Global Footprint Network 
establishes so called Ecological Footprint Accounts. They use over 4000 data points to assess 
the given country’s EF (Mathis  Wackernagel et al., 2004, p. 2). The accounts consist of two 
parts: Ecological supply on the one hand and demand on nature on the other hand. The 
ecological supply is the biologically productive area which is needed for a nation’s 
consumption and waste disposal. Existing technology and resource management are taken 
into account, when biologically productive area is measured (Wiedmann, Minx, Barrett, & 
Wackernagel, 2006, p. 29).  
Overall, there are ca. 11.4 billion hectares productive areas covering ca. one quarter of the 
earth. 2.3 of those are of marine nature while 8.8 are land. Each of these hectares is 
standardized as to productivity, and thus becoming so called ‘global hectares’ (Monfreda, et 
al., 2004, p. 234f).
There are two techniques to calculate the EF of a nation: The component based method and 
the compound based method. The component based method sums up all relevant components 
of a population’s resource consumption as well as waste production. There are inaccuracies to 
take into account for this method, such as lack of accurate and complete information about 
each product or the problem of double counting
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The compound method on the other hand uses the aggregate national data, for instance the 
total amount of paper that is being used. This method may lack detail as it does not account 
for which type of paper is used for what (Mathis Wackernagel et al., 2005, p. 5f). 
There are a number of important shortcomings to take into consideration. Possibly the greatest 
shortcoming is that there is a lack of data for some of humanity’s demand upon natural 
resources. This may underestimate the true strain it puts on resources and/or overestimate 
biocapacity. Such errors can come, for instance, from underestimating long term effects on 
nature such as soil erosion or toxic releases into ecosystems (Schaefer, Luksch, Steinbach, 
Cabeca, & Hanauer, 2006, p. 8f). Due to the difficulty of calculating exact impacts, they are 
completely left out of EF calculations (Wackernagel, et al, 2005, p. 25f). 
Such shortcomings may be classified as ‘systematic errors’. It may be said that the EF thus 
does not calculate true impacts of consumption correctly, which may be particularly true for 
the difficult to measure overall energy consumption (Ferng, 2002, p. 53).
Further possible shortcomings may be that the EF does not allocate responsibilities correctly, 
due to its complexity especially where trade is concerned, and thus may allocate EF’s between 
producing and consuming countries incorrectly. For instance, bananas grown for export are 
counted as part of the importing country’s EF, but river pollution may be more difficult to 
include (Herendeen, 2000, p. 358). 
Data weaknesses may be a source of error as well. Thus, in local or regional areas, different 
calculation methods are often applied, questioning the comparability of the EF’s on a local 
basis (Wiedmann, et al, 2006, p. 29f). Additionally, data may be less available or reliable, 
especially when considering data from poor countries. On the other hand, some environmental 
pressures may also not be accurately documented within the UN, which may distort the EF, 
relying partially on UN data (Monfreda, et al, 2004, p. 243). 
Another point of concern is that the EF’s use for policy makers is limited; one reason being 
that it does not provide a breakdown for different consumption goods or economic sectors
(Wiedmann, et al, 2006, p. 29).
The above list is only an approximation of data problems and merits of the EF. Giving a full 
account would be out of the scope of this study. For a more comprehensive approach, see for 
example Wiedmann, et al, 2006, p. 28ff or Herendeen, 2000, p. 357ff.
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Evaluating Indicators
Life Satisfaction
In this section, the question as to whether attempting to measure happiness makes sense on 
the broad scheme shall be explored. 
Setting aside the data issues when measuring life satisfaction, as they have been dealt within 
the previous section, attempting to measure happiness may be important, since, as mentioned 
in chapter 3 already, what gets measured may get more attention from decision makers. It may 
make it easier to deal with it politically; to invest in it or to avoid it, depending on what it is 
that is being measured.  
Measuring happiness may, in comparison to other indicators such as GDP per capita, be 
regarded as an attempt to measure ends – that is quality of life – and not merely potential 
means towards such an end. Measuring it may be able to set such an end on the political 
agenda. Of course, no citizen’s happiness may be directly determined by policy makers, yet, a 
couple of interesting insights might be given to them from measuring it, for instance what 
does and what does not contribute to such an end (Frey & Stutzer, 2002, p. 12; Layard, 2003, 
p. 15f). 
For instance, since income satisfaction depends largely on comparison, a world where 
everyone is poor may be preferable to many people to a world where they are less poor 
overall, but poorer in comparison to everyone else. This may also mean that an unequal raise 
in income may mean higher happiness for some, but only for a short time and lower happiness 
for many, possibly permanently. Overall utility in the given country may thus decrease, 
despite average income increasing (Rafael Di Tella & MacCulloch, 2008, p. 3).
Furthermore, measuring happiness may reveal important insights such as income increase not 
necessarily increasing happiness (R. Layard, 2010, p. 534). As of 2003, the World Values 
Survey (WVS) estimates that increasing average income raises happiness only in countries 
with low to medium average income levels (Helliwell, Huang, & Harris, 2009, p. 5). In fact, 
there is evidence that income gains only further life satisfaction for incomes up to $15.000 per 
capita in PPP (Layard, 2003, p. 17). This is in part because aspirations rise with income gain 
and people adapt to their new circumstances (Samman, 2007, 29f).
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If it is a goal of decision makers to raise the standard of living of individuals, a focus on 
raising income and/or economic growth rates alone may need to be rethought given such 
insights. They may raise question of efficiency of political efforts focussing on increasing 
income alone. It may also raise the question of what really matters: being able to afford the 
next round of new products presented in advertisement, whose effect wears off quickly or 
considering longer lasting issues such as hobbies, family, etc. (Layard, 2010, p. 535). On a 
broader scale, issues such as the level of direct democracy or social cohesion may need to be 
addressed (Frey & Stutzer, 2002, p. 139). 
Furthermore, measuring happiness may highlight what economic performance, particularly 
GDP per capita is not able to capture, for instance: Satisfaction as well as benefit to society 
from non-monetary reciprocity and work sectors such as voluntary work (Schimmel, 2009, p. 
100).
One possible argument against measuring happiness may be that happiness or rather a 
disposition for happiness is, in part dependent on one’s genes, or other set factors, such as 
personality traits or cultural factors. Such explanations can be summarized in the so called set 
point theory (Veenhoven, 2009, p. 9). While this is true to a certain extent, the level of 
happiness does also depend on one’s context, which may be influenced. To illustrate by 
analogy: Body height is a question of heredity, yet, on average, people nowadays are taller 
than 200 years ago, due to differing circumstances such as secure nutrition (Layard, 2003, p. 
20). 
Additionally, humans may compare themselves against a socially constructed standard of the 
good life. This is the so called ‘comparison theory’, arguing against measuring happiness 
(Veenhoven, 2009, p. 12). However, empirical studies show, as mentioned above, that 
material success/income augmentation is relatively weakly correlated with life satisfaction. 
Although this may be due to context shift, such a weak correlation is not true for 
achievements with family for instance. Also, married people are on average happier than 
single people despite their new frame of comparison, and this difference holds over time 
(Veenhoven, 2009, p. 13f). 
There are a number of serious points of criticism concerning measuring Life Satisfaction for 
policy making purposes. One serious issue with the idea of measuring happiness may be that 
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measuring happiness may conflict with other values such as justice, duty, or equality 
(Samman, 2007, p. 33). 
It may therefore be used to cover up other serious policy issues. Thus for instance, it has been 
claimed that Bhutan introduced its measuring programme Gross National Happiness (GNH), 
a scheme attempting to measure progress in different dimensions, such as environmental
sustainability, education, health, living standards, governance, community vitality and 
psychological wellbeing (Bates, 2009, p. 11) in a time of economic decline and high youth 
employment, to demonstrate the country’s healthy state and cover up such problems
(Whitecross, 2011, pc). It may be important to bear in mind however, that GNH is a relatively 
broad set of indicators such that in the case of this measurement, covering up negative 
developments may not be as easy. 
Britain’s conservative Tory party considered the HPI for their country, possibly to cover hard 
social security cuts (see for instance Sky News, 2008) and so did Sarkozy in France (see for 
instance The Ecologist, 2009). Veenhoven finds no correlation between income inequality, 
state welfare and happiness (Veenhoven 2005, p. 61) – this may again point towards 
happiness indices covering up important questions of justice. It may need to be considered 
that careful survey design is particularly important with a topic as sensitive as happiness (see 
the section on data above) – research that is not conducted rigorously may easily be ‘pushed’ 
towards desired results. 
While ca. 75% of happiness variance among nations may be explained by objective quality of 
life factors (Veenhoven, 2009, p. 14), it may not be possible to cover up very serious 
problems a country may have such as severe and constant human rights violation, war, very 
poor health care or constant persecution. An unpopular decision or more minor crisis may be 
covered up, however, especially when using a survey that had been conducted prior or just 
after that measure so that it did not yet take into account its full effect. In short, measuring 
happiness could undermine democratic processes, especially, if ideologies from which a part 
of the population derives satisfaction but which is harmful to other parts are at the forefront 
(i.e. fascism) (Samman, 2007, p.33). 
Samman argues to use Life Satisfaction happiness indices mainly as complementing and 
informative indices of what constitutes a good life, but should not play the decisive policy 
role. On a micro level however, it can be indicative of what matters to people. It may not be 
government’s role to make citizens happy, but they can influence things like the level of 
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direct democracy and further social cohesion, both of which are positively correlated with life 
satisfaction. In those respects, Life Satisfaction research could complement particular anti-
poverty policies (Samman, 2007, p.36ff).
A further important issue to take into consideration when looking at the question of happiness 
is Layard’s point that competitiveness and rankings are unhealthy (Layard, 2003, p. 12). If 
that is indeed so, should another ranking according to happiness really be created? Or might 
this spark an unhealthy competition for the happiest nation, motivating people to state they are 
happy when their competition for happiness actually makes them unhappy or when 
circumstances are in fact worsening, just to move up in the ranking? 
There are more issues to be considered when assessing how happy a nation or an individual is 
as this is an arguably complex topic. Due to scope limitations, not all important dimensions 
and issues can be given here. For a relatively comprehensive overview see for instance Frey
& Stutzer 2002, p. 1ff, Layard 2010, p. 534f, Veenhoven 2009, p. 1ff or Samman 2007, p. 4ff.
The Ecological Footprint
Since it does not have as many philosophical implications as the question of (measuring) 
happiness, most of the EF’s strengths and weaknesses have already been mentioned in the 
section assessing data the EF relies on.
Its core weakness is probably its tendency to underreport humanity’s demand on the earth’s 
biocapacity as well as general data weaknesses. 
Its core strength on the other hand, may be its relatively illustrative approach: Measuring 
resource demand in global hectares allows for the image of the ‘number of earths’ required for 
sustaining current consumption patterns. 
Its other core strength, especially when looking at individual nations’ EF’s is its illustration of 
the inequality of resource consumption on the earth, as shown in the country example above 
in the section describing the EF. This may link back to questions of poverty, fairness and 
finally to distribution and thus to the question of who has the power to decide who consumes 
what as well as the implications this has for the survival of a majority of people: Practically 
all so called developed nations have a footprint which, if all nations acquired it, would call for 
between two and five earths instead of one (Malta is the Western country with the lowest EF, 
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‘only’ needing two earths), while most countries of the so called developing world would 
need less than one earth or maximum two earths (Abdallah, et al, p. 61). And this has not yet 
touched upon the question of leaving space for non-human life on earth.
Evaluating the Index in Total
In order to assess the validity and necessity of the HPI (while not considering the Post-
Development Discourse yet) all points of criticism as well as merit from the individual 
indicators comprising the index need to be taken into account. 
Measuring life satisfaction to a certain extend meets criteria of validity, reliability and 
consistency if surveys are designed carefully and data is available for all nations. To a limited 
extent this is the case for the HPI in 2009, although the effect of post-hoc regressions need to 
be considered. Data availability should however be extended to having the same survey 
question for all nations included in the ranking. The main issues life satisfaction faces are the 
intercomparability across nations, respondents’ bias due to different wording as well the abuse 
of happiness measures to cover up current problems a country may have: despite alleged 
correlation with other objective criteria it should be validated taking other measures into 
account. 
The main issue with the Ecological Footprint is its tendency to overrate the availability of the 
biocapacity on earth, along with problems of data availability, especially for poor countries. 
On the other hand, it is illustrative in measuring resource demand in terms of global hectares 
and it sheds light on the inequality of resource use across nations. 
While Life Expectancy is regarded as a good measure of progress since it depends on a 
number of conditions which are expected to influence quality of life, its main issue is its 
omission of quality of life which is remedied by the Life Satisfaction component. 
In order to evaluate the HPI over all, taking the individual points of criticism and merit into 
account may not be enough. It is also important to assess whether mixing those three 
indicators together to form a composite index is valid and necessary. 
As mentioned in the description, the merit of the HPI lies in including an environmental 
criterion as part of the index, making it in a sense more holistic, since social and economic 
development may in the end rely upon resources available. Furthermore, instead of including 
an economic criterion such as income, it looks at one which considers ends and not means, 
namely Life Satisfaction as well as Life Expectancy. 
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However, Life Satisfaction and particularly the Ecological Footprint are in themselves quite 
complex, either through the philosophical implications (Life Satisfaction) or due to their 
calculation methods and what they take into account (EF). Each brings with itself certain 
imprecision, data shortcomings and other concerns mentioned above. 
Including them in one composite index may make this one index particularly complex. While 
the ranking and thoughts behind it are relatively easy to understand, going deeper and 
attempting to unravel problems and merits is relatively complicated. 
Furthermore, the problems each single indicator brings with it may be multiplied due to their 
combination. It is therefore particularly important to look for sources of uncertainty, 
imprecision and data problems when considering the HPI, as well as bearing in mind some of 
the broader issues such as overreporting of biocapacity, intercomparability among nations or 
using Life Satisfaction to cover up other problematic policy fields or decisions. In fact, 
authors of the Ecological Footprint mention particularly that each parameter for a sustainable, 
good life should be considered separately so that one is not achieved at the expense of 
another:
“There are many important parameters for building a sustainable world, each of which need to be 
illuminated separately since there is no magic formula that defines ‘optimal trade-offs’ among 
them. For sustainability, we need to achieve both ecological health as well as social well-being, 
and achieving one at the expense of the other is inherently unsustainable” (Mathis Wackernagel, et 
al., 2005, p. 28). 
This is an important point of criticism in my mind. Yet, the very idea of the HPI is to show in 
a single index, whether a country is capable of providing a good life for its citizens without 
requiring more resources than available. This idea may have considerable validity and be also 
quite necessary in a world where income augmentation still seems to have priority. It may be 
vital to consider the outcomes of each of the HPI’s components and not merely the number 
arising from combining all three. This is particularly important when comparing outcomes for 
the top and bottom 5 countries between the HPI in 2006 and 2009 (see table 7 & 8 below). 
Results vary somewhat (there is an overlap of 3 countries) and it may be assumed that this is 
in part due to the improved data quality where Life Satisfaction is concerned (see section 
4.3.2 above).
On another note, it might be worthwhile considering what would happen if a country, 
especially one with economic importance such as the UK, would consider only the HPI as a 
measure of progress and not the GDP per Capita anymore. While this might be highly 
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beneficial for happiness and ecology, the country might lose influence on the international 
agenda, where a nation’s importance is still mainly assessed according to its economic 
performance. Thus, implementing an alternative measure of progress faces the social dilemma 
that no single country, especially if it is economically strong, will implement it on its own, if 
it cannot be sure that the others will follow. 
After having given an overview over current criticism regarding the HPI and its dimensions, 
the following section will evaluate this index in the light of the particular theoretical approach 
chosen for this paper, the Post Development Theory. 
4.3.3 Evaluating the HPI in the Light Post-Development Theory
Sachs argues that the promises that economic development will spread across global space, 
improve human destiny and continue for ever in time have turned stale. The aspiration of 
catching up with the rich has ended in a blunder of planetary proportions. Economic growth 
has often failed to reach its objective which was to alleviate the burden of the poor, the wealth 
generated rarely trickled down to the poor (Sachs, 2000, p. 13f).
Ecology and poverty both call for limits of development. Peace with nature requires peace in 
economic warfare (Sachs, 1993, p. 7). 
According to Sachs, models of well-being that leave only a light footprint on earth are needed. 
There will be no equity without ecology in the 21st century (Sachs, 2010d, p. xii). 
However, the root of ecological problems is, according to Sachs, the Western competitive 
productivism. Environmental problems are a civilizational problem – namely that the current 
level of productive performance in the North is not viable, especially if repeated by the rest of 
the world. Yet these problems are treated as technical issues. Rather, what would be needed 
are fundamental debates on how society should live and what, how much and in what way it 
should produce and consume. Instead, Western aspirations are taken for granted in the entire 
world. This notion of development refers to Escobar’s description of the development 
discourse which becomes self-enforcing and so all-encompassing that alternatives become 
unimaginable. 
It could be argued that the HPI is attempting to do this: It goes beyond the notion of economic 
development and started a debate about the way society should live, how and what to 
consume, by showing that if this aspect was considered, Western countries would not 
necessarily lead ranking tables any longer. 
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It includes an ecological criterion, thus challenging common notions of development and the 
criterion of Life Satisfaction, thus aiming to let people speak for themselves about their 
quality of life, allowing for a certain degree of diversity of livelihoods, as Sachs mentioned. 
It is an index, however, composed of indicators. Thus, also with the HPI, choices as to which 
aspects to include and which to leave out are made. For instance, instead of the Ecological 
Footprint, the Genuine Progress Indicator may have been used, thereby including an 
economic component. Thus, simply by being what it is, the HPI does display a certain degree 
of arbitrariness and suggests a way to live a life and to form a society. 
Furthermore, it does produce a ranking. Hence, it does suggest that some countries overall 
fare better than others, possibly assuming one way towards progress and thus a form of 
coloniality, as Sachs and Escobar have pointed out. 
Yet, it includes a subjective criterion where the people themselves may express their views to 
a certain extend instead of being subjected to seemingly neutral measurement. This may 
qualify for the index to go beyond development, in Escobar’s sense: 
In order to go beyond development, it is important to single it out as encompassing cultural 
space and to separate oneself from it by perceiving in it in new form (Escobar, 1995, p. 6). 
In a way, the HPI may lead to perceiving development in a new form, namely through 
including an ecological criterion, highlighting the environmentally destructive potential of 
‘Western’ development.
To go not only beyond alternative modernities but to alternatives to modernity may be 
possible by a network of local histories. Furthermore it is vital to refract modernity through 
the lens of coloniality, thus unfreezing the potential for thinking about the constitution of 
alternative local and regional worlds (Escobar, 2008, p. 167f).
order to go beyond development, it is important to single it out as encompassing cultural 
space and to separate oneself from it by perceiving in it in new form (Escobar, 1995, p. 6). 
In a way, the HPI may lead to perceiving development in a new form, namely through 
including an ecological criterion, highlighting the environmentally destructing potential of 
‘Western’ development.
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possible by a network of glocal histories. Furthermore it is vital to refract modernity through 
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the lense of coloniality, thus unfreezing the potential for thinking about the constitution of 
alternative local and regional worlds (Escobar, 2008, p. 167f).
Including Life Satisfaction may be an indicator, that this index is seeking what Escobar would 
call alternatives to modernities. However, the ranking it produces may be evidence that this is 
not the case. It may, however, be safe to say, that the HPI at least goes beyond development 
through its original approach, the inclusion of Life Satisfaction and the Ecological Footprint 
as well as through challenging the common notion of development where Western nations are 
found on top. 
Western hegemony leaves its imprint not only on economy and ecology, but on minds as well. 
In order to decolonize minds, it is vital to break with ‘development’ as a habit of thought. 
A reconceptualization is vital. Thus, for instance, it will not be possible to reconceptualize 
equity without recovering the diversity of prosperity. Equity needs to be delinked from 
economic growth and relinked to community- and culture-based notions of well-being. Also, 
according to Sachs, a search for less material notions of prosperity that make room for 
dimensions of self-reliance, community, art and spirituality are needed (Sachs, 2010d).
It could be argued that through including Life Satisfaction as a criterion, the HPI includes less 
material and more diverse notions of prosperity and helps ‘decolonizing the mind’ in Sachs’ 
sense. 
Sachs gives three ideas for a politics that advances: Regeneration, which calls for actualising 
the particular image of good society which is present in each culture, instead of an ideal 
progress and a common direction; unilateral self-restraint, which means that each country 
chooses their own path without economic or environmental burdens being pushed onto others, 
instead of interdependent growth; and the dialogue of civilizations, which refers to a search of 
peaceful and sustainable coexistence along with self-examination for each culture (Sachs, 
1993, p. 17).
While the HPI does include different images of the good society through Life Satisfaction and 
includes the call for self-restraint through the Ecological Footprint, it does point to a common 
direction through the produced ranking. However, at the same time it is this ranking which 
questions traditional notions of development by showing that with different criteria, different 
nations come out as being on top. 
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The next sections summarizes findings for the HPI and addresses the original research 
question posed at the beginning of this paper – the question of the validity and necessity of 
this index. 
4.3.4 Validity and Necessity of the Happy Planet Index
As with the two previous indices studied, the validity of the HPI depends upon whether it 
meets general claims to an indicator (see section 3.1), what theoretical context it is evaluated 
within (see section 2.2), what the policy aim (see section 3.2) is and what it claims to measure 
and be.
The Index is superficially simple and understandable, but once looked at from a closer angle, 
it is relatively complex, including a dimension with many philosophical implications and 
another one which is a relatively complex index itself (the EF). It thus meets the general 
indicator criteria only to a limited extent.
If looked at from the theoretical angle of enhancing economic growth, it is probably not valid 
since it does not include any income or other economic dimension. If it is evaluated from the 
angle of development thought needing to be flexible and include many dimensions, it is more 
likely to be so, since Life Satisfaction correlates with many other dimensions.
If it is to measure whether the planet is happy, the answer may be partially yes, since Life 
Satisfaction as well as an ecological criterion is included. However, the EF is, as mentioned 
before, a rather conservative index in that omits long term damage to ecosystems such as soil 
erosion or permanent biodiversity loss. Furthermore, its notion of ‘one earth’ for use excludes 
leaving space for non-human life on earth. 
If its claim is to measure happiness, the answer is, again, partially yes, if data limitations and 
international comparison limitations of measuring happiness are taken into account.
If its claim is to measure development, it faces similar problems as the other two indices, 
albeit to a lesser extent, in the author’s opinion: Even when including an individual and broad 
notion such as Life Satisfaction, the index does not cover all dimensions development may 
have, particularly when taking in account the diversity of development called upon by 
Escobar and Sachs. Life Satisfaction does not correlate with everything and consequently is 
not a substitute for everything. Additionally, correlation must not be confused with causation. 
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Of course, as mentioned before, no index can cover all different dimensions of development 
and the diversity this concept possesses and remain an index. Thus, it might be said that the 
HPI faces these challenges not because of the way it is composed but simply because it exists. 
If its claim is to start a debate about what development is and where humanity is headed to if 
following the Western path, it is the author’s opinion, that the index is fully successful. It 
sparked initial debate and continues to do so: Whenever reading reports or rankings, one can 
hardly escape the question of whether our ‘development’ is really a positive one. The graph 
below highlights this: G8 countries are compared according to their rank in GDP per capita 
(nom.), HDI, and HPI. The shorter the bars are, the higher is the given country’s rank. While 
G8 countries do well in GDP per capita and, with the exception of the Russian Federation, 
also in HDI, this is far from true in the HPI, mainly due to their high EF. 
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As to the necessity, as with the two cases before, this depends upon who it might be necessary 
for: For decision makers it might be an interesting and highly necessary warning, however, 
apart from some country considering it as an additional index, it does not seem to be taken up 
on a grand scale to re-consider development. 
For reconsidering development as well as for including the peoples’ voice, it may be highly 
necessary. Yet, it is not the first attempt to do so, and if considering that current notions of 
development do not seem to change radically, it is not certain whether the index succeeded –
this does, however, not unconditionally question its necessity. Rather, it may highlight the 
strength of the development discourse as pointed out by Escobar and Sachs. 
Source: Design by author, according to data from World Bank 2011a; UNDP 2010, p. 143ff; Abdallah et al 2009, p. 61.
Figure 6: G8 countries compared for GDP 2010 (nom.), HDI 2010 & HPI 2009
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5. Conclusion
This paper evaluated indices according to their data and dimensions, but specifically in the 
light of Post Development Theory. The theoretical approach chosen highlighted that the 
legitimacy, the validity and necessity of an index can vary depending on the theory within 
which it is seen. Post Development Theory would probably look very critical upon both GDP 
per Capita and even the HDI, although the latter is viewed as legitimate among public, media 
and policy makers and other theoretical approaches such as the one by Jeffrey Sachs with his 
book on ‘The End of Poverty’ may view it as highly necessary. But even the HPI, simply by 
being an index and producing a ranking may be viewed as critical by representatives of Post 
Development Theory. Such an approach hence highlighted that indices are not necessarily 
neutral having validity at all times, but do so only within particular mind sets.
This theoretical approach also highlighted the arbitrariness indices can have through the 
inclusion of certain dimensions, exclusion of others and their tendency to standardize, 
equalize and homogenize, to produce ‘the norm’ and make it necessary for everyone who 
differs from it to be ‘normalized’. Some of this is highlighted by the fact that different 
countries have different outcomes for different indices; hence their status of developed or 
developing may change. This is particularly true for the inclusion or exclusion of an 
ecological dimension into an index. Due to unsustainable consumption patterns particularly in 
many Western countries, such a criterion may change notions of developed and 
underdeveloped. 
In the graph below for instance the three countries that are number one in one of the three 
indices analysed in depth in this paper are compared as to their ranks in the other two indices. 
While the difference between GDP per capita (nom.) and HDI are given but rather moderate, 
the differences between GDP per capita and HPI and even between HDI and HPI are 
relatively big: Costa Rica would move from a country of medium development to the top of 
the ladder and the opposite is true for Norway and Luxemburg.
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Indices’ potential for arbitrariness is further highlighted by their political dimensions: As 
shown in chapter 3, indices may be used as tools and justification for aid allocation and choice 
of partner countries. Such a role may have been increased through pressure for aid 
effectiveness and increased ownership by partner countries by the PD.
Development is complex. As has been shown throughout the dissertation, in particular 
through approaches by Escobar and Sachs, it has been and continues to be used, standardized
and pressed into frameworks, theories, indices and numbers. And yet, it continues to mean 
different things throughout the world. Indices that simplify, standardize, homogenize, appear 
neutral and objective and yet have more arbitrary elements within them than is immediately 
visible (which may make them dangerous tools of power), do not help with that. Even, if they 
go beyond pure economic development, even if they claim to advance development as 
freedom, and even if they include indicators that have the West appear in a critical light and 
give the world a chance to express its subjective feeling of what it means to lead a satisfying 
life. The dilemma a development index faces here is the requirement for it to be inherently 
simple (otherwise, it might cease to be an index) and thus to work with averages and 
quantifications on the one hand, while at the same time attempting to measure and grasp 
something highly complex successfully on the other hand. Such a dilemma may be almost 
impossible to overcome for any index and its developers may need to choose between the 
two.
Figure 7: 3 countries compared for GDP 2010 (nom.), HDI 2010 & HPI
2009
Source: Design by author, according to data from World Bank 2011a; UNDP 2010, p. 143ff; Abdallah et al 2009, p. 61.
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Yet, the last mentioned index, the Happy Planet Index, can be regarded as the one most likely 
to have the potential to go beyond development, to show not only alternative developments
(as the HDI may do), but alternatives to development – due to the subjectivity included in it 
and due to its potentially explosive results – the West is no longer on top of the ranking. 
Development indices – Are they valid and necessary?
Development indices may be valid where we adhere to their respective ‘era of development 
thought’ well as within the general development discourse – development of a large part of 
the world is needed: GDP per capita at the emergence of ‘development’ where it was 
economic growth and industrialization, HDI as the attempt to go beyond this and to 
incorporate more dimensions when the great, often generalizing development approaches that 
called for sacrifice of freedom etc. in the name of development had failed and the HPI as an 
index of a new era, attempting to focus on ends, not means, to include well-being as well as 
ecological sustainability, as new concepts to be included into development thought.
Some indices may paint alternative ways of development from the perspective of the time of 
its emergence– for instance the HDI, contrary to GDP per Capita. Some may even show 
alternatives to development – such as the HPI with its emphasis on ecology and subjective 
well-being, moving away from standardized, seemingly objective criteria with which a 
country is to be assessed. 
Validity when remaining within the development discourse of deeming development 
necessary depends strongly on data quality and on the quality of indicators chosen, as well as 
on whether or not the claim meets the potential and outcome of the index. Validity is achieved 
only to a very limited extent for GDP per capita (where income augmentation, but not where 
general progress is concerned). 
It is achieved to a certain extent for the HDI if its claim is to go beyond GDP per capita 
measurement and to measure certain social aspects, but not if its claim is indeed to measure 
human development. Furthermore, a number of data limitations and formula revisions need to 
be taken into account. 
It is achieved for the HPI if its claim is to spark a debate about what development means and 
where we are headed to if continuing along the path of Western development, but only to a 
certain extent if its claim is to measure ‘development’ in its complexity. Furthermore, several 
data and other issues when measuring happiness and the EF need to be considered. 
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Once outside the development discourse as painted by the Post Development Theory, it is 
difficult for any index that produces a ranking, to lead the way to alternatives to development 
– for the ranking indicates an evolutionary scale – countries on the top (with most 
development indices and indicators these are Western countries) show the way, the rest are to 
follow. 
Are development indices necessary to measure development and progress? This depends upon 
which kind of development they aim to measure. Since trends seem to indicate that statistics 
and numbers may gain importance for decision making, it is certainly necessary to carefully 
choose and assess relevant indicators, or even to choose a ‘lesser evil’ or a ‘better’ index – the 
HDI over GDP for capita for instance. Moving within the development framework, these tools 
are also necessary for aiding decision making. 
Development indices and indicators are necessary if we continue in the tradition of believing 
in data and statistics as neutral tools – for then they may show failure or success of a certain 
development measure such as literacy rate, may serve as helpful tool when deciding upon aid 
allocation and indicate what notion of development is in use in a given country or region. 
They are furthermore necessary because only what matters gets measures – and what gets 
measured matters as long as we believe in the neutrality of the measurement. They may 
highlight success of certain policy measures and point towards problematic areas and 
unsuccessful policies. Thus, it may be satisfying to a certain extent that Zimbabwe, having 
been ruled by a dictator for decades, comes out at the bottom of both HDI and HPI.
Once we try to move beyond the idea of development, to find alternatives to development as 
Escobar and Sachs suggest, the question remains whether development indices are necessary, 
useful or rather are harmful to this process. Indices are tools for standardization and 
streamlining – even the HPI produces a ranking, although it falls out of line and may not be 
regarded as such a strong tool of strengthening the development discourse as GDP per Capita 
or even the HDI. 
Thus, the original question of whether development indices are valid and necessary or tools of 
power (asymmetries) and homogenization can be answered with yes and no: Yes, if we 
remain inside the development discourse, adhere to the development idea, to the idea of some 
parts of the world having to catch up in one way or the other and others leading the way, if we 
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believe in the explanatory power of data and statistics. Yes, also, since there may be a genuine 
need to measure single aspects of development such as Life Expectancy, to highlight the 
effects of such problems as HIV/AIDS. Yes also, since what gets measured does have a 
higher chance of getting addressed and thus what measures matters. 
Yes even to a certain extend if we move outside the development discourse if the index in 
question questions this very discourse as the HPI may be doing with its extraordinary ranking 
outcomes. 
No, if the aim is to move beyond the idea of development as an evolutionary, inevitable and 
identical process that all have to follow – for the idea behind this concept is to have many 
forms of development, many forms of beliefs, cultures, languages, ways of perceiving the 
world and ideas of what a good life is.   
6. Outlook
Further study would be necessary regarding the impact of development indices on 
development cooperation. What power does each index have over the allocation of funds? 
There are some studies available, but it would be interesting to see how, for instance, aid 
flows changed/did not change with data revisions and thus differences in ranking outcomes of 
the HDI.
Very interesting and necessary would be a media and meta-synthesis of the reflection about 
development indices. During my research, I encountered many studies on indices, 
development of new, ultimate indices, and sophisticated statistical measures. The handling of 
these indices by academia but also media should provide interesting insights into the trust 
placed in them. Of particular interest would be to implement a study on the reactions to the 
release of the Happy Planet Index in 2006 – many forms of media, newspapers, radio and 
Blogs in particular commented on it. The surprise, sometimes it even seemed, the scandal was 
great given that the common pattern of Western nations at top places seemed to be broken, 
and that instead countries like Vanuatu (of which barely anyone seemed to have ever heard), 
Colombia or Costa Rica inhabited the top places. It might reveal the self-image of the West as 
on top of the social evolution and the difficulty to let go of this idea.
A media analysis might also provide interesting insights where the importance of the different 
development indices and indicators in relation to one another is concerned: For a long time
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there have been many critical voices concerning, for instances, economic growth and GDP per 
capita as a development measure. Yet they continue to play a vital role where political 
decisions in the national as well as international sphere are concerned. This was last visible 
during the world financial crisis where governments appeared to be obsessed with getting 
economic growth rates up again. It would be interesting to study the trends of media and 
political attention to GDP per Capita and other indices and how they correlate/do not correlate
with current events in society. 
Furthermore, it might be interesting to assess whether in a globalized world where national 
governments appear to have less and less steering power, indices have any function left at all. 
How are they to be put to use if one main function is to compare nations with one another and 
these very nations continue to lose importance? 
Finally, it might be important to see a study critically reflect on the positive potential of 
development indices. For instance that indices may be able to measure parts of development, 
may be able to measure whether a framework for a decent life is given. Most things have two 
sides. Thus, indices may have a potential, they may be able to benefit humankind, particularly 
if used with caution and the recognition that they are not neutral tools but have emerged 
within a particular theoretical and historical context. 
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Abstract in English
Background: Measuring development or progress is increasingly important: Problems that
get measured have a higher chance of getting attention and thus getting addressed. 
Development Indices are tools with which development efforts are justified, and through
which development itself is defined.
To the best knowledge of the author, the particular scientific contribution of this paper lies in 
it being the first attempt to look at the validity and necessity of the idea of measuring 
development and the neutrality of the chosen indices both through a literature review 
criticizing data and dimensions included as well as a specific theory lense, namely Post 
Development Theory.  Additionally, it is the first attempt to compare the three chosen 
different development indices with one another through this theoretical approach and 
highlight through this the different development notion each represent as well as their 
potential for arbitrariness by having included different development dimensions and the 
different development statuses of nations that follows from such a choice. 
Method: This research is purely theoretical. It relies on literature analysis combined with a 
case study approach. Following a general overview over the history of development thought, 
and –indices as well as claims and ways for using them, three development indices are chosen 
and evaluated in depth: GDP per Capita, the Human Development Index (HDI) and the Happy 
Planet Index (HPI). They are assessed according to the quality of their data, according to the 
dimensions/indicators they consist of as well as an indicator in total. Especially, they are
assessed within the theoretical framework chosen for this paper. 
This theoretical framework consists in Post Development Theory and the theories of Arturo 
Escobar and Wolfgang Sachs in particular. This theoretical approach has been chosen due to 
its particularly critical attitude towards the concept of ‘development’. Exposing core tools of 
this concept to such scrutiny may therefore highlight their shortcomings but also there 
strengths, if even such a critical theoretical approach should find little fault with them. 
Results: Validity and necessity of the indices evaluated in general depend upon the 
theoretical lens, their claim and upon who and what they are supposed to be necessary for. 
When evaluated within the theoretical framework, particularly GDP per Capita is found to 
II
fortify development as homogenization. Additionally, if looking at the index’ claim of 
measuring progress in general, this index has only very limited validity or necessity. 
When evaluated within the theoretical framework, the HDI has some degree of validity and 
necessity since it helped shape a broader notion of development. It does, however, have 
homogenizing elements to it in that it is composed of indicators which standardize what 
health, education and wealth are. Furthermore, it produces a ranking, indicating, there is one 
‘evolutionary’ way towards progress. Its validity is also questioned by data quality 
shortcomings. 
The HPI also has some degree of validity and particularly necessity as it kindled a debate 
about notions of development and questioned the ‘Western’ path of development. There are 
some data limitations where Life Satisfaction and the Ecological Footprint are concerned.
Conclusion: Development indices by and large move within and fortify the ‘development 
discourse’ as described by Escobar. There are, however, differences as to their validity and 
necessity between them, which depend on theoretical approach and policy aims among others. 
Measuring development it its entirety may not be valid as it is too diverse and complex to 
measure with a single index, but measuring a part of it may have a certain degree of validity if 
the results are treated with the necessary caution. Development indices which highlight 
problematic aspects throughout the world, not merely in so called developing nations are 
especially necessary.
Abstract in German
Hintergrund: Entwicklung oder Fortschritt zu messen gewinnt zunehmend an Bedeutung. 
Problemgebiete die gemessen werden haben eine höhere Wahrscheinlichkeit, 
Aufmerksamkeit auf sich zu ziehen und gelöst zu werden. Entwicklungsindizes sind 
Werkzeuge, durch welche Entwicklungsbemühungen gerechtfertigt werden und durch welche 
Entwicklung selbst definiert wird. 
Nach bestem Wissen der Autorin liegt der besondere wissenschaftliche Beitrag der 
vorliegenden Arbeit darin, dass sie den erste Versuch darstellt, nicht nur das Datenmaterial 
von Entwicklungsindizes zu evaluieren, sondern die Idee Entwicklung zu messen an sich 
durch die Sichtweise der Post Development Theory zu evaluieren und in Frage zu stellen. Es 
ist der erste Versuch, Entwicklungsindikatoren durch die spezifisch Sichtweise der Post 
Development Theory zu betrachten und hierdurch hervorzuheben das Validität und 
Notwendigkeit von Entwicklungsindizes auch von dem jeweiligen theoretischen Standpunkt 
III
abhängt. Außerdem ist es weiterhin der erste Versuch, drei unterschiedliche 
Entwicklungsindizes durch den Blickwinkel dieser Theorie zu betrachten und miteinander zu 
vergleichen und hierdurch deren Potential für Willkürlichkeit hervorzuheben, aufgrund der 
Wahlmöglichkeiten was das Einbeziehen oder Ausschließen unterschiedlicher 
Entwicklungsdimensionen angeht und der daraus folgenden unterschiedlichen 
Entwicklungsstadien verschiedener Länder. 
Methodik: Die vorliegende Arbeit basiert auf rein theoretischer Forschung. Sie stützt sich auf 
eine Literaturanalyse sowie Fallstudien. Nach einem allgemeinen Überblick über 
Ideengeschichte der Entwicklungstheorie, sowie Ansprüche und Verwendung von diesen 
werden drei Entwicklungsindizes ausgewählt und tiefer gehend evaluiert: das BIP pro Kopf, 
der sog. ‚Human Development Index’ (HDI) und der sog. ‘Happy Planet Index’ (HDPI). 
Diese Indizes werden beurteilt anhand der Qualität ihres Datenmaterials, der 
Dimensionen/Indikatoren welche sie beinhalten, sowie als Index insgesamt. Vor allen Dingen 
aber werden sie evaluiert anhand des für diese Arbeit ausgewählten theoretischen Rahmens. 
Der theoretische Rahmen besteht in der sog. ‘Post Development Theory’ und speziell den 
Theorien von Arturo Escobar und Wolfgang Sachs. Dieser theoretische Ansatz wurde 
ausgewählt, da er eine besonders kritische Haltung zu dem Konzept ‘Entwicklung’ beinhaltet. 
Wenn Kernwerkzeuge dieses Konzepts einem solch kritischen Ansatz ausgewetzt werden, 
können deren Schwächen, sowie Stärken evtl. besonders gut hervorgehoben werden. 
Resultate: Validität und Notwendigkeit der hier evaluierten Indizes hängen von der 
spezifischen theoretischen Sichtweise, deren eigenem Anspruch sowie davon für wen und für 
was sie notwendig sein sollen ab.
Wenn innerhalb des Entwicklungsdiskurses with von Escobar und Sachs dargestellt bewertet, 
stellt sich besonders BIP pro Kopf als den Entwicklungsdiskurs bestärkend dar. Weiterhin hat 
dieser Index generell wenig Validität oder Notwendigkeit, da er oft als Messinstrument von 
generellem Fortschritt dargestellt wird, diesem Anspruch aber kaum gerecht werden kann. 
Wenn der HDI innerhalb des theoretischen Rahmens evaluiert wird, so besitzt er einen 
gewissen Grad an Validität und Notwendigkeit, da er dazu beitrug, eine weitere Fassung von 
Entwicklung als bloßen ökonomischen Fortschritt zu kreieren. Auch dieser Index besitzt 
jedoch einige homogenisierende Elemente, da er aus Indikatoren besteht, welche Bildung, 
Gesundheit und Reichtum standardisieren. Weiterhin kann er seinem eigenen Anspruch, 
menschliche Entwicklung zu messen nicht gerecht werden. Außerdem produziert er ein 
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Ranking welches indiziert, dass es nur eine ‚Evolution’ hin zu mehr Entwicklungsfortschritt 
gibt. Was Datenmaterial angeht, so kann Qualität und Verfügbarkeit nicht immer garantiert 
werden. 
Auch der HPI hat einem gewissen Grad an Validität und besonders Notwendigkeit da er eine 
Debatte über Konzepte von Entwicklung entfacht und den westlichen Entwicklungsweg in 
Frage gestellt hat. Einige Einschränkungen was Datenmaterial bei Lebenszufriedenheit und 
Ökologischem Fußabdruck angeht bestehen jedoch. 
Fazit: Entwicklungsindizes bewegen sich im Allgemeinen innerhalb des 
Entwicklungsdiskurses wie von Escobar beschrieben und untermauern diesen. Es gibt jedoch 
Unterschiede was deren Validität und Notwendigkeit angeht. Validität und Notwendigkeit 
hängen weiterhin von theoretischem Rahmen und politischer Absicht ab. Entwicklung in ihrer 
Gesamtheit zu messen hat kaum Validität, da sie zu komplex und divers ist um sie mit einem 
einzigen Index zu messen. Teile von ihr zu messen hat jedoch möglicherweise einen gewissen 
Grad an Validität wenn die entsprechenden Resultate mit der notwendigen Vorsicht 
gehandhabt werden.
Entwicklungsindikatoren welche problematische Aspekte in der ganzen Welt, und nicht nur  
in den so genannten Entwicklungsländern hervorheben sind besonders notwendig. 
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Rankings – GDP per Capita
Table 1a: Ranking GDP per capita 2006-2010
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XSource: (The World Bank, 2011a).
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Rankings – HDI 
Table 2a: Ranking HDI 2010
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GDP per Capita in $US, 2009. Source: (UNDP, 2010a, p. 143ff).
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Rankings - HPI
Table 3a: Ranking HPI 20006
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Source: (Marks, Abdallah, Simms, & 
Thompson, 2006, p. 57).
Table 4a: Ranking HPI 2009
XVI
Source: (Abdallah, Sam Thompson, Michaelson, Marks, & Steuer, 2009, p. 61).
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